Lithia Motors
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 204.59-339.81, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is +5.5% above the average-multiple fair value of 272.20.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Auto & Truck Dealerships
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lithia Motors (LAD) | 6.21B | 8.28 | 0.94 | 0.83% |
| Carvana (CVNA) | 46.15B | 30.70 | 10.60 | 0.00% |
| Penske Automotive (PAG) | 13.94B | 15.47 | 2.34 | 2.66% |
| CarMax (KMX) | 6.82B | 22.57 | 1.08 | 0.00% |
| Rush Enterprises-B (RUSHB) | 6.63B | 24.80 | 2.77 | 0.91% |
| AutoNation (AN) | 5.61B | 8.44 | 2.48 | 0.00% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 49.8% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Lithia Motors’ third-quarter adjusted diluted earnings per share of $10.34 beat the $9.77 LSEG consensus, and the company announced a 7% increase to its quarterly dividend to $0.75 per share. Management said share repurchases remain attractive, and third-quarter buybacks totaled about $84.9 million.
Why it matters: Lithia’s stock fell over 7% during Oct. 21 trading despite adjusted operating margin only falling by 10 basis points to a still strong 4.3%. We think the market is focused only on the company’s very near-term prospects, and that same-store revenue fell 1.4% year-over-year. We think market sentiment on the auto dealer space is poor, with most names near 52-week lows. We suspect the market is nervous about rising interest rates and the broader US macroeconomic environment and is shortchanging Lithia’s ability to grow for a long time through several channels. Lithia is set up to keep growing organically by using AI to increase service sales, while management sees other efficiencies that will reduce overhead costs as a percent of gross profit by 500 basis points over the long term. The finance arm continues to increase income, up 69% in the quarter.
The bottom line: We are not changing our Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of narrow or fair value estimate on Lithia. We consider the shares attractive for long-term growth-focused investors. The dealer space is highly fragmented, and Lithia has only a low-single-digit share, so the growth runway is long. We like management’s view that buybacks remain attractive, with the stock well below our fair value estimate. The program has $535 million remaining authorization as of Sept. 30, and Lithia has repurchased 8.7% of its stock so far in 2026. We are comfortable with Lithia’s ability to generate organic free cash flow, so we don't think the company needs access to capital markets if the economy worsens. Total liquidity, including credit lines, at Sept. 30 was $1.4 billion.
Fair value
We maintain our fair value estimate at $430 per share. Following the close of the Pendragon deal in the UK, which is a region that has less lucrative financing operations than US dealers, management in a 2024 slide deck lowered its then so-called “future state” long-term operating margin target by 200 basis points to over 5% from 7%. We include floorplan interest in our midcycle operating margin number and we have our midcycle operating margin at 4% on better overhead cost scaling as revenue keeps growing over time. We find Lithia’s long-term growth story very attractive, and we could see our fair value estimate rising over time.
We model Lithia reaching its long-talked-about (but now deemphasized) milestone of $50 billion in revenue in 2030. Midcycle operating margin increases are possible to capture additional scale benefits as Lithia keeps expanding and because it is an excellent operator in leveraging its overhead. Long term, beyond 2030, management targets $2 in EPS for every $1 billion in sales. Total revenue over our five-year forecast period is around $219 billion. Our five-year revenue compound annual growth rate is about 6%. Operating margin, including floorplan interest, for our entire stage one five-year forecast averages about 4%. We model $2 billion of annual acquired revenue in 2026 and 2027 at a price/sales multiple of 0.25. We model about $3 billion to $4 billion for each year of 2028-30, all at a price/sales multiple of 0.25. Management is a strong operating team, so we give it a lot of benefit of the doubt that the Driveway online shopping portal can keep growing and bring unprecedented expense leverage due to more digital capability.
Our weighted average cost of capital assumption is 8.3%. Lithia tends to have one of the lowest ratios of selling, general, and administrative expense as a percentage of gross profit in the dealer sector; thus, it is a top operator, which can result in positive earnings surprises.
Despite strong SG&A efficiency, the company still has room to improve SG&A as a percentage of gross profit, as SG&A efficiency is not uniform across the company and larger deals could bring more scale from more profitable used sales, leasing, and financing. Lithia also has many recently acquired stores that are not yet up to management's expectations. In 2022, the company talked about how its larger stores acquired have better SG&A leverage than smaller stores acquired, which is influencing the type of stores it wants to acquire. Lithia still has a very long growth runway ahead and is investing in new verticals such as RV dealerships, electric vehicle charging, and fleet management. By the end of 2028, the company will move its US dealer management system to Pinewood, which should improve SG&A leverage by reducing complexity.
