Asbury Automotive
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 125.50-260.17, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is +3.2% above the average-multiple fair value of 192.85.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Auto & Truck Dealerships
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asbury Automotive (ABG) | 3.57B | 7.88 | 0.89 | 0.00% |
| Carvana (CVNA) | 46.15B | 30.70 | 10.60 | 0.00% |
| Penske Automotive (PAG) | 13.94B | 15.47 | 2.34 | 2.66% |
| CarMax (KMX) | 6.82B | 22.57 | 1.08 | 0.00% |
| Rush Enterprises-B (RUSHB) | 6.63B | 24.80 | 2.77 | 0.91% |
| Lithia Motors (LAD) | 6.21B | 8.28 | 0.94 | 0.83% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 48.3% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Asbury Automotive Group's stock rose over 13% during Oct. 27 trading despite reporting third-quarter adjusted diluted EPS of $6.16 that missed the $6.42 LSEG consensus. The company met its timeline to finish the Tekion dealer management system switchover by October.
Why it matters: Selling, general, and administrative costs as a percent of gross profit were a headwind for the quarter, with the adjusted ratio as a percent of gross profit rising 319 basis points to 67.4%. A large Tekion rollout of 47 stores caused temporary disruption, as did poor new vehicle sales. Stores take about six months to master Tekion, so management sees SG&A to gross profit improving to the low 60% range by year-end 2027. Tekion enables more gross profit by reducing discounting on lucrative service work, increasing repair orders, and selling more units per salesperson. Asbury also said it finished rolling out the Total Care Auto finance product to all stores in October, and we think the stock rallied on these switchover headwinds being complete. Now the company can focus on reducing debt. Most of the new vehicle headwind was due to lower EV sales.
The bottom line: We are maintaining our narrow moat for Asbury but lowering its fair value estimate to $295 from $315. The change reflects modeling about 4.5% less revenue over our five-year explicit forecast period because 2026 revenue is trending lower and we now model no acquisitions in 2026. We still consider Asbury one of the best operators among the six public franchise dealers, an edge that should get better with time now that Tekion is complete. We think the firm's long-term future is bright, but US macroeconomic headwinds could hold the stock back near term. Capital allocation priorities for now are debt reduction, then share repurchases, and tuck-in acquisitions. Net debt/adjusted EBITDA at Sept. 30 was 3.5 times, and management is confident it can get the ratio to 3.0 by mid-2027 through earnings growth and debt reduction.
Fair value
Our Asbury per share fair value estimate is $295, down from $315. The change reflects modeling about 4.5% less revenue over our five-year explicit forecast period, given the trend in 2026 revenue, and because we now model no 2026 acquisitions, as we expect management to focus on debt reduction and share repurchases. Tuck-in acquisitions are a lower priority for now. Our midcycle operating margin, including floorplan interest expense, remains about 5%. We still consider Asbury one of the top dealer operators in our coverage and believe its growth runway to $30 billion in annual revenue over the next decade is possible, given the sector's highly fragmented nature and Asbury’s access to capital.
Management announced in early 2024 that it is withdrawing its 2025 revenue target of $32 billion and instead targeting at least $30 billion sometime during 2025-30. Given Asbury’s continued ambition to grow from acquisitions, organically, and Clicklane, and because the dealer space is highly fragmented, we believed then-CEO David Hult when he said on the February 2024 earnings call that reaching $30 billion is a question of when Asbury gets there rather than if it gets there. However, we don't model $30 billion during our five-year explicit forecast period. We model about $23 billion in 2030, down from about $24 billion, reflecting current macroeconomic uncertainty. We will increase this figure if more large deals are announced.
We model about $5 billion in cumulative acquired revenue for 2026-30, down from about $6 billion. If $5 billion proves incorrect, we think it would likely be too low rather than too high. We model total revenue across 2026-30 of about $99.2 billion. In December 2020, Asbury unveiled its new omnichannel shopping platform for new and used vehicles called Clicklane, which should also help top-line growth. We model a compound annual revenue growth rate for 2026-30 of about 5%, down from about 6%. The Larry H. Miller deal offers excellent cost-scaling potential due to its size, and the captive financing product, Total Care Auto, delivers 20% or higher EBITDA margins, far better than Asbury's mid- to high-single-digit levels. TCA as of October is in all stores, so there is upside margin potential for Asbury over time, in our opinion, as TCA's deferred revenue grows and then is realized into profit over the life of the contract.
