Grab Holdings
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Software - Application
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grab Holdings (GRAB) | 11.10B | 27.50 | 1.64 | 0.00% |
| SAP SE (SAP) | 229.61B | 26.25 | 4.56 | 1.43% |
| Shopify (SHOP) | 159.17B | 75.90 | 12.48 | 0.00% |
| Salesforce (CRM) | 148.65B | 16.54 | 3.87 | 0.95% |
| Uber Technologies (UBER) | 129.60B | 37.34 | 4.69 | 0.00% |
| Automatic Data Processing (ADP) | 119.10B | 26.75 | 23.39 | 2.25% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 103.6% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Grab's third-quarter revenue grew 27% year-on-year, driven by the expansion of its fintech business as the loan book increased by 230% to USD 2.7 billion. Its on-demand gross merchandise value also increased by 18%.
Why it matters: Revenue was 3% higher than our estimate, and Grab raised the midpoint of its 2026 revenue guidance to USD 4.18 billion from USD 4.13 billion, driven by new fintech acquisitions, Stash and Atome. We believe the two companies can drive the loan portfolio to USD 6 billion by 2028. Grab's fintech revenue grew 123% year-on-year to USD 201 billion and delivered on time to be profitable by 2026's second-half. Profitability should be viable given the nonperforming loan rate is at 2.6% and has only increased by 50 basis points since 2025, which suggests low credit risk. On-demand GMV growth decelerated to 18% from 24% year-on-year, but implied core users increased 17% to 50.6 million, suggesting greater adoption of the ecosystem in the region.
The bottom line: We maintain our fair value estimate at USD 5.60 for Grab and view shares as undervalued. Grab has widened its leadership in Southeast Asia for on-demand services as its largest rival GoTo appears to allocate fewer resources to its business, as its GMV was flat this quarter. Grab shares rose 4% post-bell on Monday, suggesting a positive outlook on user growth and fintech performance despite similar guidance. We believe investors still have questions on capital allocation and credit risk for its fintech services, but the low NPL rate suggests no issues so far. Grab expects a 15%-20% EBITDA margin long-term for the fintech unit, which is in the range of Ant Financial's historic net margin in our view. However, the ceiling remains uncertain, but Grab is aggressively expanding the business.
Big picture: We see a ballooning financial services race to serve underbanked customers in the region and are positive on Grab's prudence in maintaining a low NPL rate despite heavy competition.
We estimate that a 15%-20% operating margin as a percentage of revenue translates to a 4%-7% EBITDA margin as a percentage of the loan book. Outside of Singapore, where 98% of the population is banked, Southeast Asia has about 70% of the population underbanked or unbanked, led by the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
In our view, NPL ratios crossing 5% are viewed by regulators and central banks as a traditional danger threshold that could lead to credit distress. We believe high-performing banks aim to keep ratios well under 2% to 3%.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate for Grab is $5.60 per share, and valuation will largely depend on revenue and margins for the mobility and delivery businesses in the short to midterm. However, Grab is seeing the emergence of its advertising business as another key driver for valuation in the long term. The main drivers will be revenue, EBITDA margin, GMV growth, and the ability to raise take rates (the commission rate that Grab charges based on the overall ticket value) in these businesses. For the next three to five years, we expect Grab’s GMV to grow significantly at double digits. As for margins, current adjusted EBITDA for mobility is close to 9%, which is already at the long-term levels that management is forecasting. The company indicated that it has the ability to increase its margin by raising the take rate or decreasing incentive levels for consumers, but it believes that demand could decline if it were to do that.
For the delivery business, adjusted EBITDA margin is 1%-2%, and the company indicated that its long-term forecast is 3%-4%. We believe Grab can eventually reach the top end of that guidance given that competitors such as Uber and DoorDash have been able to charge net take rates up to 16% and 12%, respectively. We believe Grab should be able to increase its net take rate in the long term by increasing its commission levels or giving away fewer incentives.
In the financial services business, revenue and profitability would rely on Grab raising its profile in Southeast Asia, leading to additional users adopting its platform and using its insurance products or loans. We forecast modest growth and 5% adjusted long-term EBITDA margins in the financial services division.
Management indicated the segment should break even by end-2026. We forecast for Grab to reach its goal for now but acknowledge that there could be downside risks to our estimates given the uncertainty of borrowers defaulting.
