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CarMax

US · KMX #1691 by market cap Listed 1970
48.07 -1.94 -3.88%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:44

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Above fair value
24.94 fair value ≈ 36.48 48.01
  • Implied fair-value range of 24.94-48.01, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is +31.8% above the average-multiple fair value of 36.48.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.20 Cheap vs history 16th percentile
5-year average 1.95 · #9 of 23 in Auto & Truck Dealerships
P/E ratio 24.99 Expensive vs history 67th percentile
5-year average 21.71 · forward 15.65 · #10 of 13 in Auto & Truck Dealerships
P/S ratio 0.27 Cheap vs history 16th percentile
5-year average 0.40 · forward 0.26 · #11 of 26 in Auto & Truck Dealerships

Vs. peers Auto & Truck Dealerships

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
CarMax (KMX) 6.82B 22.57 1.08 0.00%
Carvana (CVNA) 46.15B 30.70 10.60 0.00%
Penske Automotive (PAG) 13.94B 15.47 2.34 2.66%
Rush Enterprises-B (RUSHB) 6.63B 24.80 2.77 0.91%
Lithia Motors (LAD) 6.21B 8.28 0.94 0.83%
AutoNation (AN) 5.61B 8.44 2.48 0.00%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value63.00 Economic moatNarrow UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 31.1% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

CarMax's stock fell 5.4% on Nov. 3 after it detailed its Shift into Gear strategy and compound annual growth rate targets for fiscal 2030 versus fiscal 2026. Retail unit growth CAGR is guided to midsingle digits, while adjusted EPS CAGR is guided to the midteens relative to $2.91 in fiscal 2026.

Why it matters: The midteens EPS growth is far below the nearly 29% CAGR we were modeling through fiscal 2030. Modeling other CAGR targets, such as low-single-digit growth in overhead costs, implies future gross margins will be much lower than prepandemic levels of about 13.5%. CEO Keith Barr's plan is to give up margin in exchange for volume. Many cost efficiencies will be realized over time via making reconditioning software-based, instead of a checklist on a clipboard now, and moving logistics to a hub-and-spoke model versus point-to-point. These cost savings will be passed on to the customer, we believe, far more aggressively than in CarMax's history, necessitating average gross margins over our five-year explicit forecast period declining by 150 basis points to 10.4%.

The bottom line: We are lowering our CarMax fair value estimate to $63 from $96. The change reflects lower earnings growth, as our midcycle operating margin is down 250 basis points to 3.2%. We model the EPS CAGR through 2030 at about 14%, within management's mid-teens target. We still believe CarMax deserves a narrow moat as it holds a cost advantage over the vast majority of used vehicle retailers and boasts a strong national brand. Upgrading its reconditioning process and logistics to a hub-and-spoke model like rival Carvana should help keep CarMax's cost edge. We are disappointed to reset projected gross margin average through fiscal 2031, 150 basis points lower than our old model at 10.4%, but used vehicles is a volume business, and this is the way to get volume in a more online-driven marketplace.

The reconditioning and logistics savings per unit are expected to be several hundred dollars. The reconditioning software will be a third-party system, though we expect customization for CarMax's workflow. This software will be rolled out over the next 12 months-24 months, and capital expenditure starting in fiscal 2028 is guided at about $500 million annually. This spending will be for adding reconditioning centers, opening a low number of smaller volume stores each year (amounts not specified), and modernizing technology and AI.

Barr wants stores to engage online customers before they enter, rather than having customers talk to a customer experience center and the store during the same process and then come into the store. Another technology improvement he wants is to make the instant offer appraisal tool for buying a consumer's vehicle more widespread. Currently, over 20% of consumers who visit CarMax online to use instant offer cannot use it for various logistical reasons and are forced into a more time-consuming process. Improving instant offer use to over 95%, as management wants, will help lower inventory procurement costs, which in turn will mean lower prices, which in turn means more volume and overhead costs scaling. We are glad to hear share repurchases will still happen, but we don't expect large annual outlays as buybacks are guided to only contribute a low single-digit portion of the mid-teens EPS CAGR.

CarMax Auto Finance income is guided to be down low single digits in fiscal 2027 and about flat in fiscal 2028, but then up high single digits in fiscal 2029 and fiscal 2030. CarMax has talked about expanding in CAF's Tier 2 credit bucket for a while and targets 40% CAF share of Tier 2 customers by fiscal 2030, up from 10% in second quarter fiscal 2026 and over 20% in second quarter fiscal 2027. We like this strategy as it avoids aggressive expansion in subprime lending, and the middle 50% of annual percentage loan rates range between 14%-22% for Tier 2 non-prime customers versus 6%-15% for CAF's Tier 1 prime borrowers. CAF head Jon Daniels said in the presentation that he sees pretax income $8 million to $20 million higher for each point of sales attributable to Tier 2. CAF will continue to have loans held for investment, which incur a loss provision at time of origination under the CECL accounting standard, and also have held-for-sale loans, with about one gain on sale transaction a year.

