Capri Holdings
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Luxury Goods
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capri Holdings (CPRI) | 1.81B | 9.91 | 27.89 | 0.00% |
| Tapestry (TPR) | 23.59B | 15.49 | 68.58 | 1.39% |
| Signet Jewelers (SIG) | 3.76B | 11.40 | 2.05 | 1.36% |
| LuxExperience BV (LUXE) | 1.44B | -12.91 | 1.10 | 0.00% |
| TheRealReal (REAL) | 1.34B | -21.56 | -3.79 | 0.00% |
| Movado (MOV) | 654.20M | 16.20 | 1.29 | 4.95% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 159.4% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
John Idol, CEO of Capri (formerly Michael Kors) since 2003, will retire. As of Jan. 4, 2027, he will be replaced as CEO and chairman by current Estée Lauder executive Justin Boxford and current Capri board member Robin Freestone, respectively. Idol will remain as an advisor through March.
Why it matters: Capri has been restructuring since its sale to Tapestry was terminated two years ago. We think that it has made progress in debt reduction and in stabilizing its two remaining brands, and management succession is a logical next step. We are not surprised by the change as a previous succession plan was announced in 2021 (later reversed) and then Capri was nearly sold. Idol built Michael Kors into a major accessible luxury brand, but Capri's efforts to become a house of luxury brands were ultimately not successful. Boxford's skills in managing premium consumer brands at Estée align well with Capri's focus. For example, sales doubled during his five years as head of luxury skincare brand La Mer. Boxford also helped build the Michael Kors fragrance business, so he has experience with a Capri brand.
The bottom line: Our $45.50 fair value estimate per share on no-moat Capri is unchanged. Given his background, Boxford should help Michael Kors and Jimmy Choo transition from restructuring to growth. After years of turmoil, we believe investors underestimate the potential of these brands. Capri has positioned Michael Kors and Jimmy Choo for stronger sales, retail prices, and margins by investing in store remodels and marketing, closing underperforming stores, and cutting costs. For example, there has been strong growth in the customer databases of both brands. We forecast Jimmy Choo and Michael Kors will have operating margins in the low double digits and near-20%, respectively, on low-single-digit yearly sales growth in the long term. With these results, Capri's operating margins should reach 12%, up from about 5% (adjusted) this fiscal year.
Fair value
We hold our fair value estimate on Capri’s shares at $45.50 after fiscal 2027 second-quarter results that were slightly above our expectations.
Capri's sales fell 5.5% as an 8.6% decline from Michael Kors offset Jimmy Choo’s 11.5% increase. Gross margin rose 230 basis points to 63.3% on greater full-price sales, and adjusted operating margin improved to 3.8% from 2.3%. Capri's second-quarter sales benefited from $20 million in early wholesale shipments, but its results would have outperformed our estimates (9.3% sales decline, 1.3% operating margin) regardless.
For fiscal 2027, we forecast a 2% sales decline (unchanged) based on a 5% sales decline for Michael Kors (slightly down from our prior estimate of a 4% decline) and 9% sales growth for Jimmy Choo (up from 6% prior). We raised our adjusted EPS estimate to $2.20 from $2.15. Based on our forecast, our fair value estimate values Capri at 21 times and 17 times EPS and EV/EBITDA, respectively.
In the long run, we forecast compound average annual sales growth rates of 4.6% for Jimmy Choo and 1.6% for Michael Kors. We project 1.5% annual growth for Michael Kors in the mature markets of the Americas and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa but 2.5% in higher-growth Asia. For Jimmy Choo, we forecast 6.6% growth in the Americas, 5.9% in Asia, but only 2.4% growth in EMEA where it must compete with numerous Europe-based women’s luxury shoe brands.
After an adjusted operating margin of just 3% in fiscal 2026, we forecast Capri's operating margin will improve to 12% in about four years. This projection is based on segment operating margins of 19.5% and 12% for Michael Kors and Jimmy Choo, respectively. These operating margins are relatively modest for luxury brands and indicate poor market positioning. With the divestment of Versace, Michael Kors is expected to generate 85%-90% of Capri’s operating profit over the next 10 years.
Capri sold Versace to Prada for nearly $1.4 billion in cash. The deal lowered Capri’s sales and cash flow in the long run, but the cash flow loss was largely offset by the cash received. Versace had a 20% sales decline and an operating loss of about $54 million in fiscal 2025.
Economic moat
We assign a no-moat rating to Capri. We do not believe either Michael Kors or Jimmy Choo has established a competitive advantage in the form of an intangible brand asset or a cost edge. Capri is highly dependent on Michael Kors, which accounts for over 80% of the firm’s sales and all its operating profit, but the brand has been in decline. We believe it lacks the differentiated product and prestige necessary for consistent premium pricing in women’s handbags and other main product categories.
