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Baker Hughes

US · BKR #397 by market cap Listed 1970
44.81 -1.86 -3.99%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 2.44 In line with history 66th percentile
5-year average 2.33 · #33 of 48 in Oil & Gas Equipment & Services
P/E ratio 16.99 In line with history 48th percentile
5-year average -9.56 · forward 20.17 · #12 of 36 in Oil & Gas Equipment & Services
P/S ratio 1.71 Expensive vs history 78th percentile
5-year average 1.53 · forward 1.52 · #32 of 48 in Oil & Gas Equipment & Services

Vs. peers Oil & Gas Equipment & Services

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Baker Hughes (BKR) 44.50B 15.40 2.21 2.05%
SLB Ltd (SLB) 67.73B 22.28 2.60 2.55%
Tenaris (TS) 27.85B 14.15 1.65 3.23%
Halliburton (HAL) 25.25B 12.83 2.27 2.23%
TechnipFMC (FTI) 22.83B 18.46 6.85 0.34%
NOV Inc (NOV) 5.71B 39.07 0.91 2.72%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★★ Fair value70.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyMedium Capital allocationExemplary

Trading 56.2% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Baker Hughes third-quarter revenue grew 14% year-on-year to $8.03 billion, though adjusted EBITDA margin contracted 63 basis points due to industrial technology margin headwinds related to project timing, mix, and inflation. The stock fell more than 7% during the trading day.

Why it matters: We concede the results were mixed, but we think the numbers offer fodder for both bulls and bears and that the stock's decline is an overreaction. IET margin should still cross 20% for the full year based on guidance, and book/bill of 1.7 times and a record backlog show strong demand. We're more concerned about Chart's deceleration, and figures from when we covered the firm showed a revenue decline, even when accounting for a close that occurred two weeks after the start of the third quarter. We think the underlying fundamentals remain strong, and we see the pullback as an opportunity for investors to add the stock given the quality of the backlog across multiple project-based end markets. We point out that less than 20% of the company's backlog is exposed to data centers.

The bottom line: We lower our fair value estimate for no-moat Baker Hughes to $70 from $73. While we're still bullish on management's ability to drive cost synergies, Chart's fundamentals deteriorated more than we expected during the integration period. We now view the purchase as value-neutral. Despite the fair value reduction, we still think Chart complements Baker Hughes' portfolio and go-to-market strategy well. The stock remains in 4-star territory with 28% upside, and our conviction remains strong, as supported by our Medium Uncertainty Rating. We model above-consensus 2028 EBITDA and expect the firm to increase sales at a 7% organic CAGR long-term. Our projections independently line up with management expectations that Chart can achieve a 22% to 23% EBITDA margin by the back half of 2028.

Fair value

We lower our fair value estimate for no-moat Baker Hughes to $70 from $73. While we're still bullish on management's ability to drive cost synergies, Chart's fundamentals deteriorated more than we expected during the integration period. We now view the purchase as value-neutral. Despite the fair value reduction, we still think Chart complements Baker Hughes' portfolio and go-to-market strategy well, and we believe Baker Hughes can drive margins to between 22% and 23% by the second half of 2028.

We also think Baker Hughes' underlying fundamentals remain strong, especially as industrial technology's book/bill sits at 2.2 times and the record backlog shows strong demand. We think additional revenue from gas technology equipment should drive further EBITDA margin expansion in the industrial and energy technology segment, and for Baker Hughes overall, from operating leverage. We value the stock at roughly 10 times on a 2027 enterprise value/adjusted EBITDA basis.

As a provider of equipment and services to the energy and industrial markets, Baker Hughes is differentiated from its oilfield services peers. We think this business helps the overall company’s long-term growth, and we expect that Baker Hughes can increase organic revenue at a 7% CAGR from 2027-30 when including Chart, which far exceeds its peers. Baker Hughes also has an advantage in that it's more exposed to international offshore projects than a peer like Halliburton. These projects enjoy far lower breakeven pricing than US shale; therefore, Baker Hughes' oilfield revenue should be less sensitive to near-term commodity pricing headwinds.

On a segment basis, we're very bullish on IET, but we suspect we're more bearish relative to the market on the OFSE segment. We think IET's revenue, which we model at an organic 9% compound annual growth rate during our forecast, will be driven by data center and LNG-related demand for IET products (turbines, compressors, and electrical equipment) and new energy wins. On average over the long term, we think IET can maintain incremental EBITDA margin in the mid-30s. Aside from strong volume-related leverage, we think IET’s margins will expand as it converts high-margin backlog, introduces new digital products, and continues its lean journey (supply chain, design, improved cycle times). By our midcycle year, we believe IET can improve its EBITDA margin by over 600 basis points, from 18.5% today.

For OFSE, we model a low-single-digit five-year outlook, driven positively by international markets on production and completion-related revenue. We believe producers will mostly focus their spending on improving production (maintenance spending) rather than on exploring and developing new basins (capital spending). From this standpoint, OFSE is well-positioned, as its portfolio is strongly positioned in specialty chemicals and artificial lift. Finally, we expect there's still more productivity and efficiency that Baker Hughes can extract from OFSE's near-term margins, which we expect will dip below 18% in 2026. Longer-term, however, we believe that volume leverage will primarily support this business, though we think OFSE's current profitability is close to what it can maintain through the cycle.

Economic moat

On a consolidated basis, we assign Baker Hughes a no-moat rating.