Loans that are held for sale do not have a CECL provision unless they were originally not held for sale at time of origination. More Tier 2 mix means a lower FICO score of about 550-675 versus over 675 for Tier 1. CAF income will therefore suffer near term due to a higher Tier 2 mix, meaning higher upfront loan-loss provisions for Tier 2 paper under CECL. After the initial surge of Tier 2, though, income for these loans after Year 1 will be significantly more profitable than CAF's normal levels, which were skewed to a higher Tier 1 mix, hence the high single-digit growth targets for fiscal 2029-30.

Fair value

After incorporating compound annual growth rate targets for fiscal 2030 vs. fiscal 2026 given on Nov. 3, we are lowering our CarMax fair value estimate to $63 per share from $96. The change reflects lower earnings growth, as our midcycle operating margin is down 250 basis points to 3.2%. We model the EPS CAGR through 2030 at about 14%, within management's mid-teens target. However, over our five-year explicit forecast period, we now model an EPS CAGR of nearly 15%, down from nearly 26%. From fiscal 2022 through fiscal 2026, CarMax's gross margin compressed relative to prepandemic levels of over 13% due to high inventory acquisition costs. We no longer model gross margin returning to prepandemic levels based on management's implied guidance on its Nov. 3 strategy update. Our gross margin now averages 150 basis points lower at 10.4% while operating margin averages 130 basis points lower at about 2.8%.

Used-vehicle prices, though declining from recent levels, remain high, in our view, because late-model used-vehicle supply (up to 4-year-old vehicles) has not yet fully recovered from weak new-vehicle sales since spring 2020. Falling prices, however, also mean cheaper inventory procurement over time. Management has said that mid-single-digit comparable-store unit growth can translate into high-teens EPS growth, so strong comp quarters can drive rapid stock price expansion. Longer term, we think CarMax could enter new verticals to offset the price decline; possibilities include expanding its vehicle shipping capability, CAF offering wholesale financing to dealers at CarMax auctions, CAF expanding its credit spectrum securitization deals as it now is with Tier 2 borrowers, and CarMax capturing more vehicles that, for now, are sold peer-to-peer. We consider CarMax a top used-vehicle retailer, so we want to give it plenty of credit for its ability to scale its overhead costs over time as more business moves to omnichannel, which allows for fewer store openings and perhaps fewer stores one day. The company will also open more reconditioning centers and auction facilities and bring more technology to the recon process to increase throughput and lower costs. Less brick-and-mortar means lower commissions and probably lower headcount over time, which should enable cost scaling. We model revenue growing at a compound annual rate of about 8%, up from about 2%-3% in our prior model. Our midcycle margin reflects our expectation that operating margins could reach around 4.5% in our bull-case scenario.

We think the firm will continue to grow and gain scale by leveraging its selling, general, and administrative expenses once it revamps its strategy and online consumer experience. SG&A per retail unit in fiscal 2026 was flat year over year at $3,087, but is up from $2,540 in fiscal 2022. In the future, management will track SG&A per the combined retail and auction units, which for fiscal 2026 was $1,822, excluding restructuring charges. We believe additional SG&A scaling will occur after fiscal 2027, as revenue eventually expands sufficiently for the market to see the benefits of recent cost-reduction efforts. In November, the company said it's on track to achieve another $200 million in SG&A cuts by the end of fiscal 2027. We model SG&A as a percentage of revenue at about 8.4% on average during our five-year forecast period, down 50 basis points. We forecast capital expenditures to average about 1.5% of revenue per year, up from 1.2%, and discount our projected cash flows at a weighted-average cost of capital of 9.1%. We model CAF income at around 1.9% of revenue on average over our forecast period, down 30 basis points due to lower near-term income growth from higher loan loss provisions from Tier 2 expansion. CAF comprises about 71% of our fair value estimate, up from about 48% previously.

Economic moat

We assign CarMax a narrow Morningstar Economic Moat Rating. CarMax is the used-vehicle expert. Since 1993, it has retailed nearly 14 million vehicles, wholesaled almost 9 million, and appraised about 45 million. This expertise allows it to retail about 99% of the vehicles that go on the lot. CarMax has two of the five moat sources in our economic moat framework: intangible assets and cost advantage. Many things about CarMax’s moat are replicable in theory, but we see them as difficult to copy well. CarMax's intangible asset moat source stems from its strong brand equity and valuable cache of historical auto pricing and lending data. CarMax is one of the largest used-vehicle retailers in the world with a very well-recognized brand that is known for its no-haggle selling process, excellent customer service, superior inventory selection, and convenient financing and delivery options. CarMax's selling process is unique compared with dealers. For example, sales associates are paid a flat commission regardless of the vehicle sold. In our view, this method properly aligns the salesperson's incentives with the needs of the customer. Franchise dealers have tried the no-haggle approach in the past, but have not always been successful because their salespeople pursue deals with high gross profit.

