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FEDEX FREIGHT HOLDING CO INC

US · FDXF #1071 by market cap Listed 1970
118.54 -8.04 -6.35%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Near fair value
114.25 fair value ≈ 139.00 163.75
  • Implied fair-value range of 114.25-163.75, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is -14.7% below the average-multiple fair value of 139.00.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio -70.35 Cheap vs history 13th percentile
5-year average -25.88
P/E ratio 36.81 Expensive vs history 83rd percentile
5-year average 31.74 · forward 29.40 · #14 of 15 in Integrated Freight & Logistics
P/S ratio 1.95 Cheap vs history 21st percentile
5-year average 2.28 · forward 1.83 · #30 of 32 in Integrated Freight & Logistics

Vs. peers Integrated Freight & Logistics

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
FEDEX FREIGHT HOLDING CO INC (FDXF) 17.72B 36.81 -70.35 0.00%
United Parcel Service (UPS) 90.44B 20.47 6.03 6.18%
FedEx (FDX) 71.19B 8.45 2.06 1.91%
Expeditors International (EXPD) 24.86B 24.47 10.62 0.82%
JB Hunt Transport Services (JBHT) 20.37B 30.82 5.61 0.82%
C.H. Robinson Worldwide (CHRW) 15.54B 24.06 9.84 1.88%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★☆☆ Fair value110.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 7.2% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

FedEx's freight’s total pro forma (for the June 1 spinoff from FedEx) third-quarter revenue grew 8% year over year, primarily driven by surging fuel surcharges. This is the firm’s first earnings release since moving from a May fiscal year-end to calendar-year reporting.

Why it matters: All-in yield (revenue per hundredweight, including fuel) increased 9% on fuel. Core yield (ex fuel) was roughly flat—up 40 basis points—though pricing on contractual renewals has been gaining traction. Uncertainty is elevated, but we expect core yields to improve over time as revenue-quality initiatives following the spinoff take hold. Tonnage was roughly flat in the quarter, though underlying demand trends are stable. Freight’s adjusted operating ratio (expenses/revenue; lower is better) improved 50 basis points to 85.3%, likely due in part to efficiency and revenue quality efforts, partly offset by spinoff-related investments including IT outlays and duplicative operating costs, namely transition service agreements. We still expect positive operating leverage (return of volume growth), network refinements, and the roll-off of spinoff-transition costs to drive profitability progress in the years ahead.

The bottom line: We do not expect to materially alter our $108 fair value estimate for no-moat FedEx Freight, as our longer-term revenue and margin forecasts will likely remain intact. As with most LTL stocks, the shares surged in first-half 2026 on improving industrial end-market demand and nascent opportunities for Freight to narrow its margin gap relative to certain peers now that it's a pure-play carrier. That said, market sentiment eased amid a summer correction partly driven by surging oil prices, which can threaten economic growth, and lofty investor expectations. The shares are now fairly valued relative to our longer-term model assumptions.

Fair value

Following third-quarter results, we are raising our DCF-derived fair value estimate for FedEx Freight to $110 per share, from $108, due primarily to the time value of money.

LTL industry demand deteriorated materially in FedEx Freight’s fiscal 2024 (ended May 2024), driven by retail sector destocking and the onset of soft industrial end markets. FedEx Freight’s total revenue fell 7%, but that would have been even worse if not for the mid-2023 Yellow bankruptcy, which tightened the LTL supply/demand equation, bolstering carriers’ pricing power. We estimate the firm's adjusted operating ratio (expenses/revenue; lower is better) remained mostly steady in fiscal 2024 (near 81.4%, by our estimate) thanks in part to terminal closures aimed at improving network productivity. Note that our historical OR calculations include estimated corporate cost allocations from FedEx but exclude pro forma incremental public company costs that emerged after the June 1 spinoff. Our post-spin forecasts do, however, reflect our preliminary take on those costs.

In fiscal 2025, FedEx Freight’s top line fell about 5.5%, as the LTL demand backdrop remained sluggish, only partly offset by lingering benefits from Yellow’s exit. Core rate-setting conditions across the industry remained mostly favorable, save for the onset of tough year-over-year comps. LTL supply and demand were less imbalanced than the truckload sector throughout fiscal 2025. FedEx Freight’s adjusted OR worsened to 84.2% on lost leverage from lower revenue (lost network density)—a common theme across the industry.

