FEDEX FREIGHT HOLDING CO INC
- Market cap
- 16.97B
- P/E (TTM)i
- 25.91
- P/Bi
- -34.14
- EPSi
- 4.38
- Div yieldi
- 0.00%
- 52W posi
- 7%
Anonymous reader poll. Unscientific, not investment advice.
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 117.62-159.62, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is -18.1% below the average-multiple fair value of 138.62.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Integrated Freight & Logistics
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FEDEX FREIGHT HOLDING CO INC (FDXF) | 16.97B | 25.91 | -34.14 | 0.00% |
| United Parcel Service (UPS) | 78.52B | 17.15 | 5.21 | 7.11% |
| FedEx (FDX) | 68.41B | 15.58 | 2.16 | 2.01% |
| Expeditors International (EXPD) | 24.81B | 27.78 | 11.71 | 0.83% |
| JB Hunt Transport Services (JBHT) | 20.91B | 31.67 | 5.72 | 0.80% |
| C.H. Robinson Worldwide (CHRW) | 15.77B | 25.80 | 9.69 | 1.86% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 4.8% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Despite sluggish industrial sector demand, FedEx Freight's fiscal fourth-quarter 2026 (ended May) top line grew 5% year over year, driven by higher yields (revenue per hundredweight, including fuel). Profitability deteriorated, but that was not a surprise.
Why it matters: All-in yield rose 11% on a jump in fuel surcharges. Even so, management still expects core yields to accelerate in the year ahead on more focused stand-alone revenue-quality initiatives after the June 1 spinoff from FedEx. Tonnage fell 3%, though the firm noted sequential hints of demand improvement. Using its legacy reporting structure as a FedEx segment, Freight's adjusted operating ratio (expenses/revenue; lower is better) deteriorated materially (to 84.9%), due to lower tonnage and spinoff-related investments, including the salesforce buildout, IT infrastructure overhaul, and duplicative operating costs like transition service agreements. Even so, we still expect positive operating leverage (return of volume growth), network refinements, and the roll-off of spinoff-transition costs to drive material profitability progress in the years ahead.
The bottom line: While the fiscal fourth quarter was mostly in line with our forecasts, we expect to lift our $102 fair value estimate by 5%-8% due to modestly boosting our midcycle margin assumptions to give the firm more credit for longer-term network productivity gains. Barring a tariff- or oil shock-driven economic pullback, we expect tonnage growth to return in the second half of calendar 2026 on recovering industrial end markets. We also assume the rational less-than-truckload industry pricing backdrop persists and Freight's revenue quality efforts start to lift its yield profile. Relative to our longer-term revenue, margin, and free cash flow forecasts, shares are overvalued and appear to be pricing for perfection, creating a high bar for execution. This is a common theme across the LTL names we cover, including Old Dominion, Saia, and XPO.
Fair value
We are raising our DCF-derived fair value estimate for FedEx Freight to $108 per share, from $102, due to modestly boosting our mid-cycle margin assumptions to give the firm more credit for longer-term network productivity gains.
LTL industry demand deteriorated materially in FedEx Freight’s fiscal 2024 (ended May 2024), driven by retail sector destocking and the onset of soft industrial end markets. FedEx Freight’s total revenue fell 7%, but that would have been even worse if not for the mid-2023 Yellow bankruptcy, which tightened the LTL supply/demand equation, bolstering carriers’ pricing power. We estimate the firm's adjusted operating ratio (expenses/revenue; lower is better) remained mostly steady in fiscal 2024 (near 81.4%, by our estimate) thanks in part to terminal closures aimed at improving network productivity. Note that our historical OR calculations include estimated corporate cost allocations from FedEx but exclude pro forma incremental public company costs that emerged after the June 1 spinoff. Our post-spin forecasts do, however, reflect our preliminary take on those costs.
In fiscal 2025, FedEx Freight’s top line fell about 5.5%, as the LTL demand backdrop remained sluggish, only partly offset by lingering benefits from Yellow’s exit. Core rate-setting conditions across the industry remained mostly favorable, save for the onset of tough year-over-year comps. LTL supply and demand were less imbalanced than the truckload sector throughout fiscal 2025. FedEx Freight’s adjusted OR worsened to 84.2% on lost leverage from lower revenue (lost network density)—a common theme across the industry.
While stable, underlying industry demand hasn’t seen an upward inflection over the past year as on-again, off-again tariffs prolonged weakness across many industrial and residential construction end markets while tempering retailer restocking activity. For fiscal 2026 (ended in May), we look for FedEx Freight’s revenue to decline 2%-2.5% on a low-single-digit tonnage decline, partly offset by slightly higher all-in yield. We expect FedEx Freight’s OR (excluding spinoff transaction costs) to deteriorate to a depressed 89%, partly due to cost/wage inflation and lost leverage from lower volumes. It also reflects elevated investments to bolster FedEx Freight’s competitive positioning, including the dedicated salesforce buildout and an IT infrastructure overhaul.
