Southwest Airlines
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Airlines
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Southwest Airlines (LUV) | 21.58B | 21.50 | 2.94 | 1.63% |
| Delta Air Lines (DAL) | 52.64B | 15.97 | 2.34 | 0.97% |
| United Airlines (UAL) | 32.82B | 9.25 | 1.85 | 0.00% |
| Ryanair (RYAAY) | 28.04B | 14.37 | 2.20 | 1.61% |
| LATAM Airlines Group (LTM) | 12.66B | 7.86 | 5.73 | 3.45% |
| American Airlines (AAL) | 7.88B | -16.30 | -1.86 | 0.00% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 22.0% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
On Friday, Nov. 13, in response to malfunctioning network communications equipment, the US Federal Aviation Administration halted domestic air departures for several hours, stranding thousands of fliers and snarling airport tarmacs for days.
Why it matters: The failure reportedly stemmed from a couple of malfunctioning network routers recently installed by the contractor L3Harris, which administers the FAA's communication network. It remains unclear whether hardware, software, or configuration were to blame. In any case, a security breach does not seem the likely cause, despite initial concerns at the time of the FAA's announcement of the ground stop that a cyberattack or other security breach may have been underway. Airlines face disruptions to their flight schedules quite frequently, though only rarely on a truly nationwide scale. They have evolved to cope with getting their equipment, staff, and passengers rerouted and back on schedule, though this can take several burdensome days.
Between the lines: Even if an error on L3Harris's part caused the new routers to swamp the FAA's network, we do not expect meaningful financial consequences to the company. On the contrary, the apparent fragility of the FAA's system and the strain it places on air traffic controllers seem likely to steel political resolve to fund and complete the FAA network's overhaul as soon as possible.
The bottom line: We haven't altered our forecasts or fair value estimates for the no-moat US airlines, which remain at least 10% overvalued for reasons unrelated to the outage. We maintain our $342 fair value estimate for narrow-moat L3Harris, which trades at a 23% discount. With its Medium Morningstar Uncertainty Rating, we would consider L3Harris shares compellingly cheap below $240 per share. Along with other defense contractors, its shares have gotten cheaper in recent months driven in part by doubts about future military budgets.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate is $34.40 per share, representing an enterprise value of 5.3 times our 2026 EBITDA estimate and 11.6 times our 2026 GAAP earnings estimate. In January 2026, the airline introduced seats with extra legroom and started assigning seats with ticket purchases and pricing them based on their desirability in the cabin. In late 2025, it also introduced a basic economy ticket, which will not include its customary allowance for two checked bags, thus matching the industry standard for bargain air travel. We believe that matching industry practice will restore Southwest's ability to compete with its full-service rivals as well as other no-frills carriers using its distinct route network.
Over the near term, we still expect strong domestic leisure travel and strengthening business travel as workers return to offices. We anticipate Southwest's load factors may hover around recent lows below 80% and its passenger revenue yields are likely to exceed $0.20 per mile as its pricing segmentation takes effect.
Our operating margin forecast averages 7.8%, compared with the 2015-19 average of 16.4%. We no longer see evidence that pandemic-related restructuring has generated labor efficiencies at Southwest. We observe airlines adding unit costs as they rehire necessary crew and renegotiate labor agreements. We forecast 4 more cents in structural costs per available seat mile in Southwest's midterm future than it experienced in 2015-19, which is largely a reflection of the simple reality that Southwest's unit costs more closely resemble those of a "normal" airline than they did a decade ago.
We expect capital expenditures around $3 billion in 2026, as Southwest is awaiting delivery of dozens of 737 MAX aircraft during the year, and average around $3.0 billion per year over our explicit forecast period (compared with the 2015-19 average of $1.8 billion), though the airline has announced plans to offset some of these outlays with opportunistic sales of its existing jets and even new ones from its Boeing order book.
We think Southwest deserves a cost of equity on par with the best US-based airline peers, and a lower cost of debt given its conservative balance sheet. Southwest continues to fund its business with more equity than debt, which results in an 8.2% weighted average cost of capital.
Economic moat
We assign Southwest Airlines a Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of none.
Airlines rent seats by the hour on aircraft that fly for decades, their operations and financial results subject to fluctuations beyond their control including volatile fuel costs, growth in labor costs, weather, seasonal variation in travel demand, and ticket prices in most markets. The airline business remains price-competitive, capital-intensive, and labor-intensive, all of which make it difficult for an airline to generate any profit beyond its cost of capital. IATA, an industry group, published estimates in 2020 and 2026 that return on invested capital had only approached the industry's cost of capital once in 30 years, never exceeding it. Our own modeling reflects the same reality for Southwest: over the last decade it showed volatile annual ROICs ranging from 25% to negative 29%, averaging 8.5%, consistent with our 8.2% cost of capital estimate and our midcycle forecast.
