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Eni SpA

US · E #283 by market cap Listed 1970
52.64 -1.35 -2.50%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:30

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Above fair value
6.91 fair value ≈ 25.42 43.93
  • Implied fair-value range of 6.91-43.93, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is +107.1% above the average-multiple fair value of 25.42.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.36 Expensive vs history 94th percentile
5-year average 0.94 · #10 of 20 in Oil & Gas Integrated
P/E ratio 10.42 In line with history 41st percentile
5-year average 14.86 · forward 9.44 · #10 of 17 in Oil & Gas Integrated
P/S ratio 0.77 Expensive vs history 90th percentile
5-year average 0.52 · forward 0.76 · #5 of 20 in Oil & Gas Integrated

Vs. peers Oil & Gas Integrated

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Eni SpA (E) 74.72B 9.60 1.25 4.56%
Exxon Mobil (XOM) 652.63B 16.46 2.46 2.58%
Chevron (CVX) 409.53B 15.30 2.11 3.38%
Shell (SHEL) 264.14B 8.12 1.33 3.23%
TotalEnergies (TTE) 186.64B 8.50 1.41 4.65%
BP PLC (BP) 110.11B 12.42 1.77 4.72%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★☆☆ Fair value49.30 Economic moatNone UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 6.3% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Eni reported third-quarter adjusted net earnings of EUR 2.8 billion, up from EUR 1.2 billion a year ago, supported by higher commodity prices, increased production, and wider refining margins. Strong results and an improved outlook prompted another increase in 2026 guidance and shareholder returns.

Why it matters: Eni continues to capitalize on the supportive commodity price environment by increasing its hydrocarbon production, which rose 4% to 1.8 million barrels of oil equivalent per day, supported by project ramp-ups and the full contribution from the Searah joint venture. Full-year production growth is now expected at 6%-7%, from around 5% previously. Management further improved its full-year outlook, raising guidance for gas and power and Enilive. Group cash flow from operations is now anticipated at EUR 16.5 billion, up from EUR 11.5 billion at the beginning of the year. As we expected, Eni confirmed a EUR 0.46 per-share extraordinary dividend for 2026 and raised its share buyback for the third time this year to EUR 3.8 billion, from EUR 1.5 billion initially. Including the confirmed EUR 1.10 per-share ordinary dividend, total shareholder distributions imply a yield of around 10%.

The bottom line: We reconfirm our EUR 21.80 fair value estimate for no-moat Eni. Our model already incorporates updated oil and gas prices and strong refining margins, both well above our midcycle-level assumptions, so the guidance upgrade has little bearing on our valuation. Following a 62% year-to-date rally, we view shares as overvalued.

Key stats: Eni’s balance sheet strengthened in the quarter, supported by robust cash generation and the deconsolidation of Plenitude at the end of September. Net debt fell by EUR 4.6 billion sequentially, bringing gearing to 9%, below the 10%-15% full-year guidance range.

Eni expanded its Venezuelan growth pipeline during the quarter, securing operatorship of Junín-5, with over 3 billion barrels of recoverable resources and plans to add 200 kbd gross within 24 months. Expansion at Perla should also support gas production growth through 2028. We see these projects adding another leg to Eni’s medium-term production growth, amid execution and country risk.

Fair value

Our fair value estimate is $49.30 per share, reflecting the most recent strategic and financial guidance and higher near-term oil and gas prices. Our fair value estimate corresponds to a forward enterprise value/EBITDA multiple of 3.0 times our 2027 EBITDA forecast of EUR 27.4 billion.

We derive our fair value estimate using Morningstar’s standard three-stage discounted cash flow methodology. Under this methodology, we derive a terminal value using our assumptions for long-term earnings growth and return on new invested capital. This valuation methodology also more explicitly incorporates our moat rating, which reflects how long we expect a given firm to deliver excess returns on invested capital from a discounted cash flow analysis.

In our DCF model, we assume Brent prices of $90/bbl in 2026 and $88/bbl in 2027. Our long-term oil-price assumption is $65. We assume a cost of equity of 9.0% and a weighted average cost of capital of 7.8%.

We forecast production to grow to 2.0 mmboe/d in 2030, in line with management’s guidance for a 3%-4% CAGR from 2025. We also forecast a gradual improvement in downstream and gas and power midcycle earnings, driven by a revamped chemicals segment and improved contract structures in gas and power. We forecast earnings growth slightly below management guidance of EUR 2.5 billion in EBITDA in 2030 for Plenitude and EUR 3.0 billion in EBITDA for Enilive.