Our midcycle operating margin, including floor plan interest, of about 5% reflects our expectation of a margin ranging from under 4% in bad times to nearly 6% in good times. Asbury tends to have one of the lowest selling, general, and administrative expenses as a percentage of gross profit ratios in the dealer sector, so it is a top operator. Pricing discounts are hurting gross dollar profit per unit for both new and used vehicles, and competition and factory rules limit how much a dealer can sell a vehicle for; thus, management must remain vigilant about leveraging SG&A to keep its SG&A/gross profit ratio low, which the Tekion conversion should help with.
We model average annual operating margin including floorplan interest of about 4.8%. We think capital expenditures will average about 1.5% of sales during our explicit forecast period. We model additional acquisitions throughout this forecast period, with annual revenue acquired of about $1 billion-$2 billion every year except for no deals in 2026. Our weighted average cost of capital is about 8%.
Economic moat
We are maintaining our narrow moat rating for Asbury, as its size continues to generate economies of scale and working-capital efficiencies, while the service segment and its warranty work give the company an intangible advantage over garages. We think the dealer sector is the best business in the automotive supply chain. Public dealers can centralize back-office operations and generate far more volume than small dealers, which brings scale. Asbury in October 2026 finished its move to a cloud-based dealer management system by Tekion to increase productivity and gross profit, which will further help reduce overhead costs. Dealers have no burdensome retiree expenses, and large public dealers are not dependent on the health of a single brand. The dealers enjoy mid- to high-single-digit gross margins on new vehicles and 100% gross margin on financing and insurance. We think that the best source of competitive advantage is the parts and service operations. Many customers bring their vehicles to the dealer for service either because the vehicle is under warranty or because the dealer is close to home and has factory parts and expertise to service it. Once vehicle owners know a dealer, we think they are likely to keep going back for service. The dealer knows the vehicle, and comparison shopping for repair work is very time-consuming because the customer has to take the vehicle to each shop to get a quote.
These logistics create inelasticity of demand, which confers pricing power on the dealer and is a source of strong profits in good times and bad. In fact, during a downturn in new vehicle sales, dealers generally report higher gross margins due to a favorable mix shift, but lower operating margins due to deleverage in selling, general, and administrative expenses. Excluding large impairment and restructuring charges, dealers can still report positive EBIT even in a severe recession. Although most dealerships are good businesses, we think the large publicly traded dealers are best-positioned for growth because these firms can be the most flexible in changing brand mix. Many small-business owners are choosing to exit or sell because they cannot get the scale on a variety of expenses compared with large dealer groups. Asbury is one of the largest dealers in the US, yet it has only about 1.1% of the new-vehicle market share. About 91% of dealer owners own between one and five stores, per the National Automobile Dealers Association, and we expect this ratio to keep declining over time, so we see a long growth runway for consolidators such as Asbury.
Bull case
The firm's product mix, weighted toward import and luxury brands, brings more affluent consumers to the dealership, which partially mitigates the sales decline during cyclical downturns that auto sales typically experience. Most Clicklane digital customers are also of a higher credit quality and wealth than the company had in the past.
Auto dealerships are moaty businesses that can maintain a narrow range of operating margins regardless of economic conditions.
Sizable dealership companies enjoy economies of scale, albeit limited ones.
Bear case
The company has switched all its stores to a new dealer management system from Tekion that could bring a hard learning curve for a few months and hurt near-term expense leverage but probably help long-term expense leverage.
Overpaying for acquisitions is a risk and can lead to value destruction for investors.
Unlike some dealers, Asbury does not have many stand-alone used-vehicle stores because its Q auto stand-alone used-vehicle store experiment failed. A robust digital shopping tool in Clicklane should still enable good used-vehicle growth, in our view.
By David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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