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Nike

US · NKE #423 by market cap Listed 1980
32.92 -1.41 -4.11%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Below fair value
47.91 fair value ≈ 61.24 74.57
  • Implied fair-value range of 47.91-74.57, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is -46.2% below the average-multiple fair value of 61.24.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 3.21 Cheap vs history 0th percentile
5-year average 9.40 · #9 of 14 in Footwear & Accessories
P/E ratio 15.75 Cheap vs history 0th percentile
5-year average 29.16 · forward 27.52 · #7 of 11 in Footwear & Accessories
P/S ratio 1.07 Cheap vs history 0th percentile
5-year average 2.80 · forward 1.16 · #9 of 14 in Footwear & Accessories

Vs. peers Footwear & Accessories

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Nike (NKE) 48.90B 15.75 3.21 4.98%
Deckers Outdoor (DECK) 10.40B 10.36 4.48 0.00%
On Holding (ONON) 10.02B 19.31 3.89 0.00%
Crocs (CROX) 7.07B 11.72 5.26 0.00%
Birkenstock (BIRK) 5.53B 16.69 1.80 0.00%
Steven Madden (SHOO) 2.90B 16.29 2.95 2.12%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value52.50 Economic moatNarrow UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 59.5% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Nike revealed Full Stride Ahead, a plan to focus on product innovation, local design and control, and supply chain speed, at its first investor day since 2017. The firm also reiterated its fiscal 2027 guidance and provided fiscal 2031 targets (12%-14% operating margin, $3.00-$3.50 in adjusted EPS).

Why it matters: Nike's share price has fallen about 80% over the past five years as it has lost share due to a lack of innovation and poor management of sales channels. A robust product pipeline provides confidence in a recovery, but sales and profit growth is at least a year away. The event solidified our stance that its resources ($1 billion in annual research and development spending) should enable it to limit competitive threats. Although its performance products lineup looks strong, declines in core lifestyle franchises will persist until excess inventory is cleared. Nike expects fiscal 2031 revenue of about $48 billion. Based on product management plans, the firm may lose share for the next two fiscal years before returning to market growth of around 4% in fiscal 2029 and then above-market growth in the following years.

The bottom line: Our $52.50 fair value estimate on narrow-moat Nike is unchanged. Investors may have hoped for a faster return to sales and profit growth, but its 2031 targets align with our forecast (12.5% operating margin, $3.32 in EPS), and we see a long-term investment opportunity. Gross margins should rise as new products and inventory clean-up efforts bring higher average selling prices and fewer markdowns. Further, by the end of fiscal 2031, Nike will have cut $2.5 billion in annual costs through outsourcing online fulfillment and other efficiency efforts. In Greater China (11% of sales), Nike is increasing local control over product development and planning while reorganizing sales channels to reduce discounts. After years of sales declines, we forecast these efforts should bring a return to growth in this critical market by fiscal 2029.

Nike highlighted some of its smaller brands at the event, but we do not forecast that any of them will generate material sales or profits in the foreseeable future. We are unclear as to why Nike holds on to Converse (2% of sales), as it is not a sports brand anymore and appeals to only a small niche of consumers. Sub-brands ACG and Nike Skims may have more long-term potential as they operate in the attractive markets of outdoor and women's athleisure, respectively. As such, they may be worth some management time and investment, but we do not believe this would be significant.

Although there has been some market talk of a possible dividend cut (current yield over 4%), Nike has committed to continuing to pay its current annual dividend of $2.4 billion per year ($1.64 per share). As we forecast about $4 billion (9% of sales) in average annual free cash flow to the firm over the next five fiscal years, we do not anticipate that the company will need to issue debt to make these payments (although some maturing debt may be refinanced). We maintain our Standard Morningstar Capital Allocation Rating.

Fair value

We cut our fair value estimate on Nike’s shares to $52.50 from $94 after its first-quarter results, reducing our Morningstar Economic Moat Rating (to narrow from wide), and lowering our financial expectations.