Following the June spinoff, FedEx Freight will switch to a December calendar year-end. Our model forecasts follow that pattern to the best of our ability with limited pro forma historicals to reference. Barring a tariff- or oil-shock-driven economic pullback, we expect slight year-over-year tonnage growth to return in the second half of calendar 2026 on a potential cyclical uptick in retailer restocking and recovering industrial end markets. Our forecasts for the next several years also assume rational LTL pricing conditions persist, FedEx Freight’s efforts to penetrate higher-margin healthcare and grocery end markets bear fruit, and the firm avoids losing material share as it unwinds contracts previously bundled with FedEx’s parcel offering. We forecast 1%-2% revenue growth in calendar 2026, with 5%-6% recovery in calendar 2027.
Uncertainty surrounding post-spinoff cost structure run rates is elevated, but we assume an approximate 89% adjusted OR in calendar 2026, improving to 87.2% in 2027. FedEx Freight will see the onset of spinoff-related dis-synergies in June 2026 (duplicative corporate-related costs and higher insurance costs, for example), but we expect increasing benefits from positive operating leverage and network refinements—including nascent efforts to raise revenue quality, boost dock visibility, and minimize linehaul miles—in the years ahead. We forecast incremental gains to around 86% in 2028 and 85.0%-85.5% in 2029. This compares with management’s 85% OR (15% margin) target by 2029.
Economic moat
FedEx Freight is a solidly profitable LTL carrier, but we hesitate to award an economic moat. We suspect the firm has the building blocks of a narrow moat, given the high barriers to entry in LTL shipping, coupled with solid pro forma ROICs (by our calculations). However, FedEx Freight’s results are bolstered by the pandemic-driven volume surge and the 2023 Yellow bankruptcy. Additionally, the firm’s independent cost structure and execution haven’t been fully tested.
From a bigger picture perspective, LTL trucking is asset-intensive (requiring real estate, terminals, and tractors) and there are limited opportunities to differentiate over the long run. In our view, most high-quality operators struggle to carve out a durable competitive edge through common transportation moats. The one exception is Old Dominion, which has uniquely built a lane density advantage. In transportation, moats are more common in asset-light third-party logistics, where network effects can create value, or among global express carriers and railroads, both of which benefit from economies of scale or cost advantages.
It is true that entry barriers in LTL shipping are substantially higher than those found in the more fragmented full-truckload space. This is because of the need for a broad network of consolidation terminals and a large fleet of trucks. Thus, a new entrant would incur painful losses for an extended period due to minimal lane density—trucks would need to run but would not be full. As a result, the industry hasn’t seen many new entrants, and it’s somewhat concentrated, especially compared with the full-truckload sector. Thus, a handful of high-quality providers have managed to gain share, raise core pricing, improve mix, and produce meaningful economic profits on average over extended periods. However, most carriers have historically been hard-pressed to post economic profit over a full cycle, and even the best have seen capital returns erode rapidly during periods of plummeting demand and irrational rate setting (especially during the Great Recession).
It might appear that the high-fixed-cost nature of LTL operations should allow for enduring scale-based cost advantages or benefits from superior internal processes that optimize linehaul and pickup and delivery efficiency. However, although the process can take many years, network service reach and routines capable of maximizing quality and productivity can be replicated by well-capitalized competitors over time, and for most carriers, scale economies have proven insufficient over the full cycle.
There have been several trucking market pullbacks over the past decade, but the industry has not seen a major economic recession, with declines in both US goods spending and industrial production. In fact, although underlying freight demand retreated in 2023 (off the pandemic-driven surge), unfavorable demand trends persisted through 2025, and deterioration in carrier margins and ROICs (especially among large, high-quality carriers) was tempered by share gains and core pricing support linked to the Yellow bankruptcy.
It's also true that carriers have become more price- and capacity-disciplined since the Great Recession, but the magnitude of that progress hasn't truly been tested. We still think a major freight recession—one that hits retail and industrial end markets simultaneously—would materially reduce yields and returns on invested capital. That was evident throughout the Great Recession, when numerous struggling LTL carriers on the brink of collapse slashed prices to unmaintainable levels in a desperate attempt to grab volume and stay alive.
Bull case
FedEx Freight has built out a new dedicated salesforce focused on penetrating higher-margin customers in healthcare, grocery, and data center end markets.
The company's terminal rationalization efforts have helped lift its underlying margin potential in recent years.
E-commerce growth should provide incremental demand tailwinds for LTL carriers over the longer term—more frequent yet smaller shipments.
Bear case
Underlying demand across the LTL trucking industry will probably face lingering headwinds from sluggish industrial end markets into the first half of 2026.
US tariffs or an oil price shock could prevent a cyclical uptick in retail sector restocking this year.
Most of the large, high-quality LTL carriers began expanding their terminal footprint in 2023, and that trend will likely continue through 2026. This dynamic raises the risk of industry overcapacity at some point.
By Matthew Young, CFA
Quote time 2026-10-08 06:35:54 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.