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Broadridge Financial Solutions

US · BR #985 by market cap Listed 1970
181.41 -0.53 -0.29%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Below fair value
239.29 fair value ≈ 303.23 367.15
  • Implied fair-value range of 239.29-367.15, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is -40.2% below the average-multiple fair value of 303.23.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 7.85 Cheap vs history 15th percentile
5-year average 9.94 · #75 of 76 in Information Technology Services
P/E ratio 20.09 Cheap vs history 14th percentile
5-year average 31.59 · forward 19.13 · #30 of 39 in Information Technology Services
P/S ratio 2.72 Cheap vs history 12th percentile
5-year average 3.45 · forward 2.58 · #56 of 80 in Information Technology Services

Vs. peers Information Technology Services

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Broadridge Financial Solutions (BR) 20.52B 20.09 7.85 2.21%
IBM Corp (IBM) 212.12B 19.10 5.97 3.00%
Accenture (ACN) 131.82B 16.31 4.18 2.95%
Infosys (INFY) 48.73B 15.04 4.72 4.36%
Fiserv (FISV) 29.73B -7.56 1.41 0.00%
Cognizant (CTSH) 25.95B 10.59 1.76 2.24%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value212.00 Economic moatWide UncertaintyMedium Capital allocationStandard

Trading 16.9% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

In its seasonally soft fiscal first quarter, Broadridge reported revenue of $1.67 billion, up 5%, and adjusted EPS growth of 3%. Recurring fee revenue grew 9% organically, while event-driven fees declined $46 million from an elevated prior-year result. Broadridge reaffirmed its full-year outlook.

Why it matters: Recurring revenue grew 11%, or 9% organically, driven by strong position growth in the investor communication solutions segment and solid results in the global technology and operations segment. Adjusted operating margin declined year over year, which we attribute to lower event-driven ICS revenue. Billable equity position grew 11% (16% including nonbillable positions) and fund positions (mutual fund and ETF) grew 16%. While timing contributed to fund position growth, the firm’s testing indicates high-single-digit growth for the rest of the year, which suggests upside to the 6% we modeled and the 6% seen in fiscal 2026. GTO revenue grew 13%, or 10% organically. We estimate organic revenue growth of about 6% excluding higher term license revenue, which can be lumpy. We view this as a solid result, especially as internal trade volume growth of 7% was not elevated.

The bottom line: Overall, we maintain our fair value estimate of $212 per share on wide-moat Broadridge.

Key stats: Adjusted operating margin in the quarter was 13.8%, down from 15.8%. We attribute the decline to lower event-driven revenue. Because the firm’s margins are higher in the second half of the year due to proxy season, we believe its 21% outlook for fiscal 2027 is attainable. ICS operating margins (excluding acquisition amortization) declined to 9.5% from 12.1% last year. GTO margins of 25.5% were up from 23.6% in the year-ago quarter. Broadridge is bullish on its artificial intelligence initiatives, noting $6 million in savings and a $25 million target for fiscal 2027. It’s unclear how much of these savings Broadridge will pass on to clients, and we see offshoring as a margin driver.

Broadridge’s retention rate of 98% continues to be strong. Broadridge noted zero losses to AI and zero losses in its crown jewel proxy business. By our estimates, Broadridge has approximately 95% market share of beneficial positions. As there is little upside from current levels, we model this decreasing slowly to 90% market share over our 10-year forecast period. We do not see much risk from Vanguard’s recent announcement to acquire Altruist, as we believe Vanguard and Altruist hold a relatively immaterial number of positions from Broadridge’s perspective. We understand that Vanguard’s brokerage unit currently uses Broadridge for proxy delivery, while Altruist uses competitor Mediant. Broadridge views tokenization as an opportunity arising from greater complexity and sees economics “equal to or superior to today’s model.” We still see many hurdles for tokenization, most notably generating issuer buy-in.