We see a wide range of outcomes for the shares, including a best-case scenario in which Grab can transform its app into the ubiquitous super-app that it had envisioned. The current app includes ride-hailing, delivery, and financial services—which the company hopes to leverage into an app that is pervasive in everyday life for individuals in Southeast Asia. However, given the wide range of outcomes we see for the business, this segment could be economically unviable and contribute minimally to our fair value estimate in a bear-case scenario. If this were to happen, Grab would abandon its efforts in its financial services business, which would leave only its core businesses standing.
In a best-case scenario, we expect its financial services business to take off as well, where its fintech payment services would be pervasive throughout Southeast Asia. The flywheel effect from its services could cause its users to spend more time on the platform, where it starts to become the everyday super-app that the company visualizes. Grab could generate incremental ad revenue similar to WeChat, where the app is ubiquitous in everyday Chinese life, offering everything from payments, purchasing, a mini-browser, social media, and more. Our bull-case scenario assumes the success of its financial services business but does not yet assume that Grab can become the WeChat-like behemoth for Southeast Asia.
Economic moat
We assign a Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of none to Grab, as the company is still incurring heavy losses—and is still in the growth stage of ramping up its business, where there is still uncertainty about its long-term profitability, despite having a leading market share in ride-hailing and food delivery in several Southeast Asian countries. We think that its core businesses—ride-hailing and food delivery—both demonstrate a positive network effect and have accumulated large amounts of consumer data at this current stage but are vulnerable to minimal switching costs. This is especially true for its food delivery business, given significant competition with Delivery Hero-owned Foodpanda, GoFood, and ShopeeFood in Southeast Asia. For the overall company, current heavy operating losses outweigh its developing network effect and factor into our moat rating despite pockets of positive return on investment. We believe Grab’s current strategy is to cultivate switching costs for its business so that it can develop a moat around its platform, and to do so, it wants to combine everyday consumer services into one comprehensive super-app—that includes its ride-hailing, food and grocery delivery, hospitality booking, and also its nascent financial services business that provides digital payments and bank loans. By incorporating different services, Grab hopes to capture a cross-selling flywheel effect on its platform where users will subsequently increase the time spent on its app, which ultimately transforms the platform into a ubiquitous ecosystem that plays an important part of daily life for Southeast Asian individuals.
However, we view Grab as a platform providing two separate services that share operating expenses, rather than the all-encompassing ecosystem in its long-term vision. The platform app is still a work in progress that satisfies consumer demand for the services rendered, but not ubiquitous like its counterpart WeChat in China—the latter provides search, payment, purchasing, and social media functions. We are encouraged by Grab’s dominant market share in several of its core countries but believe there is too much uncertainty to determine whether it can be successful in its endeavors, as the platform will take time to build out. Outside of its operations in Singapore, Grab operates in emerging markets where consumers are likely to be price-sensitive, given lower disposable income. We think that commoditized services such as ride-hailing and food delivery are susceptible to low-cost strategies where competitors can offer incentives or vouchers that expose low customer switching costs and lack of brand loyalty. In addition, its financial services business is in its nascent stage, incurring the largest operating loss out of its segments as Grab hopes to incorporate this element into its super-app similar to WeChat Pay. It is too early to determine whether its fintech venture can be successful, as the competitive landscape is likely to be challenging and already saturated, unlike the near duopoly of Alipay and WeChat Pay in China. However, we view Grab’s ride-hailing business as having at least a narrow moat given its network effect and consumer data from years of operations, similar to its American counterparts, Uber or Lyft, which also have narrow moats.
We believe that even if Grab is unable to transform itself into the super-app that it has set in its long-term vision, the platform could at least position itself as Uber, which has a first-mover advantage, substantial network effect, and intangible assets from years of data collection from its users. Following Grab’s acquisition of Uber’s Southeast Asian operations in 2018, the company has a dominant market share in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines for ride-hailing. There are some local alternatives for ride-hailing in each country, but there are none that are as pervasive across Southeast Asia or close to the size of Grab’s ride-hailing operations currently. Outside of Indonesia, where the closest competitor is Gojek, which is the ride-hailing arm of multinational GoTo—there is no other multinational operation for ride-hailing such as Grab. To illustrate Grab’s market share, Gojek entered Singapore in 2018 and still lags Grab and local-based ComfortDelGro in terms of ride numbers. While users have no switching costs and are likely to prefer the cheapest option, the lack of existing established competitors that have large war chests should mean that new entrants will need some time and capital to set up initial outlay costs. This may be more difficult in the current inflationary environment.
