Fair Isaac
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 1,193.77-2,874.15, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is -65.9% below the average-multiple fair value of 2,033.96.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Software - Application
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fair Isaac (FICO) | 14.84B | 19.12 | -3.83 | 0.00% |
| SAP SE (SAP) | 229.61B | 26.25 | 4.56 | 1.43% |
| Shopify (SHOP) | 159.17B | 75.90 | 12.48 | 0.00% |
| Salesforce (CRM) | 148.65B | 16.54 | 3.87 | 0.95% |
| Uber Technologies (UBER) | 129.60B | 37.34 | 4.69 | 0.00% |
| Automatic Data Processing (ADP) | 119.10B | 26.75 | 23.39 | 2.25% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 3.7% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Fair Isaac reported fiscal fourth-quarter revenue of $657 million, up 27% year over year, and adjusted net income of $239 million, up 28%. Most notably, the company did not provide fiscal 2027 guidance, which it customarily does. Shares fell as much as 7% in after-hours trading.
Why it matters: We think the negative market reaction is understandable given management's lack of guidance. The market will need to get comfortable with the idea that the lack of guidance reflects less incremental deterioration than a strategy to roll back pricing transparency, which may have backfired. While management noted that the preferred program, which maintains its $10 price per score but requires a Fico pull on all mortgages, is only one option, the firm is actively pushing it. Management did not provide color on nonpreferred pricing, but we suspect it will be higher. We also believe the firm will reinstate guidance as the air clears in future quarters.
The bottom line: We trim our fair value estimate for narrow-moat Fair Isaac to $720 per share from $780. While we are leaving our mortgage forecasts mostly unchanged, we expect to adopt a more conservative approach toward the firm’s nonmortgage scoring business. We reiterate our High Uncertainty Rating, given the varying pricing and market-share scenarios in our model.
Big Picture: Overall, Fair Isaac appears to be lying low, trying to keep things as close to business as usual as possible, waiting for VantageScore adoption and the pricing controversies to settle. The preferred program essentially freezes pricing and market share. Fair Isaac is not currently trying to monetize its score through other players, like investors and mortgage insurers, in the mortgage ecosystem. Over the long run, Fair Isaac will likely evolve its pricing strategy.
Bears Say: The direct license program and performance-based pricing, with higher prices being charged on closed loans, may prove to be a failure.
Mortgage scores revenue drove the quarter’s strong revenue growth, rising 72% year over year to $241 million. Fair Isaac cites a “high-single-digit” volume decline, with lower-fee Heloc loans growing faster and no meaningful volume loss due to competition. With the firm’s 102% increase in list price and TransUnion’s inquiries down 16% on average, and Equifax’s down 9%, mortgage revenue would have grown 77% absent any mix shift or share loss, by our calculations.
Nonmortgage B2B revenue ($115 million) was flat year over year even as auto and credit card origination loans grew double digits, suggesting softness in nonorigination or other lines of business such as personal loans. We've reduced our fiscal 2027 estimate to 7% growth from 10%. For comparison, revenue growth in fiscal 2026 and 2025 was 4% and 13%, respectively. B2C scores revenue of $58 million came in just below our $60 million estimate. We expect about 3% annual growth through the cycle.
The firm’s software business, which represented 16% of the firm’s profit in the quarter, performed well with bookings accelerating. This suggests that fears of artificial intelligence disruption, at least in the near term, are not a headwind for the business.
Fair value
After updating our model, we have reduced our fair value estimate on Fair Isaac to $720 per share from $780 after lowering our nonmortgage scores revenue assumptions. While origination revenue in auto and card has been strong, reported B2B nonmortgage revenue has trailed these numbers. Our fair value estimate equates to about 19 times our fiscal 2027 GAAP EPS estimate.
We project revenue to grow at a 5% compound annual growth rate over the next five years. Scores segment adjusted operating margin was 90% in fiscal 2026, leaving little room for expansion. The software segment, with a 28% adjusted operating margin, has more room to improve, and we expect it to be about 36% by fiscal 2031 due to cost take-outs. On Oct. 6, 2026, Fair Isaac announced it would trim its headcount by approximately 15% in fiscal 2027. We suspect most of the reduction will come from the firm’s software business. Segment-adjusted operating margins exclude unallocated expenses and stock-based compensation, so "true" margins are lower than they appear.
Scores generated over 80% of the firm's profit and are currently growing faster than software, making them the most important driver of our forecast. However, we expect a slowdown in scores as the firm’s ability to take price is limited by regulatory and tactical considerations. For fiscal 2027 to fiscal 2031, we expect scores revenue growth to average 5% per year. Mortgage revenue will still face volume headwinds in 2027, and we account for some losses to a potential bi-merge. Over the next five years, we expect nonmortgage B2B scores revenue to grow at about a 7% clip and B2C at about a 3% to 4% clip. We use a weighted average cost of capital of 8.2%.