Driveway Finance Corp.'s captive finance arm had an average loan book of $5.6 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2026. The company expects the loan book to reach $17 billion long term, ultimately financing 20% of Lithia's US retail unit sales (up from 14.5% in 2025). A DFC loan has about triple the profits over the loan's life compared with a third-party commission that Lithia gets for getting a customer financed from a Lithia lending partner. Management guides for DFC to eventually generate $550 million-$600 million in earnings on a $17 billion loan portfolio, up from $74.6 million in 2025. We think Lithia will continue to realize strong SG&A leverage as it brings newly acquired stores up to its operating standards and gains the scale to match its growth. We model capital expenditures at slightly below 1% of sales per year on average.
Economic moat
We assign Lithia a Narrow Morningstar Economic Moat Rating. The firm shares the same narrow-moat traits as other public dealers (cost advantage and intangibles) but also has a distinctive rural market focus that leaves it with no formidable competition for a given brand. State franchise laws are another source of the sector's moat, and Lithia's rural focus makes this advantage even more powerful than its competitors by giving the company efficient scale. Franchises are difficult to terminate even in an OEM bankruptcy, and laws exist stating that a brand cannot have a rival store within a fixed distance of an existing one. This distance plays right into Lithia's business model: If one goes just outside towns such as Fairbanks, Alaska; Midland, Texas; or Billings, Montana, there is little to no development. It also owns dealerships in Hawaii because an island limits the number of stores a brand will have there.
Despite the DCH deal in 2014 and subsequent purchases moving the company into large metropolitan markets, management is retaining its rural strategy. Lithia now pursues growth in both rural and metro areas, so we see no reason to change our moat rating because of the strategy change to both metro and rural markets. Lithia's competitors operate in large metro areas and also have narrow moats, just not from efficient scale, as Lithia does with its rural market niche. Other dealers' moats come from cost and intangible advantages, which Lithia also shares. The firm targets overhead cost as a percent of gross profit to fall by 10 percentage points over the long term, into the high 50% range, strengthening its cost advantage over smaller dealers. This overhead improvement will come via AI yielding more sales by preselling further services when a customer books an online appointment and by improving volumes and maximizing existing assets. For example, selling more generic parts over more expensive automaker-branded parts once a vehicle is off-warranty to help consumers say yes to a job more often, or doing more of the service or vehicle sale at a customer's home.
We think the dealer sector is the best business in the automotive supply chain. The public dealers can centralize back-office operations and generate far more volume than a small dealer, which brings scale. Dealers have no burdensome retiree expenses, and the large public dealers are not dependent on the health of one brand. The dealers enjoy mid- to high-single-digit gross margins on new vehicles and 100% gross margins on financing and insurance. We think the best source of competitive advantage is parts and service. Many customers bring their vehicle to the dealer for servicing because the vehicle is either under warranty or because the dealer is close to home and has the factory parts and expertise to service the vehicle. Once vehicle owners know a dealer, we think they are likely to keep going back to the dealer for service. The dealer knows the vehicle, and comparison shopping for repair work is time-consuming because the customer has to bring the vehicle to each shop for a quote.
These logistics create inelastic demand, which in turn gives dealers pricing power and a source of strong profit in good times and bad. In fact, during a downturn in new-vehicle sales, dealers generally report higher gross margins, owing to a favorable mix shift, but then report lower operating margins because of selling, general, and administrative expense deleveraging. Excluding large impairment and restructuring charges, dealers can still report positive EBIT even in a severe recession. Although most dealerships are good businesses, we think the large publicly traded dealers are best positioned for growth since these firms can be the most flexible in changing brand mix, and their growing size means they can achieve working-capital efficiencies by moving inventory around their store base. Many small-business owners are choosing to exit or sell because they cannot get the scale on a variety of expenses compared with large dealer groups. About 91% of dealer owners own between one and five stores per the National Automobile Dealers Association, and we see that ratio continuing to fall over time, so we see a long growth runway for consolidators such as Lithia.
Bull case
Lithia’s growth runway looks very long to us; acquisitions are opening up new areas of the US, and international expansion has started by entering Canada in 2021 and the UK in 2023.
Manufacturers grant a limited number of franchise rights in a given geographic area, providing dealers with some protection against potential competitors.
In our opinion, Lithia’s rural niche in the US makes it the Walmart of auto dealers.
Bear case
Lithia could need additional capital to fund expansion. In addition, it will face increased competition for acquisitions now that it will operate in large cities.
Making many large acquisitions in quick succession increases integration risk.
If gas prices ever get severely high, Lithia could suffer because its rural customers favor pickups and SUVs.
By David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:05 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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