Charter Communications
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 206.90-616.19, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is -68.7% below the average-multiple fair value of 411.56.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Telecom Services
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Charter Communications (CHTR) | 14.73B | 12.10 | 1.34 | 0.00% |
| Verizon (VZ) | 192.64B | 11.86 | 1.82 | 6.05% |
| T-Mobile US (TMUS) | 175.42B | 15.97 | 3.12 | 2.46% |
| AT&T (T) | 150.29B | 11.99 | 1.41 | 4.98% |
| Comcast (CMCSA) | 88.42B | 7.88 | 0.96 | 5.30% |
| America Movil SAB de CV (AMX) | 74.06B | 15.57 | 3.02 | 2.37% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 117.5% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Charter's first report since the Cox merger in August showed little change in recent trends, with customer losses in legacy Charter territory nearly doubling year over year to 160,000 in the quarter. Cox losses didn't worsen much, but at 78,000, they remain very weak given its far smaller footprint.
Why it matters: Management expressed frustration with the lack of progress in returning to growth and announced plans to change its market approach again, while also launching an effort to simplify the business and cut $2 billion in annual costs, about 3% of revenue. Details were sparse, but it seems the firm plans to lead with broadband-only offers and lower prices for long-tenured customers. Management expects to have room to maneuver without hurting average revenue per user, which we take as an indication that pricing will remain disciplined. While sharpening execution makes sense, we believe Charter's struggles stem more from the increased level of competition it faces. Charter's strong current market share will make it difficult to grow its customer base until the market reaches a new equilibrium.
The bottom line: We maintain our $280 fair value estimate and narrow moat rating. While we expect Charter will continue to shrink for the next couple of years, we believe shares are sharply undervalued relative to the firm's cash-generating ability. Pro forma for Cox, total revenue declined 1.5% year over year, aided by a 20% jump in ad revenue, which was driven by political spending. Residential revenue declined 4%, in line with the prior quarter. We estimate residential ARPU across the combined firm has held roughly stable over the past several quarters. Inside legacy Charter, broadband and wireless ARPU showed modest strength, delivering on the outlook management provided last quarter.
Coming up: Management remains committed to reducing capital investment, aiming to spend about $11 billion in 2027 versus $13 billion this year.
Fair value
Our $280 fair value estimate implies an enterprise value of about 6 times our 2026 EBITDA estimate, pro forma for the Cox acquisition.
We assume Charter remains a dominant internet access provider in its service territory and continues to command solid pricing power, especially in the later years of our forecast as the firm shifts its emphasis away from increased customer penetration and the competitive environment reaches equilibrium.
We have grown less optimistic about Charter’s ability to add customers over the longer term as wireless carriers continue to take share and fiber networks expand. Charter’s network expansion efforts should offset some of this increased competition, but we expect residential customer penetration of homes passed, including the Cox business, to drop to 42% in 2030 from 51% at the end of 2025. Until recently, we had expected penetration to begin stabilizing and remain above 40% in 2035. We now model that figure at a bit above 35%.
We still expect pricing to remain rational, given the massive capital investments competitors are making, but we have recently grown concerned about price competition. As a result, we now expect revenue per broadband customer, including Cox, to decline about 1% in 2026. At the start of the year, we expected revenue per customer to grow 2.5% in the legacy Charter markets, but that proved too optimistic. We assume broadband revenue per customer is flat in 2027 and returns to growth in 2028, reverting to 3% annually for the remainder of our forecast.
In total, we expect the combined Charter and Cox to serve nearly 20% fewer customers in 2035 than in 2025, but that revenue per customer will increase slightly, including a growing contribution from the wireless business. The net result is that we forecast the combined firm will increase revenue by less than 1% annually through 2035, with year-to-year volatility driven by political ad revenue.
Because television content is so expensive, margins should naturally improve as the television business shrinks. Management’s focus on reducing the cost of serving customers should also lift profitability over the longer term. However, Charter’s aggressive push into the wireless business will hinder margin gains. We expect these puts and takes to offset each other. Still, the shrinking customer base will likely hurt operating leverage, even as the firm realizes cost savings from the Cox acquisition. We assume the EBITDA margin drops below 37% in 2030 and to 36% in 2035, down from the 40% range in recent years at both Charter and Cox.
Charter has pursued several state and federal broadband subsidy programs and is now building aggressively in rural areas. Management also expects to spend around $5 billion in total through 2027 to upgrade its existing cable footprint to the next iteration of DOCSIS technology, which will enable multi-Gbps broadband speeds. We expect capital investment to follow management’s budget, topping $13 billion in 2026 and then falling to a bit above $11 billion in 2027, including Cox integration costs. Charter has said it could run the legacy Charter business at $8 billion in annual capital spending in 2028 and beyond, likely implying a bit more than $9 billion including Cox. We think this will prove aggressive as customer demand for fiber-based networks grows. We assume spending stays around $10 billion in 2028 and grows from there.
