Pembina Pipeline
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Oil & Gas Midstream
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pembina Pipeline (PBA) | 28.00B | 20.74 | 2.60 | 4.22% |
| Enbridge (ENB) | 101.84B | 22.67 | 2.40 | 5.92% |
| Williams (WMB) | 80.40B | 25.32 | 5.12 | 3.23% |
| Enterprise Products (EPD) | 77.27B | 11.83 | 2.54 | 6.15% |
| Kinder Morgan (KMI) | 67.63B | 18.74 | 2.14 | 3.89% |
| TC Energy (TRP) | 64.72B | 23.89 | 3.63 | 3.94% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 2.4% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Pembina Pipeline's third-quarter adjusted EBITDA of CAD 1.13 billion came in above S&P consensus of CAD 1.04 billion. 2026 guidance was narrowed to a CAD 4.5 billion midpoint.
Why it matters: Commodity prices continue to be tailwinds for 2026 and 2027 as the Iran war supports higher prices in Asia. Our EBITDA forecast was already above the old EBITDA midpoint, and refreshing our commodity price deck increased it to the new midpoint. Major projects are now being discussed, with expansions of Greenlight and Cedar LNG being contemplated. We like the idea of both moving forward, given clear commercial need. Cedar can take advantage of excess capacity on the Coastal GasLink expansion servicing Canada LNG. Management wants to advertise a first-mover advantage for its data center/power generation business. We are skeptical that such an advantage truly exists with one project under construction. Many developers, some with a long track record, are floating projects in Alberta.
The bottom line: We are raising our fair value estimate to CAD 67 per share from CAD 66 and maintaining our USD 47 fair value estimate. The increase was driven primarily by the time value of money, as well as improved commodity prices in 2027 and 2028. We see shares as fairly valued, trading in 3-star territory.
Long view: Long-term, we see management's 5%-7% per share fee-based earnings growth as extremely achievable. Our own estimate trends near 6%, and 7% will require more investment. Distributable cash flow is set to grow as well, with a large inflection in 2030 as growth spending concludes. We see plenty of room for management to boost returns in 2028 if no additional major capital projects are pursued. However, there are multiple major pending claims on cash. Pembina is Pacific Link's private-sector partner and may demand CAD 4.5 billion at current cost estimates, depending on project-level financing. Greenlight 2 and Cedar LNG 2 would similarly take priority over expanded returns.
Fair value
We are maintaining our USD 47 fair value estimate. Our US-dollar-denominated fair value estimate uses a CAD 1.41/USD 1 conversion rate.
Uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment may delay announcements of new projects as Canadian producers review their capital plans. The sector’s reliance on take-or-pay contracts with midstream partners like Pembina provides an incentive to maintain production, but not grow it beyond their obligations. Still, there are some possible green shoots. With China turning away from US crude oil, purchases of Canadian crude eclipsed US purchases in 2025. Continued brittleness in relations may incentivize further investment in projects like the Trans Mountain pipeline. Pembina is advancing expansions of the Peace River system in response to increased customer demand.
Fundamentally, Pembina's earnings are driven by two levers: volume and pricing. The majority of existing volumes and pricing are protected by strong take-or-pay agreements, producing a low-volatility business. Further growth comes from new projects entering service. These have similarly strong contracts. Together, the existing portfolio can support a higher dividend, with low-single-digit growth and new projects boosting the business overall through higher volumes.
Economic moat
We currently don't believe Pembina has an economic moat, but we see a path to upgrading our assessment. Historically, the firm has struggled to consistently beat its cost of capital, due to poor investment decisions that have dragged down returns. The firm has grown through poorly timed acquisitions, which have inflated its capital base. We see the potential for consistent excess returns, but any improvement largely depends on successful organic rather than inorganic investment.
Areas of operation are subject to major stakeholder risk as pipelines crisscross First Nation land and sensitive wildlife areas. This adds complexity and can delay or kill projects. Cedar LNG is a joint venture with the Haisla Nation, helping to defuse potential stakeholder opposition. This represents an important shift, making our moat decision a close call. Ultimately, we erred on the side of caution because leadership is unchanged since the write-downs, but if current plans are executed successfully, we would likely upgrade our assessment.