Following the June 2026 spinoff, FedEx Freight switched to a December calendar year-end, and our model forecasts follow that pattern using pro forma historicals. For 2026, we expect 5%-6% revenue growth, primarily driven by spiking fuel surcharges that are boosting all-in yield. LTL-industry demand trends remain muted but are gradually improving, and we suspect Freight’s tonnage could flip positive year over year in the fourth quarter, with help from recovering industrial end markets. Absent a demand-destructive oil shock, our base case calls for modest freight demand growth over the next few years, and we look for underlying core yield gains (excluding fuel) to remain positive. We also assume efforts to penetrate higher-margin healthcare and grocery end markets bear fruit, and the firm avoids losing material share as it unwinds contracts previously bundled with FedEx’s parcel offering. We bake in 4%-6% growth in 2027, with more modest 2%-3% growth in 2028 on tough fuel surcharge related comps for yields. .

Uncertainty surrounding post-spinoff cost structure run rates is elevated, but we pencil in an approximate 88.7% adjusted OR in calendar 2026, improving to 87.3% in 2027. FedEx Freight will see near-term post-spin transition service agreement costs, but we expect increasing benefits from positive operating leverage and network refinements—including nascent efforts to raise revenue quality, boost dock visibility, and minimize linehaul miles—in the years ahead. We forecast incremental OR gains to around 86% in 2028 and 85.0%-85.5% in 2029. This compares with management’s 85% OR (15% margin) target by 2029.

Economic moat

FedEx Freight is a solidly profitable LTL carrier, but we hesitate to award an economic moat. We suspect the firm has the building blocks of a narrow moat, given the high barriers to entry in LTL shipping, coupled with solid pro forma ROICs (by our calculations). However, FedEx Freight’s results are bolstered by the pandemic-driven volume surge and the 2023 Yellow bankruptcy. Additionally, the firm’s independent cost structure and execution haven’t been fully tested.

From a bigger picture perspective, LTL trucking is asset-intensive (requiring real estate, terminals, and tractors) and there are limited opportunities to differentiate over the long run. In our view, most high-quality operators struggle to carve out a durable competitive edge through common transportation moats. The one exception is Old Dominion, which has uniquely built a lane density advantage. In transportation, moats are more common in asset-light third-party logistics, where network effects can create value, or among global express carriers and railroads, both of which benefit from economies of scale or cost advantages.

It is true that entry barriers in LTL shipping are substantially higher than those found in the more fragmented full-truckload space. This is because of the need for a broad network of consolidation terminals and a large fleet of trucks. Thus, a new entrant would incur painful losses for an extended period due to minimal lane density—trucks would need to run but would not be full. As a result, the industry hasn’t seen many new entrants, and it’s somewhat concentrated, especially compared with the full-truckload sector. Thus, a handful of high-quality providers have managed to gain share, raise core pricing, improve mix, and produce meaningful economic profits on average over extended periods. However, most carriers have historically been hard-pressed to post economic profit over a full cycle, and even the best have seen capital returns erode rapidly during periods of plummeting demand and irrational rate setting (especially during the Great Recession).

It might appear that the high-fixed-cost nature of LTL operations should allow for enduring scale-based cost advantages or benefits from superior internal processes that optimize linehaul and pickup and delivery efficiency. However, although the process can take many years, network service reach and routines capable of maximizing quality and productivity can be replicated by well-capitalized competitors over time, and for most carriers, scale economies have proven insufficient over the full cycle.

There have been several trucking market pullbacks over the past decade, but the industry has not seen a major economic recession, with declines in both US goods spending and industrial production. In fact, although underlying freight demand retreated in 2023 (off the pandemic-driven surge), unfavorable demand trends persisted through 2025, and deterioration in carrier margins and ROICs (especially among large, high-quality carriers) was tempered by share gains and core pricing support linked to the Yellow bankruptcy.

It's also true that carriers have become more price- and capacity-disciplined since the Great Recession, but the magnitude of that progress hasn't truly been tested. We still think a major freight recession—one that hits retail and industrial end markets simultaneously—would materially reduce yields and returns on invested capital. That was evident throughout the Great Recession, when numerous struggling LTL carriers on the brink of collapse slashed prices to unmaintainable levels in a desperate attempt to grab volume and stay alive.

Bull case

FedEx Freight has built out a new dedicated salesforce focused on penetrating higher-margin customers in healthcare, grocery, and data center end markets.

The company's terminal rationalization efforts have helped lift its underlying margin potential in recent years.

E-commerce growth should provide incremental demand tailwinds for LTL carriers over the longer term—more frequent yet smaller shipments.

Bear case

While industrial end markets have improved, economic fallout from an oil price shock could temper demand in the year ahead.

Wage and general-cost inflation will likely remain a partial headwind to margin gains for all LTL carriers in the years ahead.

Most of the large, high-quality LTL carriers began expanding their terminal footprint in 2023, and that trend will likely continue through 2026. This dynamic raises the risk of industry overcapacity at some point.

By Matthew Young, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:40 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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