Grab’s ride-hailing adjusted EBITDA margin hovers around 12%, which the company indicated is its long-term target and similar to Uber. This leads us to believe that operations are scalable given Uber’s ROI increases along with the number of rides. Uber increased its EBITDA margin due to its operating leverage brought forth by the network effect, especially during the pandemic as the delivery side grew significantly. Uber’s sales and marketing expenses as a percentage of revenue declined during the recovery last year. Given a leading market share in its core countries like Uber and an expanding network effect unimpeded by a lack of major competition, we believe that Grab can also follow a similar pattern, leading to favorable future ROI.
As for food delivery, Grab leverages its drivers to perform 3P delivery functions, which should provide cost synergies favorable to long-term ROI. According to management, over 60% of drivers who work in ride-hailing also perform food delivery tasks, which highlights some of the cost overlaps between the two businesses. However, lack of profitability and volume of high-margin marketplace orders leads us to a no-moat rating for this segment for now. Current adjusted EBITDA margin remains negative (negative 1%), and the competitive landscape for this business is more crowded than that of ride-hailing. Foodpanda, Deliveroo, ShopeeFood, and emerging peers such as LINE Man or Lalafood hold significant market share in Southeast Asia. This means food delivery should be more susceptible to incentive wars and low switching costs, as other peers are already established in the market. There are signs that Grab’s food delivery requires the constant use of vouchers to maintain its market share, as there is a strong correlation between the deceleration of consumer incentives and the GMV growth of Grab’s food delivery business. This is different from the relationship between ride-hailing and incentives used. According to third-party think tank Snapcart, promotions and cheap delivery fees are two of the top three factors in choosing which platform to use. We view food delivery as a commoditized service, as customers are likely to be more price-sensitive and prefer cheaper options given competitors are substitutes.
Grab now has leading market share for delivery as it does with ride-hailing. However, margin uplift is limited, as management indicated its long-term forecast for adjusted EBITDA is about 3%-4%. We believe the low ceiling outlook is likely due to a need to protect its market share using incentives to ward off competition and keep customers on the platform. This is given the strong correlation between voucher use and GMV growth, which illustrates the lack of loyalty and low switching costs.
The third major Grab business, financial services—which includes fintech payments, insurance products, and business loans—has a no-moat rating. The financial services business currently is in its early stages and incurs major losses, and we estimate that Grab’s fintech payments business occupies less than 2% market share in Southeast Asia. We consider the industry in Southeast Asia saturated with plenty of competitors, as the payments business competes both with localized competitors for each country, as well as with global peers such as PayPal, Stripe, and Apple Pay. In order to reach a dominant share or become ubiquitous, Grab would likely have to increase spending on sales and marketing for customer acquisition. Greater user adoption is not necessarily guaranteed, as there are virtually zero switching costs to use another payment service.
Grab’s digital lending business in Southeast Asia serves the 480 million unbanked or underbanked population, but despite a relatively unsaturated market, it also has heavy competition and must compete not only with other e-commerce platforms (SeaMoney, GoTo) and digital-only banks such as Timo in Vietnam or Eon in the Philippines but also physical banks that have set up virtual operations such as OCBC and DBS in Singapore. Grab has a digital bank license in Singapore and Malaysia, and has a minority stake in Bank FAMA in Indonesia. In Singapore, it partners with Singtel to form GXS Bank for its digital bank operations. Currently, it has about USD 600 million in its loan portfolio compared with Sea's USD 4 billion.
None of Grab’s businesses outside of ride-hailing warrant a moat given the heavy competition, lack of switching costs, and negative returns for the moment. We are uncertain whether Grab can form a super-app in the long term, and at the moment there are limited data points that measure its adoption other than for ride-hailing or food delivery. However, we believe that at worst, its ride-hailing business on a stand-alone basis has a narrow moat, given its differentiating network effect and intangible data. Ultimately, if Grab can create an ecosystem that establishes a moat and switching costs, we believe the company is positioned for robust growth, given its leading market share and eventual ubiquity of its application, if we use WeChat as an example.
Bull case
Grab operates mostly in emerging markets, which should see above-average GMV growth in the short to midterm relative to developed peers.
Seventy percent of Southeast Asia’s population is either underbanked or unbanked, which facilitates growth for Grab’s financial services business.
The mobility business has no major competitors, which could facilitate continued robust GMV growth.
Bear case
The delivery business competes with several other peers with low profitability in the industry.
We think there are legitimate questions about the road map to profitability of the financial services business and its weak market positioning.
Possibility of a bigger conglomerate with a massive war chest as a market entrant if capital allocation is not an issue for a new competitor.
By Kai Wang, CFA
Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:34 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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