We think Baker Hughes' industrial and energy technology segment is a much stronger, moatworthy business relative to the oilfield services and equipment business. That's evident to us from both a qualitative and quantitative basis. But when incorporating goodwill in the capital base and the cumulative impact of impairments, Baker Hughes has never cleared its firmwide WACC as it's currently constituted.

Oilfield Services and Equipment Segment Has No Moat

Following the paradigm shift toward producer capital discipline and consolidation in North America, the oilfield-services industry now appears to require suppliers to hold either first or second position to generate through-the-cycle economic profit. At roughly 5% of the global oilfield-services market, Baker Hughes' OFSE segment holds the number-three spot, behind Big Three peers SLB and Halliburton. We think having a first or second share is needed to dig a moat, because the cost advantage from economies of scale and scope partly underpins our ratings for SLB and Halliburton. Services firms have large, fixed cost bases, evidenced by their inherently high operating leverage. These fixed costs include equipment, technology, and facilities. So, service firms require high utilization rates to earn economic profit.

As a global service provider, Baker Hughes achieves good utilization by supplying a wide range of producer clients that value its service breadth, including national oil companies, major integrated firms, and independents focused on US shale. But Baker Hughes partly improved its position with key customers through a transformative M&A that inflated its invested capital base and would never have derived the full benefit of these global customer relationships without its combination with GE's oil and gas assets in 2017.

Industrial Energy and Technology Segment Has a Narrow Moat

We think the IET segment benefits from switching costs (primarily) and intangible assets. While IET is organized along five product lines, we compartmentalize it as three separate businesses: gas technology equipment and services, industrial products and solutions, and climate technology solutions. We believe gas technology and the industrial business earn a moat from switching costs and intangibles, with gas technology having the stronger intangibles and moat, given the complexity of the equipment, in our view.

We consider gas technology to be a razor-and-blade business, with its large installed base of equipment benefiting from intangible assets and the services side of the business benefiting from switching costs. Among other pieces of critical equipment, Baker Hughes manufactures aeroderivative (smaller, more compact) gas turbines for oil and gas applications through a 50/50 joint venture with GE Vernova. Baker Hughes sells heavy-duty gas (or larger-scale) and steam (or coal-powered) turbines through a supply agreement with GE Vernova and GE Aerospace, as well as manufactures other smaller industrial turbines, compressors (used to transport natural gas through pipelines), pumps, and electrical equipment. Its gas tech equipment is highly engineered and complex. Success in the industrial and energy markets this business serves depends on a long, successful record, strong intellectual property, and adherence to regulatory standards.

Gas equipment sales earn Baker Hughes lower margins relative to service revenue. The company sells equipment at comparably low levels of profitability, but substitution risks are low. IET works closely with its customers in the design, testing, and installation process, and equipment product cycles may last up to 10 years. Once installed, IET earns back far higher-margin, recurring aftermarket parts and service revenue (repair, upgrades, and monitoring) that frequently spans over two decades.

Baker Hughes' content isn't a significant amount of customer project spending, but its solutions represent the most mission-critical part of that outlay. Roughly half of Baker Hughes' gas technology service revenue is secured by either contractual or long-term service agreements. For instance, most of Baker Hughes' content in LNG liquefaction plants (commonly referred to as LNG trains), where LNG is converted into a liquefied form for transport, has contractual service agreements that span anywhere from 5 to 20 years.

However, even in situations where critical equipment isn't secured by a contractual relationship, customers tend to buy parts from the original equipment manufacturer. This reliance on an OEM like Baker Hughes mostly stems from the associated high cost of failure of the equipment. Mechanical failures can lead to unplanned downtime and be catastrophic to a customer's operations and their bottom line. Baker Hughes' digital, remote monitoring solutions can identify potential faults early and improve the real-time performance of equipment, which, in our view, only reinforces IET's switching costs.

Chart Enjoys a Narrow Moat

We assign Chart Industries a narrow economic moat based on switching costs. The moat is primarily built around specialty products and the related aftermarket revenue that serve markets such as LNG, carbon capture, hydrogen, and water treatment. These products are designed to be mission-critical, last for decades, and are irreplaceable. The stickiness of this equipment means that highly lucrative service contracts that contain strong inflationary protections are used to ensure performance optimization while reducing maintenance costs. Customers strongly prefer that Chart handles this type of work, given the complexity of the equipment and reduced administrative headaches of dealing with multiple contractors. With a materially larger aftermarket contribution post-Howden, we expect Chart’s returns on invested capital to reach into the midteens through the cycle, well ahead of its cost of capital.

Bull case

Baker Hughes will grow far faster than its oilfield peers. Investors don’t fully appreciate the growth opportunities in its IET portfolio and a rerating through the successful integration of Chart Industries.

Exposure to international projects and strong positioning in productivity-related solutions mean Baker Hughes’ revenue is much more defensive than that of its peers.

The company has far more levers it can pull to drive further margin and return improvements; a 20% EBITDA margin is merely part of its journey, not its destination.

Bear case

Baker Hughes is priced for perfection; bulls assign it an inflated multiple relative to peers that either is not justified by its returns profile or assumes no midcycle reversion.

Baker Hughes is trapping value in its current structure, and despite multiple portfolio reviews and outside investor pressure, has indicated it intends to keep this structure intact.

Macroeconomic-related and commodity weakness from oversupply of oil and other factors has led to a pullback in capital spending that will negatively affect the entire oilfield-services industry.

By Joshua Aguilar

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:35 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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