Skip to content

Markel Group

US · MKL #885 by market cap Listed 1970
1,936.58 -15.07 -0.77%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:30

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.28 Cheap vs history 17th percentile
5-year average 1.36 · #11 of 47 in Insurance - Property & Casualty
P/E ratio 13.78 Expensive vs history 82nd percentile
5-year average 36.44 · forward 14.11 · #27 of 43 in Insurance - Property & Casualty
P/S ratio 1.46 In line with history 63rd percentile
5-year average 1.41 · forward 1.51 · #28 of 47 in Insurance - Property & Casualty

Vs. peers Insurance - Property & Casualty

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Markel Group (MKL) 23.68B 13.78 1.28 0.00%
Chubb Ltd (CB) 141.99B 13.03 1.94 1.07%
Progressive (PGR) 133.67B 11.66 3.88 6.01%
The Travelers Companies (TRV) 82.02B 10.34 2.78 1.20%
Allstate (ALL) 66.07B 6.06 2.18 1.59%
WR Berkley (WRB) 29.09B 16.56 3.03 0.49%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★☆☆ Fair value2,070.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyMedium Capital allocationStandard

Trading 6.9% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Markel continued to show progress in improving its underwriting in the third quarter, but losses on the equity portfolio were a drag on results.

Why it matters: Fixing its recent underwriting issues has been a focus for management over the past couple of years, and the third quarter provided further evidence that the company is back on track. The combined ratio in the quarter was 91.9%, compared with 92.7% last year. This improvement came despite higher catastrophe losses. Excluding catastrophe losses, the combined ratio improved 440 basis points year over year, and we think Markel has closed its recent gap with peers. We're also pleased to see it returning to high levels of favorable reserve development. Adjusted gross premium growth was 9% in the quarter, a level that suggests management is confident that it can now grow off a stable base of business.

The bottom line: We will maintain our $2,070 fair value estimate for the no-moat company. While underwriting results were encouraging, Markel recognized a $280 million loss on its equity portfolio in the quarter. We think the stock is modestly undervalued at the moment due to its recent underwriting issues and investment results that have lagged the market. We think more-recent results suggest that underwriting is now under control, and while the company's investment approach may be out of favor in the current market environment, historically Markel has shown an ability to produce some alpha over time.

For more details on our view of Markel, please see our presentation "There Will Be No More Berkshires," published Oct. 27.

Fair value

We are increasing our fair value estimate to $2,070 per share from $1,960, mainly due to the time value of money since our last update and some modest adjustments to our assumptions. Our fair value estimate is equivalent to 1.4 times 2025 year-end book value and 1.8 times year-end book value excluding intangibles and accumulated other comprehensive income.

We assume premiums rise at a 3% compound annual rate over the next five years. We think the need to pull back and restore underwriting margins will limit near-term growth. Longer term, we expect only limited growth, since we expect a weaker industry pricing environment.

Our assumptions yield an average combined ratio of 97%, slightly worse than the 95% average the company has posted over the past five years. We expect underwriting profits in the industry to narrow over the course of our projection period as we expect normalization of industry returns and higher interest rates to lead to lower underwriting profitability for the industry.

On the investment side, we assume fixed-income results will improve as interest rates have risen. We project the company's noninsurance operations to grow organically at a mid-single-digit rate over the next five years and maintain recent margin levels. Our projections do not include any unannounced acquisitions.

We use a cost of equity of 8.9% in our valuation.

Economic moat

In general, insurers do not benefit from favorable competitive positions. Industry competition is fierce, and the products are essentially commodities. Furthermore, most participants do not know their cost of goods sold for a number of years, allowing them to underprice policies without knowing it. Firms have a large incentive to chase growth without regard for profitability, a cycle that repeats itself as competitors are forced to match artificially low prices or risk losing business. That said, we do believe the space contains some moaty franchises.

While Markel has generated a reputation as a mini-Berkshire, we do not believe it benefits from a moat. In terms of underwriting, the company falls a bit short of the level we think is necessary to award a narrow moat. Markel does tend to focus on specialty, noncommodified lines, and we believe focusing on specialty lines is the most common path to a moat for property-casualty insurers. Outside of excess and surplus lines, the company operates in a number of areas that fit our definition of specialty lines, ranging from executive liability to commercial equine insurance.

As a result, the company historically has produced very attractive loss ratios. However, its elevated expense ratio has limited underwriting income over time. Expense ratios in specialty lines are typically higher than in other lines, but Markel's expense ratios are high even relative to other specialty insurers. The company's relative inefficiency on this score is one of the main obstacles to developing a moat, in our view.

We believe the company's perceived ability to generate alpha on the investment side is the primary attraction for many investors. CEO Tom Gayner has an impressive record, beating the S&P 500 by 90 basis points on average over the past decade. More recently, though, he has trailed the market due to limited tech and AI exposure. Still, we like his investing approach, as it closely mirrors our own methodology, although we think the company's asset allocation decisions (and the bull market) have been a much bigger factor in driving book value growth over time.

We estimate that even if Gayner is able to beat the market by one percentage point, this would add only 55 basis points to return on equity, suggesting that his investment skill is not enough to significantly affect our view of the company's long-term prospects. Further, the company acquires noninsurance operations as part of its investment strategy. While Markel believes these companies can grow over time to justify the prices paid, we think a skeptical view of potential value creation in this area is warranted.

Bull case

Markel's focus on specialty lines creates the potential for a moat.

Gayner's philosophy of opportunistically investing in high-quality equities should be a long-term winner.

Markel is conservative in setting initial reserve estimates and generally benefits from sizable favorable reserve development.

Bear case

Markel's relatively large exposure to equities makes the company much more vulnerable than peers to a bear market and reduces the upside from higher interest rates.

Due to Markel's recent underwriting missteps, the company has largely missed out on the hard market its peers are enjoying.

In terms of relative performance, the low-interest-rate environment and bull equity market we saw in the decade following the financial crisis formed an ideal backdrop for Markel, but capital market conditions have now changed.

By Brett Horn, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

Markel Group discussion 0 comments

Add a comment