What's more, the industry was pummeled by severe macroeconomic shocks over the last two decades: Sept. 11, 2001, two global pandemics (SARS and covid-19), and the global financial crisis. Airlines experienced drastic and systemic disruptions to their operations, staffing, and financial viability, resulting in much higher leverage and many bankruptcies. Similar shocks are likely to recur at any time, which no airline can defend itself from, leaving investors persistently at risk of permanent capital loss.
Although the amount of fuel needed to power every flight is known to the gallon by weight at takeoff, the price the airline will pay for it can vary widely over a week, seasonally, and regionally. Most important about fuel prices is that each airline experiences them in more or less the same way: they are a commodity. Most of the time, airlines can pass this cost on to customers by charging more per mile when fuel prices are high. Over the long term, airline CPI, a component of consumer CPI, has been remarkably stable notwithstanding transitory spikes in fuel prices, implying that aggregate airline fares operate similarly to a commodity, as well.
Major US carriers have partnered with a credit card issuing bank to promote loyalty programs that feature their frequent flyer points. For some, these programs, in which the bank pays the airline more for the points up front than they are technically worth to redeem, represent the lion's share of ongoing operating profit. We do not see these programs as changing the competitive dynamics or structural profitability of the airline. Rather, the airlines have time-shifted when they experience any profit from serving a loyal segment of customers, in many cases redeeming points for perks such as premium seating and lounge access that add incremental cost to provide and maintain.
Through persistent price competition, basic advertised airfares now only include transportation for a passenger (and a small personal item) in an unassigned seat. Labor and other cost inflation have narrowed the historical gap in structural unit costs between discount and full-service carriers. Instead, by charging higher fares to include baggage allowance, seat assignments, and a widening array of other perks, and by exchanging them for collected loyalty points, airlines have tried to establish switching costs among certain segments of their customers. If they represented a large enough and loyal enough portion of customers to deliver economic profits to an airline over an entire cycle, we might ascribe it a narrow moat, though we suspect that industry fundamentals and price competition will outweigh segmentation through the next downturn.
The most-costly competition airlines engage in is for aircraft. Every other decade or so, Boeing and Airbus offer new models powered by new engines that can fly farther, carry more passengers, and consume less fuel. We observe a steady increase in available seat miles (ASMs) flown per gallon of fuel consumed across all airlines, as they consistently upgrade their fleets. Delta, United, and American were able to fly an average airplane seat about 60 miles on a gallon of fuel in 2012 and approached 70 in 2023. Southwest went from 70 ASMs per gallon a decade ago to over 80 in 2023. Southwest has a mileage advantage versus the Big Three because it flies only variants of the narrow-body 737 on point-to-point routes, while the others fly hub-and-spoke routes with regional and wide-body jets that burn more fuel per seat mile. The structural unit cost (cents per ASM) advantage Southwest enjoyed versus legacy carriers in the 2000s has all but eroded while budget leisure airlines like Spirit, Frontier, and Allegiant emerged with even-lower unit costs than Southwest’s. The mileage trend reflects improvements in engine efficiency, wing design, and fuselage materials, and it represents a competitive ratchet that no airline can afford to ignore: multiplied over many hundreds of millions of seat miles per year, even a small difference in fleet efficiency would represent a structural disadvantage for an airline competing on similar routes. Thus, airlines constantly refresh their fleet to stay competitive (new seats, bigger luggage trays, and the like are a side benefit of new planes that also may augment an airline's brand perception for a short time).
Airlines provide invaluable service to their customers and communities, often stimulating the economies of those destinations they connect to the global travel network. However, investors in airlines are literally flying on a wing and a prayer, as we see no prospect for durable economic profit in this industry. Instead, we observe that the duopoly airframe suppliers Airbus and Boeing and the oligopoly engine manufacturers GE, Safran, Pratt & Whitney, MTU, and Rolls-Royce reap the economic reward from providing successively more efficient, powerful aircraft that airlines line up to buy or rent so their service and cost profile can keep up with competing carriers.
Bull case
Southwest is adapting to customer preferences for premium seats, which could increase revenue yield and profitability, which has suffered for the airline recently.
Southwest's lean operating model and discipline leave it with the cleanest airline balance sheet in North America, lowering its risk profile for equity investors.
Southwest’s (belated) investments in yield management and operational technology should allow it to attract new customers through bulk ticketing agencies and mitigate future scheduling disruptions from weather.
Bear case
As the largest passenger carrier in the US, Southwest faces competition from legacy carriers as well as lower-cost airlines.
Southwest's growth plans have been hampered by Boeing's delayed deliveries of 737s, leaving the airline with more staff on payroll than it really needs.
Southwest's plan to assign seats and offer extra legroom in the cabin may expose it to more direct price competition on some routes, as its offering will more closely resemble other airlines.
By Nicolas Owens
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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