Nike opened fiscal 2027 with a 4% decline in sales. Gross margin rose just 60 basis points to 42.8% on lower logistics costs, and selling, general, and administrative expenses fell a mere 3% as expense control offset higher sports-related marketing.

Given the slow progress, management guided to fiscal 2027 adjusted EPS of $1.15-$1.35, short of our prereport $1.69 forecast. We expected that sales trends to improve, but management now anticipates a high-single-digit sales decline for the year. Consequently, for fiscal 2027, we now forecast an 8% drop in sales (down from a 2% decline previously), a 5.9% operating margin (from 6.8%), and $1.16 in EPS (from $1.69), including $300 million in expected restructuring charges.

We also lower our long-term expectations, as we think increased competition will negatively affect Nike’s sales and margins. Over the next decade, we assume a 3% compound annual growth rate in sales, down from 5% previously. Further, we estimate peak gross margin at 45% (down from 48%) and peak operating margin at 14% (down from 18%).

By region, we expect Nike to achieve annual revenue growth of roughly 3% after fiscal 2027 in North America, in line with expected market growth. We forecast mid-single-digit annual sales growth in Europe and emerging markets. In Greater China, Nike’s fastest-growing segment before recent challenges (including rising competition and poor customer traffic at franchised stores), we expect compound average growth of 1% over the next decade, down from 9% previously. This reflects our view that sportswear revenue growth has slowed in China and the market has become more competitive.

We think Nike’s operating margins will strengthen as it achieves cost efficiencies, shifts sales to direct channels, and increases sales in higher-margin Greater China (even if at a more measured clip). The firm’s restructuring plan, which includes layoffs and the elimination of layers of management, is expected to reduce expenses by an additional $2.5 billion over the next four years. In Greater China, we forecast Nike’s EBIT margins will rise to 29% (32% previously) from a very poor 22% in fiscal 2026. Nike’s EBIT margins in the region have recently been inconsistent due to economic conditions, clearing of obsolete inventory, and competition from native brands but should improve over time through greater investment. In North America, we forecast segment operating margins of about 26% after fiscal 2030 (down from 28% prior) as it increases direct-to-consumer sales and limits discounting of its products.

Economic moat

We lower our Morningstar Economic Moat Rating to narrow from wide but continue to believe that Nike holds a brand-based intangible asset edge. In a market where consumers choose products based on performance, style, and marketing, Nike and its premium sub-brand, Jordan, remain leaders in global sportswear share, with significant pricing power driven in part by annual sports sponsorship spending that is 20%-25% higher than second-place Adidas (KPMG). This spending drives visibility and consumer desirability, giving Nike a market-leading 30% share of the US sports footwear market versus 10% for Adidas (Euromonitor). However, with no barriers to entry or switching costs, emerging sports brands like On and Hoka have gained share in the more than $150-per-pair retail premium running-shoes market (Glossy.co). These brands have grown to mid-single-digit shares of the US sports footwear market from negligible levels before 2020 (Euromonitor). Given Nike’s long-term contractual and business relationships with athletes, leagues, suppliers, distributors, franchisees, and retailers, we do not think any challenger brands can erode the firm’s competitive advantage over the next 10 years, but we are now less confident over a 20-year horizon.

We believe Nike’s moat is strongest in its home market, where it has deep connections to amateur and professional sports, but acknowledge that former management was slow to respond to rivals. As such, CEO Elliott Hill is cutting costs and lifting marketing spending (to 10% of revenue in fiscal years 2025 and 2026 from 7%-8% in prior years). Through such efforts, we believe Nike will achieve a 13% midcycle operating margin (up from 10% over the past three years and 3 points above our apparel coverage average) and returns on invested capital (ROICs) that exceed our 9% weighted average cost of capital (WACC) hurdle and trend up to the mid-20s over the next decade from 16% in fiscal 2026.