Economic moat
Overall, we believe Fair Isaac warrants a narrow Morningstar Economic Moat Rating. We base this on the firm’s benchmark scores business, which we believe possesses an intangible asset and network effect moat source.
In general, we believe there are two main use cases for FICO scores. The first is to make an underwriting decision for an individual loan. The second is as a benchmark for credit quality among various stakeholders such as originators, investors, analysts, and regulators.
We do not see the underwriting use case as particularly moaty. Many lenders do not use, or do not heavily weigh, FICO scores for their consumer lending decisions. Underwriting is a highly differentiated and often proprietary process for a lender. Capital One, for instance, differentiated itself with an “information-based strategy” that used information technology and sophisticated analytics.
It is the benchmark use case that we believe gives Fair Isaac its moat. Even if loans are not underwritten using FICO scores, originators still use FICO scores as a way of communicating their credit quality. Network effect businesses have winner-take-all or winner-take-most dynamics, and this is what we see with Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac, citing a Mercator Advisory Group study in 2023, notes that it has 95% market share across seven categories of nonmortgage asset-backed securities, to this effect. We also note that in the mortgage space, predicting prepayments is a very important consideration for investors.
We see multiple examples of lenders not using FICO scores for underwriting, but they use FICO scores nonetheless when communicating credit quality to key stakeholders. Since 2014, CarMax has disclosed that for its auto financing unit, “FICO scores are not a significant factor in our primary scoring model, which relies on information from credit bureaus and other application information.” Despite this, the firm’s latest car loan-backed asset-backed securities reference a weighted average FICO score, indicating that utilization of the product is effectively unavoidable when involving certain stakeholders.
From the mid-1990s to 2026, the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) required FICO scores for government conforming mortgages. In April 2026, a handful of lenders were permitted to use VantageScore, and by September 2026, all were permitted to do so.
Our rationale for a narrow moat rather than a wide moat is that the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, have enormous influence on Fair Isaac even if they can’t regulate pricing. We’ve been struck by the degree to which the GSEs, which are undercapitalized, are willing to cede economics via score shopping and potentially a higher cost of funding, as investors will generally demand a premium on VantageScore-backed pools.
In the meantime though, we expect that the non-GSE market will be more risk averse, and we expect mortgage insurers to carefully consider the long history of FICO scores as well as capital requirements based on scores.
Where Fair Isaac’s market share ultimately settles is an open question, in our view. Over a long enough time horizon, investors will likely incorporate VantageScore and FICO into their workflows, and the GSEs could adjust their practices such that meaningful spreads diminish. We note that agency MBS are guaranteed, but prepayment behavior can affect their value. Generally speaking, higher credit score borrowers have a greater ability and willingness to refinance. For example, a bank may prefer an agency MBS pool (which is guaranteed from credit risk) with a lower FICO score, as lower score borrowers are less likely to refinance.
Scenarios where Fair Isaac retains dominant market share are if investors continue to prefer FICO scores and discount VantageScore, if the GSEs are unwilling to cede revenue from VantageScore, or if both FICO and VantageScore become required in a future administration. Another possibility is that both Fair Isaac and VantageScore have market shares over 50%, with many but not all mortgages pulling both scores. We cannot rule out a future FHFA changing the score entirely to one score, in which case moving to VantageScore is a possibility.
Another issue we think Fair Isaac may face is declining score integrity. We believe there is strong evidence that VantageScore and FICO scores are not independent of each other. If FICO scores increasingly resemble a biased sample, they may lose their usefulness over time. One interesting analogy here is the structured finance market during the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Before the crisis, S&P and Moody’s were both dominant, with over 80% and Fitch at about 60% market share in the structured finance asset-backed market. However, there was a lot of rating shopping in this market and pressure to rate securities highly, and investors began to lose faith in the rating. As a result, S&P and Moody’s saw their market shares drop to around 50% each. Said differently, the mortgage credit scores market can go from a single standard to a more fragmented landscape whereby no one score is dominant, and new scores such as those based on consumer-permissioned data could gain traction.
Bull case
Fair Isaac has a long runway to increase prices, since it's a small cost but critical for lenders. The use of mortgage performance-based fees offers another avenue for price realization.
Fair Isaac has shown great capital allocation by having optimal leverage, repurchasing shares, and avoiding pricey and distracting acquisitions.
VantageScore will not gain traction in mortgage, as it will only be pulled alongside—rather than in lieu of—FICO and its loans will often incur a higher cost of capital.
Bear case
The FHFA decision to allow VantageScore for government-conforming mortgages will alter its pricing strategy and could result in VantageScore gaining traction in both mortgage and nonmortgage markets. In addition, VantageScore could gain traction for mortgage prequalifications.
Fair Isaac's revenue has shifted toward mortgage scores due to price increases, and mortgage volume growth may continue to prove elusive as interest rates rise.
The government-sponsored entities may take their time to allow FICO 10T and the direct license program for GSE mortgages.
By Rajiv Bhatia, CFA
Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:16 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
Fair Isaac discussion 0 comments