The firm generates revenue through three types of arrangements. Take-or-pay agreements require the customer to either deliver commodities to the pipeline or pay a minimum fee. Contracted capacity not utilized can be resold, generally at a premium, as a pipeline is the lowest-cost method of transmission. Similarly, cost-of-service requires the customer to pay for transport and delivery, with an additional fee determined by the return on invested capital. Fee-for-service is generally a series of charges, including volume and capacity reservation fees, that commit a customer to deliver a minimum quantity of product. Finally, commodity-exposed revenue is generated by buying products from producers on a one-time or short-term basis, then leveraging spare capacity in the network to deliver them to a location where they can be sold for more.
The pipelines segment earns a narrow moat.
Revenue is largely secured with take-or-pay or cost-of-service agreements with customers. Compared with fee-for-service, in which the producer can decide whether to use the pipeline, these contracts are not volume-sensitive, as the producer is obligated to pay a fee regardless of whether they use the capacity.
Given Canada’s export-oriented oil and gas sector, volume growth is almost entirely dependent on new midstream capacity linking the landlocked fields in Alberta and British Columbia to consumers in the US or coastal export terminals on the Canadian west coast. For midstream firms, this is a great dynamic if the market is growing. To increase production, a producer bids up unallocated midstream capacity to displace another party or enters into a long-term agreement with a new pipeline. There are alternatives to pipelines, such as rail, but they have capacity and commodity limitations and are more expensive.
Pembina has also become the lone private partner in a proposed West Coast oil pipeline connecting the core of Alberta to Vancouver. The project could become lucrative for the firm and boost the segment’s ROICs. However, it also represents the type of projects that historically dragged down returns. A heavy oil pipeline, crossing environmentally and politically sensitive jurisdictions, that is also likely to blow past initial cost estimates should give investors pause. Luckily, the remaining 90% stake is held by the government, which will also be loaning funds to indigenous tribes for the purpose of buying into the project. This should lower the ultimate risks but does not eliminate them, as the project will likely be developed over a decade. Governments and public opinion can shift several times over that time.
The facilities segment, which processes the natural gas and NGL product streams, is unlikely to justify a moat as structured. The segment contains substantial field level gathering and processing operations, and we do not assign a moat to gathering and processing operations due to the generally shorter contract term and constant reinvestment needs. However, the fee structure underpinning the segment gives us pause in our moat evaluation.
Fees tend to be fixed and subject to regular increases, limiting exposure to commodity prices but not volume. Additionally, some contracts are determined by a set percentage return on invested capital, but these are in the minority. Fees reset on contract expiration, as initial contract rates tend to be higher to recoup investment costs. If competitors have invested aggressively in the same footprint over that time, then rates could reset lower.
Marketing and new ventures earn no moat.
Spare capacity in the other segments is sold on a one-time or short-term basis. This segment can see wide swings in performance as the spare capacity and the type and pricing of the commodities being marketed can vary greatly. As this is the segment’s primary activity, we assign it a no-moat rating.
In the future, the segment will also include a minority interest in Cedar LNG, expected to be completed at the end of 2028, and the Greenlight Electricity Centre. Both are tied to national and provincial strategic economic development priorities. Further expansions at both facilities are likely, with a second phase of the GEC already being contemplated.
These activities are far more moaty than marketing and could credibly result in a segmentwide and companywide upgrade.
Bull case
Strong take-or-pay contracts provide a low-volatility baseline to support investment and dividends.
Vertically integrated NGL fractionation and export capacity provides a powerful reason for producers to sign up with the firm.
Cedar LNG successfully clearing regulatory hurdles and progressing to development will meaningfully boost EBITDA once online.
Bear case
Take-or-pay provisions appear strong, but agreements eventually expire and are re-signed at market rates.
Canadian carbon taxes could make volumes less competitive and substantially hamper upstream investment.
A history of poorly timed investments has materially affected returns to shareholders. Further growth by acquisition risks repeating the same mistakes.
By Adam Baker
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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