Much of Nike’s increased marketing spending is tied directly to global sports, where it has deep connections that would be too costly (for example, due to rising endorsement prices) to replicate in a time frame that would threaten its narrow moat. The firm’s decades of marketing, technical innovation, and consumer data let it sell higher-priced items in higher volumes than peers in categories like basketball and football (soccer). For example, at global sporting goods retailers like Dick’s Sporting Goods/Foot Locker and JD Sports, many Jordan basketball shoe styles have US list prices above $170 per pair—the only widely available brand priced at this level. Across the entire basketball shoe market, Jordan has the highest per-pair average of $161 versus $120 for both Puma and Adidas and $110 for Under Armour, which we attribute to styling, quality, and endorsements with the most popular players (RunRepeat).

Nike has invested in its brand by accelerating both the pace of technical innovation and sports marketing. These efforts are especially important in football as boots (cleats) with the latest technology (materials, weight, etc.) carry retail prices that are roughly triple those of others. On has plans to challenge the leaders in this market, but it faces significant obstacles with virtually no past spending on innovation or marketing related to the sport. Meanwhile, both Nike and Adidas have annual football marketing budgets above $800 million and have the highest-selling and most expensive boots (Footy Headlines). Nike currently has two of the three most expensive regular-priced offerings, and 48% of professional players wear its boots (Footy.com). As evidence of the barriers to success, Under Armour and New Balance entered football in 2009 and 2015, respectively, but still have negligible (sub-1%) shares (RunRepeat).

Given its unparalleled reach, we believe Nike has competitive advantages and pricing power in emerging markets like China, where yearly per-capita sportswear spending is small (less than $50) but rising (Euromonitor). Nike and three other firms control nearly 60% of the Chinese sportswear market (Nike around 16%), making it more concentrated than developed markets (comparable figure is under 40%) and allowing less pricing pressure. Even so, Nike was slow to respond to recent entrants like Hoka and On, so it is increasing local product design and leaning into its strength in higher-priced performance footwear, where it has a 22% share versus 17% for second-place Anta (Euromonitor). This type of footwear has grown to 40% from 33% of China’s sports footwear market over the past decade but remains below the US comparable mark at 58%, suggesting expansion potential (Euromonitor). After its current restructuring, we forecast Nike will achieve 5% annual sales growth in China, in line with market levels. However, even if its pricing power falters and revenue declines, consolidated ROICs would still average 19% over the next decade, as China accounts for less than 15% of total revenue.

Nike’s ROICs have exceeded its WACC by sizable margins (averaging 13 points over the past 10 years), so we may consider removing its moat if competitive pricing pressure prevents this spread from expanding beyond recent levels of about 7 points by the end of its restructuring (fiscal 2030). Financial results could deteriorate from a permanent loss of pricing power across multiple sportswear categories. Consumers are willing to purchase from multiple brands, but the sportswear market is one in which few companies achieve broad success. For example, Under Armour is a legitimate challenger to Nike in some areas of performance apparel in the US but has largely failed in footwear; its share of the US sports footwear market halved between 2016 and 2025 (3.4% to 1.7%) despite the signing of NBA star Steph Curry away from Nike and other pricey investments (Euromonitor).

Bull case

The global sportswear market continues to expand, especially in Asia and other developing markets. As the market share leader with premium offerings, Nike is positioned to benefit.

Nike generates significant free cash flow and is committed to maintaining its quarterly dividend payments.

Nike’s strategy aims to improve efficiency while developing innovative products to drive sales and improve pricing. The firm is also investing in technology and cutting costs. Through these efforts, we anticipate EBIT margins will return to double-digit levels in the medium term.

Bear case

Nike has had a tumultuous period due to economic issues in key regions and its own mistakes. Given the depth of its problems, the timing of a turnaround is uncertain, especially in China.

Tariffs and higher oil prices are near-term risks that Nike cannot fully overcome through cost cuts and price increases. Moreover, inflation could reduce consumer demand for sportswear.

The success of relative newcomers like Hoka and On demonstrates how consumers will sample new footwear brands. Nike is under constant pressure to innovate to hold its share.

By David Swartz

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:20 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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