Evidencing Capri’s lack of a competitive edge, its operating margins and adjusted returns on invested capital, including goodwill, have declined. Between fiscal 2015 and 2026, the company’s adjusted operating margins declined to 3% from 29%, and its adjusted ROICs, including goodwill, dropped to just 3% from 39%. Looking ahead, although the divestment of Versace will improve returns, we forecast a five-year average ROIC of 10%, short of our 11% weighted average cost of capital and low for a luxury brand owner. We believe that Capri’s current investments in store operations and advertising generate returns above WACC, but we forecast the firm’s ROICs, including goodwill, will remain below those of Coach-parent Tapestry’s (around 28%).
Capri’s primary property, Michael Kors, was a niche handbag and apparel brand for many years until new owners in the early 2000s opened hundreds of company-owned stores and expanded distribution in department stores. By 2016, however, oversaturation had brought widespread discounting of its bags and other products. In response, the company began closing stores and reducing distribution, but years of effort have failed to improve the brand’s prices or sales volume. Between 2015-25, Michael Kors’ share of the US luxury handbag market fell to 11% from 29% as it lost share to Coach, Louis Vuitton, and other brands (Euromonitor). As Michael Kors’ share has fallen, discounts have been necessary to generate sales. In a 2024 court hearing, executives testified that the average selling price of Michael Kors bags was only $92 versus nondiscounted prices of $250-$500. We estimate the average retail price of Coach bags at more than $400. In fiscal 2027, we project a gross margin of 79% for Coach and only 63% for Michael Kors.
The sub-$300 handbag category in which Michael Kors operates has limited barriers to entry and many competitors. Michael Kors’ gross margins are like those of handbag brand Kate Spade (mid-60s), which has similarly priced items and has also lost significant share over the past decade (Euromonitor). Both brands have significant exposure to US department stores that commonly discount merchandise. In its own distribution, Michael Kors has been closing full-price stores while opening outlets, a clear sign it is struggling to sell merchandise at full price. Specifically, over the past decade, the number of full-price Michael Kors stores has declined by 30% while the number of outlets has nearly doubled.
Capri’s management has been investing in store renovations, new advertising, and new products that should stabilize Michael Kors’ results. However, we think the brand will struggle to regain lost share (we forecast compound average annual sales growth of only 1% over the next decade) or pricing power. Specifically, Michael Kors consistently generated operating margins above 20% before fiscal 2024, but we do not forecast its margins returning to those levels for at least the next 10 years. For comparison, we forecast Coach’s long-term operating margins in the mid-30s due to higher merchandise prices and lower wholesale exposure.
We would consider upgrading our moat rating to narrow if Michael Kors returned to consistent sales growth and operating margins improved to historical levels (low-20s) from fiscal years 2025-27 (11%-12%), as this would demonstrate improved brand health and a recovery of pricing power. Better financial results from Michael Kors would very likely lift Capri’s ROICs to more than 10 percentage points above our WACC estimate.
We do not think Capri’s smaller brand, Jimmy Choo, has a brand-based advantage either. Jimmy Choo is one of the better-known luxury women’s footwear brands and offers shoes priced at $500 and up, on par with market leaders. However, Jimmy Choo has just 0.4% share of the global women’s footwear market and roughly 3% share in the women’s designer footwear niche (Euromonitor). As such, it lacks scale and posted operating losses in each of Capri’s last two fiscal years. As with Michael Kors, Jimmy Choo’s profitability has been negatively affected by promotional pricing in US department stores, competition from much larger European luxury houses, and a lack of trendy merchandise. We estimate Jimmy Choo’s fiscal 2027 gross margin at 68%, which is low compared with luxury peers like Prada (typically 80% gross margins).
Capri does not have a brand-intangible asset or any other factor that could provide a moat. It has no production cost advantage over rivals as it does not own factories. Specifically, Michael Kors, like many competing apparel and accessories firms, outsources its products to third-party factories in Asia, while most Jimmy Choo merchandise is produced by third-party manufacturers in Italy. Further, there are neither network effects nor switching costs in Capri’s key categories of women’s handbags, apparel, and shoes.
Bull case
Capri has retired much of its debt from the proceeds of the Versace sale. Moreover, the divestment of this troubled brand allows management to focus on improving the health of its two remaining brands.
Michael Kors is one of the largest brands in terms of units and sales in the high-margin and growing handbag space. It is also a diversified apparel label.
Jimmy Choo is one of the best-known women’s luxury footwear brands. It has sales and margin growth opportunities in attractive markets.
Bear case
Jimmy Choo’s sales growth and profitability have been inconsistent. Despite diversification efforts, the brand remains highly dependent on women’s luxury footwear.
Michael Kors has struggled with declining market share, and its profitability has fallen dramatically. Although turnaround efforts are being made, we believe widespread discounting has degraded the value of the brand.
China and other parts of Asia are important and fast-growing luxury markets, but Capri has low sales and visibility in these areas compared with many peers.
By David Swartz
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:05 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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