Broadridge took a $15.2 million restructuring charge in the quarter “in part” due to the firm’s AI and productivity initiatives. We are comfortable with our margin assumptions, which call for 21.0% margins in fiscal 2027 and 22.1% margins in fiscal 2031. On an adjusted EBITDA basis and net of low-margin distribution revenue, these numbers go from 35.7% in fiscal 2027 to 36.6% in fiscal 2031. Broadridge’s proxy disclosures indicate it has been leaning into offshoring. Based on these disclosures, 42% of its workforce was in the US as of April 30, 2026, down from 47% as of April 30, 2023. Our bias is that Broadridge can continue to lean into offshoring. First, we note the appointment of Broadridge’s chief growth and strategy officer in March 2026, who has experience in McKinsey’s outsourcing and offshoring practice. Second, we note that many of Broadridge’s financial services clients have been leaning into offshoring. For more on this topic, clients can view our Sept. 18 special report, “Information Services: How Many Jobs Can Move Offshore?”

Fair value

After adjusting our valuation model, we are decreasing our fair value estimate to $212 from $250 as we take a more probabilistic approach to the firm’s governance business. Changes to the firm’s governance business are mostly likely either neutral or negative to Broadridge. While we believe the neutral outcomes are much more probable, we believe it is prudent to take a haircut to Broadridge’s revenue. While tokenization of equities could be neutral, it could also be a negative if it changes the recordkeeping architecture. In addition, Broadridge’s fees on mutual fund and ETF interims could eventually face a haircut, though these fees have been going down in real terms, as they do not adjust for inflation and went into effect in January 2014.

We peg the firm's weighted average cost of capital assumption at 7.8%. Our discounted cash flow-based fair value estimate translates to approximately 23 times our fiscal 2027 GAAP earnings per share estimate (and 20 times our non-GAAP EPS estimate, which excludes special items and the amortization of acquired intangibles).

Over the next five years, we expect organic revenue growth of about 5% and Broadridge to earn about half of its profit from its governance (proxy and interim communication) franchise. We expect its equity position growth to be about 10% in the medium term, driven by managed accounts. Because Broadridge earns the same fee if a beneficial owner owns 10 shares or 1,000 shares, it is the number of positions that matters, and we expect total positions to be robust through a variety of market conditions. Because pricing is regulated, we expect it to be flat.

Given the scalability of Broadridge’s business model, we expect the investor communication solutions segment's operating margins (net of distribution revenue) to be in the 34%-37% range during our 10-year forecast period. In the global technology and operations segment, we expect mid-single-digit organic revenue growth. On a firmwide basis, we expect non-GAAP operating margin expansion of about 30 basis points per year.

Economic moat

Overall, we believe Broadridge merits a Wide Morningstar Economic Moat Rating based primarily on switching costs. In addition, we believe the firm’s regulatory communication has a scale-based cost advantage. Broadridge exhibits many of the characteristics of firms with switching costs as a moat source, such as a high amount of recurring revenue (over 90% of fee revenue is recurring revenue, and revenue retention rates are typically about 97%-98%). Broadridge’s regulatory communication business, whereby it delivers proxy and interim communications to US security holders in the “street name,” is its crown jewel, in our view, and the source of its wide moat, in our view.

Broadridge is the market-leading player in the proxy and interim communication business. Most securities in the United States are held in the street name of brokerages rather than directly under the name of the end investor, and as a result, issuers (whether they be corporate issuers, exchange-traded funds, or mutual funds) can’t directly communicate with their beneficial owners. Communication and proxy voting have to be coordinated with the broker/dealer, the issuer, and the beneficial owner; virtually all broker/dealers hire Broadridge to serve as a third-party agent to handle this role. Broadridge processes over 80% of outstanding shares.

Broadridge’s view has been that tokenized shares will continue to have the same governance requirements. Broadridge’s signing of Ondo, which offers tokenized US equities to non-US persons with similar fee schedules, supports this. That said, it’s likely that a pass-through voting position generates lower fees than a beneficial position. We view tokenization as primarily being incremental for non-US investors; we do not believe that tokenization will cannibalize liquid and mature asset classes such as US equities.

