Perrigo
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Perrigo (PRGO) | 2.21B | -1.25 | 0.91 | 7.28% |
| Takeda Pharmaceutical (TAK) | 69.76B | 311.00 | 1.50 | 1.44% |
| Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (TEVA) | 45.77B | 91.23 | 5.74 | 0.00% |
| Haleon (HLN) | 39.76B | 19.14 | 1.85 | 2.09% |
| Zoetis (ZTS) | 32.14B | 13.34 | 9.73 | 2.64% |
| United Therapeutics (UTHR) | 23.63B | 20.94 | 3.76 | 0.00% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 25.5% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Perrigo reported a 5% (or 2% organic) and 9% decline in revenue and adjusted EPS, respectively, during the third fiscal quarter. Shares are up 3%.
Why it matters: Both external and internal developments challenged results. A weak cough and cold season, on top of preexisting macro challenges, led to soft self-care consumption (down 3%), and lower contract volumes weighed on other categories (down mid-single-digit to low-teens percentages). Retailer behavior, an ongoing issue for Perrigo in 2026, persisted during the quarter. While inventory destocking was the main drag in the first half of the year, it has shifted to inventory buildout due to low cough and flu incidence. This was echoed by peers during the quarter, but we think it has an outsized impact on Perrigo since upper respiratory is the firm's largest category, making up 20% of revenue.
The bottom line: We maintain our $20 fair value estimate per share for no-moat Perrigo. Though shares, trading around $15, look 25% undervalued, we reiterate our Very High uncertainty on the name. Two business exits for the year rationalize the portfolio and enable a better use of capital. That said, we expect a lot of noise in results in upcoming quarters from divestiture impacts as well as pending further category reviews, which make apples-to-apples comparison difficult. A good example of this is the disconnect between macro over-the-market health product consumption trends, which have improved sequentially since first quarter, and Perrigo’s numbers, which have been challenged all year. We think the moving pieces within the firm make it hard to get a clean read on the underlying health of the business, which ultimately lowers our conviction on the name. The uncertainty during this transitory period is heightened by the ongoing search for a permanent CEO.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate is $20 per share. We highlight our Very High Uncertainty Rating and reiterate our stance that 2026 is a transition year for the firm. Given this, our view on the near-term upside for the stock is mixed, though our long-term outlook remains favorable.
Soft category consumption trends are proving more persistent than previously assumed, and our near-term growth expectation is more tempered relative to our midcycle assumptions to reflect a slower top-line recovery and a more gradual margin rebound. Retailer behavior has been more measured in 2026 compared with historical levels, and a mix of inventory destocking and a slower inventory buildup has weighed on Perrigo's performance.
Two business exits this year rationalize the portfolio and enable better use of capital going forward. That said, we expect a lot of noise in results in upcoming quarters from divestitures as well as pending further category reviews which make apples-to-apples comparison difficult. A good example of this is the disconnect between macro over-the-market health product consumption trends, which have improved sequentially since first quarter, and Perrigo's numbers, which have been challenged all year. We think the many moving pieces within the firm make it hard to get a clean read into the underlying health of the business, which ultimately lowers our conviction on the company. The uncertainty from this transitory period is also heightened by the ongoing search for a permanent CEO.
In the long term, however, we expect more normalized top-line growth around 2%-3% year over year, thanks to a mix of pricing actions and volume gains. Historically, we have seen a 100- to 200-basis-point increase in the top line from price, mostly from passing along inflation, and we expect a similar strategy for the next five years. While other pure-branded CPG players have been able to weather high inflation by raising their prices accordingly and passing along those rising costs to consumers, as we saw during 2022 and 2023, we see Perrigo’s store-brand business somewhat lacks the full ability to price up its products, given that it mainly participates in a value segment and also faces retailer pressures, which hurts margin. However, we expect this dynamic to slightly improve with Perrigo’s increased exposure to the branded business, since we believe some of its leading brands have strong branding power to raise prices and still maintain shares.
On margin, we expect a mix of bolstered branded portfolio, optimized portfolio, and supply chain reinvention programs to provide tailwinds. Perrigo recently focused on increasing manufacturing efficiency and overall productivity. The firm reduced its inventory to cut nonstrategic brands and product variants. We believe reducing the number of unfavorable product options and focusing on key items and configurations can help improve scale and drive margin. On the other hand, this could also risk upsetting retailers as they might not receive products that they want to sell, although so far, we have not seen this have an adverse impact on the company’s relationship with key retailers.
Economic moat
We assign Perrigo a no-moat rating because we do not believe the company possesses any structural advantages sufficient to generate excess returns over the next 10 years.
Perrigo’s business can be broken into two major segments: store brands (private label) and national brands. We believe Perrigo’s store brand business, which generates more than half of total sales, lacks material competitive advantages over other players to warrant a moat rating. In consumer health, real product differentiation is low, but perceived product differentiation is high, so pricing power is earned through brand reputation. While this is certainly achievable in the industry as we see from players like Kenvue and Haleon, we believe Perrigo is not able to build brand reputation with its private-label business for a multitude of reasons. The most obvious reason is that we believe a retailer has more leverage in the retailer/supplier relationship. Since contracts aren't long-term in nature—usually renegotiated every 12 months—retailers can shift their manufacturing partners over time to secure the best price/terms. And major stores, pharmacies, and online retailers have substantial scale and negotiation leverage in the supply chain, leaving little economic profit to be captured upstream. Furthermore, Perrigo’s private-label products have a specific retailer’s branding on their packaging, so Perrigo’s ability to earn recognition from consumers is little to none. Also, private label is largely seen as value offerings—Perrigo’s store brands are priced on average 30% lower compared with their branded counterparts. We believe these reasons provide minimal opportunities for Perrigo’s private-label business to boast meaningful competitive advantages and to earn excess returns.
The remaining portion of Perrigo’s sales is generated from its branded consumer health products. While the company boasts a wide product portfolio that plays in various categories, including oralcare, nutrition, digestive health, and women’s health, we believe it has brands with neither significant market share nor strong pricing power to earn a moat rating. We identified Dr. Fresh and Firefly as Perrigo’s key brands in North America and Compeed, Coldrex, Solpadeine, and NiQuitin in international markets. Data from Euromonitor shows that these brands rarely possess any meaningful share and are overshadowed by bigger and more recognizable brands. Furthermore, we fail to see any example from Perrigo’s brands that boasts a meaningful pricing premium over its competition. While Perrigo has tried to improve its branded business by divesting nonstrategic brands and purchasing bigger names—adding Compeed and Mederma through the HRA acquisition and acquiring Good Start from Nestlé—we still believe it lags other major players in the industry in having a moatworthy portfolio.
Bull case
Perrigo is now more tapped into the higher-margin branded consumer health market, which should act as a tailwind to the top and bottom lines.
Because of its presence in private label, we think the company can more easily weather downturns compared with competitors that play solely in the branded market.
Perrigo’s scale and ability to supply a wide range of private-label OTC products is unmatched by other smaller players, which partly protects the company’s relationship with its customers.
Bear case
By expanding its business to focus more on branded products, Perrigo now faces stiffer competition from larger consumer healthcare product manufacturers.
Many consumer packaged-goods players have significantly larger capital and research budgets, which help them more easily launch products that could displace Perrigo’s brands.
Mismanagement in production could lead to product recalls and result in large settlement fees, putting pressure on Perrigo’s bottom line.
By Keonhee Kim
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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