Economic moat
We believe Charter possesses a narrow moat based on efficient scale, offset in part by limited growth potential as rival networks improve. The firm also produces relatively meager returns on capital, thanks largely to the 2016 acquisitions that formed the company.
The majority of US homes today can receive fixed-line internet access service from only two providers: the traditional cable firms and phone companies. Building these networks requires heavy construction spending, limiting the threat of entry. Cable networks like Charter’s have provided a cost-effective platform to meet evolving customer demands. The costliest upgrade in the industry’s history, primarily undertaken in the late 1990s and early 2000s, involved the shift to a hybrid fiber-coax network architecture, a move that has paid handsome dividends. This architecture, coupled with steady technological advances, has enabled Charter and its cable peers to steadily add network capacity at a modest incremental cost.
By contrast, phone companies have only been able to meet customer demands through heavy investment to replace copper cables with fiber optics. Most phone companies had either been unable or unwilling to invest in fiber at scale, but that has changed in recent years. Most notably, AT&T started to invest aggressively in fiber expansion in 2021. The firm’s fiber network now reaches about 40 million locations, including 4 million acquired from Lumen, up from 21 million at the end of 2021, with plans to reach up to 60 million by the end of this decade.
Charter likely faces fiber competition across approximately 60% of its footprint, and that percentage will likely increase to about 75% by the end of the 2020s. While several firms seem intent on building aggressively, we suspect that the pace of fiber construction across the US will slow as the remaining locations yet to be upgraded to fiber are increasingly high-cost.
In addition to fiber competition, fixed-wireless access has started to chip away at the broadband market. T-Mobile and Verizon have taken the lead in marketing FWA, while AT&T has made the service available to pockets of its footprint. With a huge swath of wireless spectrum coming online over the past couple of years, the wireless carriers have substantial fallow capacity and huge investments in licenses and equipment looking for a return. T-Mobile now serves around 10 million FWA customers, while Verizon serves 6 million.
FWA will likely prove adequate to serve a portion of customers, pressuring penetration levels and returns on capital for other broadband providers like Charter. However, we’re skeptical that fixed wireless will take significant market share over the medium- or longer term, as growing demand from core smartphone users and other mobile applications limit the network capacity the carriers are willing to allocate to broadband. We also suspect a large portion of FWA customers will include new use cases, like construction sites. Verizon reports that 40% of its FWA customers are businesses, while more than 90% of Charter’s broadband customers are consumers.
Satellite also represents an incremental threat to traditional broadband service. We are also skeptical of satellite's ability to meet the capacity needs of customers in more densely populated areas, but competitors like Starlink could also pressure Charter's customer base in the years ahead.
Despite the influx of competition, we expect broadband price competition to remain rational. Returns on capital for fiber projects are not strong, even among relatively mature firms. Fiber builders have no incentive to cut prices aggressively to increase customer penetration. Doing so would quickly invite a competitive response from cable companies in the short term and devalue the market over the long run—hallmarks of a market shaped by efficient-scale dynamics.
We also expect pricing discipline among fixed-wireless providers. Smartphone data traffic generates far more revenue per unit of network capacity consumed. The wireless carriers will prioritize serving core smartphone customers to preserve this business while looking for new applications that leverage the mobility wireless networks provide. We expect a similar rationale will direct the satellite players' strategies.
Charter’s superior network position has enabled it to steadily gain market share over the past decade. Half the households and businesses in its footprint subscribe to at least one Charter service, a level of penetration that allows for very attractive returns on capital. While incremental competition will put pressure on customer penetration, we expect Charter to maintain returns on capital that exceed its cost of capital over the next 10 years.
Bull case
Like its cable peers, Charter’s networks provide a platform to easily meet customers’ growing bandwidth demands, which should stabilize market share and drive strong cash flow.
As the largest US cable company, Charter has the scale to adapt quickly. The firm is rapidly expanding into the wireless business, helping to cement customer relationships.
Charter's television offering is unique, bundling multiple streaming services with its traditional service. Rivals will find this position challenging to replicate.
Bear case
Charter has a reputation for poor customer service. As high-quality alternatives continue to emerge, customers will steadily jump ship.
A heavy debt load has limited Charter’s financial flexibility and could spell serious trouble for shareholders if recent business struggles worsen or if the capital markets dry up.
Charter expects to slash network investment after 2027, but it will still lag fiber networks' capabilities. Migrating to fiber will eventually swamp the firm's resources.
By Michael Hodel, CFA
Quote time 2026-11-20 20:01:12 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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