Our gross capital spending forecast is EUR 7 billion in 2026, in line with guidance. Our forecast is slightly higher than the guidance of EUR 29 billion for 2026-30. We do not explicitly model any divestitures, but management indicates that they will offset spending by about EUR 4 billion during the forecast period.

Economic moat

In our view, Eni does not have an economic moat, as its asset base cannot deliver durable excess returns at our long-term oil price assumption of $65/bbl.

Although Eni’s upstream portfolio has delivered strong returns in recent years, it fails to qualify for a moat, given its history of uneven returns. We also do not think it can deliver returns on capital employed above 10% at our midcycle price. This compares with a return on capital employed of 15% from 2010 to 2014, when oil prices were much higher. While Eni’s production costs are low relative to peers, largely thanks to production from North Africa, it also realizes higher tax rates that weigh on margins and returns. While we expect Eni to increase production from higher-margin assets and grow its liquefied natural gas portfolio, which will improve returns, we do not think these efforts will prove sufficient to deliver durable excess returns for the upstream segment.

Eni’s downstream—refining and chemicals—segment will also likely prove to be an obstacle to delivering excess returns. Although the segment has struggled with profitability in the past, we expect modest improvement. Eni has diversified its European refining assets by adding capacity in the Middle East through its 20% ownership in ADNOC Refining, which has a refining capacity of 922 thousand b/d. Its chemicals segment should improve as it restructures to focus more on biochemicals and advanced materials rather than base chemicals, while benefiting from margins returning to midcycle levels in the coming years from currently depressed levels.

Eni carved out its marketing and biofuels businesses to form Enilive. In biofuels, Eni is converting its lower-quality European refineries to biofuel facilities, which have a more attractive demand and margin outlook, thanks in part to government support. Eni plans to double biorefining capacity to above 3 mmt/y by 2028 and above 5 mmt/y by 2030. Marketing looks to capitalize on alternative energy distribution (for example, electric vehicle charging) and food offerings to reduce reliance on petroleum products over time. We do not see these efforts collectively carving out durable competitive advantages at this time, as others are doing the same, but they should improve returns. Management is targeting 15% returns on capital by 2030.

Eni also has a large gas and LNG segment that holds a collection of floating LNG assets and equity interests, largely in Africa (Congo, Mozambique, Egypt, Nigeria and Angola), which we consider worthy of a moat based on cost advantage. While the segment has delivered low returns in the past, this was largely due to poor contract structures and rising gas supply prices. Eni’s recent efforts to restructure contracts, increase integration, and increase supply sources are improving profitability and returns for the segment.

Eni plans to grow its renewable power generation installed capacity to 10 GW by 2028, 15 GW by 2030, and 60 GW by 2050 from about 6 GW in 2025. We typically consider renewable generation—particularly solar, where Eni is focusing its efforts (more than 70% of renewable generation)—unworthy of a moat, since it offers little opportunity for competitive advantage and typically has low returns.

As other firms move into the space, power rates may compress, though Eni seeks to mitigate this by integrating renewable production with its retail customer base, which is targeted to grow to 15 million by 2030 and 20 million by 2050.

Eni continues to leverage its offshore wind expertise, participating in major projects such as the Dogger Bank development in the UK, to carve out a cost advantage. However, success remains to be seen, as it will likely remain a relatively small player that lacks the scale for a cost advantage. Offshore wind has also faced cost inflation, which has damaged returns.

Eni’s other efforts to reduce its carbon intensity are unlikely to result in a durable competitive advantage either. Efforts to reduce carbon intensity include ramping up carbon capture, utilization, and storage to more than 15 mmt/y by 2030 and over 40 mmt/y in the 2030s. This business has been established as a satellite company (Eni CCUS Holding) in a joint venture with Global Infrastructure Partners. However, with most assets still in early development or in the planning stage, the economics of carbon capture remain uncertain.

Bull case

Eni's aggressive growth in areas outside its legacy hydrocarbon business puts it in a better position than most peers for the energy transition.

By employing the satellite model, Eni improves its competitive position, unlocks value, and ensures capital for its transition plan. Recent outside investments at attractive valuations validate the strategy.

Growing hydrocarbon production will maintain Eni's leverage to oil and gas prices even as it diversifies its business mix.

Bear case

Eni’s transition to a low-carbon/renewable business could result in poor execution and capital allocation missteps, resulting in lower returns and missing out on potentially higher oil prices.

The satellite model may complicate Eni's investment case and not result in an improved valuation compared with peers that sell assets outright and return cash to shareholders.

The government’s majority stake in Eni, next to control of the board, may result in less-than-optimal allocation of resources, especially if jobs in Italy are at stake.

By Allen Good, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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