Franchise dealers such as Sonic and Asbury began emulating this format in 2014 but had to start from scratch with stand-alone used-vehicle stores under new brands (EchoPark and Q Auto), so we do not see any new brick-and-mortar player as a formidable threat to CarMax. Asbury terminated its Q Auto brand in 2017, and Lithia Motors' L2 used-only stores did not survive the Great Recession. AutoNation (AutoNation USA) and Penske Automotive Group (CarShop in the US, Sytner Select in the UK, and Penske Select in Australia) have joined the stand-alone used-vehicle store fight with Sonic's EchoPark, but we think the market is fragmented enough that CarMax, the franchise dealers, and digital-only players like Carvana can all find success if they execute right.

The brand does not just help CarMax sell vehicles; it helps the company best source them as well. In fiscal 2022, for example, the number of vehicles CarMax purchased from consumers increased 95.5% from fiscal 2021 to over 1.4 million, with about half of those vehicles purchased online, something we don't think a one- or two-store dealer can do without massive IT investment or a brand as powerful as CarMax. The company buys about 900,000-1,000,000 vehicles annually from consumers, plus about 150,000 from dealers. Vehicles purchased from consumers have higher gross profit per unit when retailed than vehicles bought at auctions, and the percentage of CarMax's retail unit sales that it bought from consumers (what it calls its self-sufficiency ratio) is now at record levels of over 70%, up from 30%-40% before the pandemic. We see this increase as the result of online vehicle commerce becoming more common, but also CarMax's digital efforts, such as internet marketing, its instant online appraisal tool, and the firm’s customer experience call centers and AI capabilities.

We view CarMax's Big Data advantage as an intangible asset, as well. CarMax's sales and appraisal data go back to its founding in 1993 as part of the now-defunct Circuit City. This data cannot be purchased by a competitor. CarMax uses the data to arm its buyers with the best information on vehicle auction pricing and appraisal value. The data is also used to develop a national pricing algorithm, which helps CarMax retail 99% of the vehicles offered through its stores. Since Keith Barr joined as CEO, the company is adding more emphasis in the algorithm to local competitive conditions and individual vehicle types. We believe CarMax's data advantage results in stronger profitability compared with competitors. CarMax posts a higher used-vehicle profit than all of the publicly traded franchise dealers. We believe its data edge has helped CarMax maintain its gross profit per retail unit at about $2,100-$2,300 despite large upward and downward changes in average selling price.

In our view, CarMax's size and large store base give it an advantage over smaller competitors. Its ability to have customers shop omnichannel could strengthen the moat if the firm can raise the conversion rate of shoppers who start online and then come to a store. A large store base combined with a large digital presence gives CarMax a broader net to grab business versus a large online-only competitor. A small used-car lot operation or one- or two-store franchise dealers cannot cost-effectively move inventory around a large geographic area the way CarMax can. In fiscal 2026, about 38% of CarMax's unit volume came from consumers transferring a vehicle, which can be done for no fee if the vehicle is close to the customer or a few thousand dollars if shipped from far away. The ability for CarMax to ship nearly any of its typically over 50,000 (but as many as over 70,000) vehicles in inventory at it's over 255 stores to anywhere in the US gives the customer a superior selection versus a small retailer.

We believe CarMax's information systems and captive finance arm differentiate the firm from its competitors, although these capabilities can be replicated, just not at the same scale. In terms of information systems, most dealers use prepackaged software that is geared to the multifaceted operations of a franchise dealer. CarMax developed its own dealer management system software in the 1990s. It is the only large brick and mortar retailer that uses a DMS tailored for a used-vehicle retailer.

CarMax does not rely on one brand. The company offers consumers a great selection with more than 50,000 vehicles available nationwide for transfer to any store or delivery if a customer is within 60 miles of a store. An average CarMax store has nearly as many as 350 vehicles on the lot, while a traditional dealer will have just 30-100 vehicles.

Bull case

We think CarMax is positioned to gain market share in almost any environment. Omnichannel helps this story, as it lets consumers have maximum flexibility in their experience.

We expect continued US market share and revenue growth long-term once the company improves its messaging around online capabilities to customers.

No competitors have successfully duplicated CarMax's business model to the same degree, providing the company with a considerable head start on would-be imitators.

Bear case

CarMax operates in a cyclical industry, and its strong model is not immune to a recession. Tariffs are not a direct threat, but they will likely mean higher used vehicle prices and squeeze consumers' ability to buy a used vehicle.

CAF's credit spectrum expansion announced in June 2024 could backfire if management does not adequately manage credit risk.

Some of the largest franchise auto dealers are trying to replicate CarMax's success with their own stand-alone used-vehicle stores, and Carvana is formidable competition. We don't expect gross margins to return to prepandemic levels.

By David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:44:19 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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