By law, issuers must reimburse broker/dealers for the costs of forwarding proxy materials. The maximum fees are set forth by the proxy voting review committee, a self-regulating organization with oversight from the Securities and Exchange Commission. Because there is no incentive to charge below the maximum fees, in practice, the maximum fees are the fees charged to issuers, and some of the revenue is shared with the broker/dealer. We believe switching costs arise from Broadridge’s multiyear contracts and client inertia.

We also believe that Broadridge’s corporate issuer clients view proxy fees as a cost of being public, as it is relatively immaterial to their bottom line. For example, McDonald’s disclosed that it has about 5 million beneficial owners; at Broadridge’s average of approximately $1 per delivery, this becomes $5 million in fee expenses for McDonald’s. Likewise, we believe micro- or small-cap companies have only a fraction of the shareholders, so they face fees of $20,000-$50,000. As a result, we don’t expect corporate issuers to spend much time or money lobbying to have proxy delivery fees reduced. If there is one area of greater risk, it would be in the mutual fund interim business, where clients are more concentrated and more concerned about their expenses.

Broadridge’s competitors include Mediant Communications, which we believe has only a small handful of clients, such as Janney Montgomery Scott and Interactive Brokers. In addition, Robinhood uses Say Technologies, which it acquired. Overall, we believe these competitors have very limited market share. We believe that because of Broadridge’s scale, it has a cost advantage and can offer an attractive revenue share with the broker/dealer. In addition, by having many broker/dealer clients, Broadridge earns an additional fee for householding proxies.

We understand that Broadridge’s contracts with broker/dealers are typically five to seven years. Another barrier is the “nobody ever got fired for going with IBM” mindset as it applies to Broadridge. The service Broadridge provides is a regulatory necessity, but is relatively undifferentiated and not a big driver for the broker/dealers, so inertia tends to be there.

From its proxy and interim communication business, Broadridge has developed mailing, technology, and processing capabilities and has leveraged these capabilities to provide other services. An example of this would be mailing out trade confirmations for broker/dealers. To corporate issuer clients, Broadridge provides analytics, registered shareholder solutions (for the minority of shareholders who still hold their shares directly), and virtual shareholder meeting capabilities. Overall, we believe these other services have a narrow moat based on switching costs from client inertia and the time/resources to find a new solution.

Broadridge’s global technology and operations segment provides securities processing solutions for capital markets, wealth management, and asset management firms. Broadridge provides solutions that automate the securities transaction lifecycle including data aggregation, performance reporting, cash management, reconciliation, and other services. Broadridge's solutions include desktop productivity tools, data aggregation, performance reporting, reconciliation, and other solutions. We believe Broadridge primarily competes with in-house solutions as well as FIS (SunGard). The biggest risk, in our view, would be a customer loss due to mergers and acquisitions. For example, Broadridge lost E-Trade as a client due to the latter's acquisition by Morgan Stanley. In 2021, Broadridge acquired Itiviti, a provider of trading technology to buy-side and sell-side firms. Similar to other business process outsourcing companies and software companies, we believe the switching costs stem from process disruption and the time/resources needed to onboard to a new solution. The wealth management deal with UBS was signed in late 2018, but it took until fiscal 2024 for Broadridge to recognize the bulk of this revenue.

Bull case

Broadridge has a dominant market share position in delivering proxies and interims to beneficial shareholders. Direct indexing and the rise of retail investing can support position growth beyond consensus expectations.

During the financial crisis, Broadridge’s equity position count was down only 2% in 2009, indicating that its business model is recession-resistant.

Broadridge’s global technology and operations offerings are sticky, and with the move toward outsourcing, the firm should be able to grow faster than the addressable market.

Bear case

Broadridge’s fees are set by the NYSE proxy working group, which is overseen by the SEC. A fee review could have a negative impact. In addition, asset managers continue to face fee pressures and may be more mindful of regulatory fees in Broadridge's mutual fund and ETF interim business.

As Broadridge expands via acquisitions, it may enter businesses more competitive than its proxy and interim communications business.

Emerging infrastructure and technology such as tokenized equities could have a negative impact on Broadridge's proxy and securities processing business.

By Rajiv Bhatia, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:32 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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