Skip to content

Caesars Entertainment

US · CZR #1919 by market cap Listed 1970
29.06 -0.21 -0.72%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:30

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.82 In line with history 42nd percentile
5-year average 2.15 · #5 of 12 in Resorts & Casinos
P/E ratio -11.24 In line with history 57th percentile
5-year average -11.41 · forward -59.53
P/S ratio 0.51 Cheap vs history 21st percentile
5-year average 0.83 · forward 0.50 · #8 of 17 in Resorts & Casinos

Vs. peers Resorts & Casinos

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Caesars Entertainment (CZR) 5.92B -11.13 1.81 0.00%
Las Vegas Sands (LVS) 24.36B 15.92 -70.77 2.96%
Wynn Resorts (WYNN) 8.25B 22.71 -37.91 1.24%
MGM Resorts International (MGM) 8.19B 12.45 3.27 0.00%
Vail Resorts (MTN) 5.32B 36.18 22.14 5.96%
Boyd Gaming (BYD) 5.28B 10.97 2.15 1.04%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★☆☆ Fair value31.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyVery High Capital allocationExemplary

Trading 6.7% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Caesars' third-quarter revenue increased 2.5%, with Vegas declining 2% and regional and digital assets up 6% and 5%, respectively. Adjusted EBITDA decreased 2% on a 7% lift in general costs. Caesars did not host a conference call because of its impeding acquisition by Fertitta Entertainment in May.

Why it matters: While shareholder focus is on the proposed acquisition, we think Caesars' results point to consumers' favor of lower-cost regional and digital gaming options versus higher-cost destinations like Vegas amid elevated inflation. In addition to their value proposition, Caesars' regional assets are benefiting from $3 billion in recent upgrades to properties that represented about 74% of trailing 12-month regional EBITDA. Even though Caesars' 6% digital revenue growth through the first nine months trails the industry's high-single-digit increase, its third-quarter EBITDA margin of 15.5% was up from 9%. We think this supports the company's omnichannel position and strategy to limit high promotional activity.

The bottom line: We plan to maintain our $31 per share fair value estimate, which is Fertitta's offer for no-moat Caesars, but decrease our $36 per share stand-alone valuation by about $1 on weaker near-term Las Vegas demand. We think Fertitta's terms discount Caesars' history of extracting synergies, driving cash flow, and reducing leverage. This is seen in the past Isle, Tropicana, and Eldorado deals that we calculate averaged about a 30% return on invested capital. We expect the Fertitta deal to close as scheduled in June 2027 and enhance Caesars' existing 50 casinos by adding the Golden Nugget brand and Fertitta's restaurant and entertainment assets.

Fair value

Our fair value estimate for no-moat Caesars is the $31 per share deal offer from Fertitta Entertainment. We have decreased our standalone valuation to $35 per share from $36 to account for lower near-term revenue growth. We think Fertitta's acquisition is likely to be approved and don't expect any competitive offers. Our stand-alone valuation applies an 8 times enterprise value/EBITDAR multiple on our 2027 EBITDAR forecast. Drivers of our forecast remain anchored in revenue and EBITDA margins across the company's Las Vegas and regional assets.

Caesars' third-quarter revenue increased 2.5%, with Vegas declining 2% and regional and digital assets up 6% and 5%, respectively. Adjusted EBITDA decreased 2% on a 7% lift in general costs. The company did not host a conference call due to its impeding acquisition by Fertitta Entertainment in May.

While the shareholder focus is on the proposed acquisition, we think Caesars' results point to consumers' favor for lower-cost regional and digital gaming options versus higher cost destinations like Vegas amid elevated inflation.

For 2026, our stand-alone Caesars Las Vegas revenue growth is a decrease of 1.5% (1% previously), with growth of 2% in 2027 and 3% in 2028. Our 2026-35 annual revenue growth forecast for Las Vegas and regional casinos are 1.6% and 2.0%, respectively. We see Las Vegas EBITDAR margin averaging in the mid-40s and regional EBITDAR margin averaging in the low-30s in 2026-35.

We model a low single-digit digital revenue share for Caesars. We see digital revenue rising to $2.9 billion by 2035, up from $1.4 billion in 2025. We continue to expect the digital segment's profit margin to ramp up to 25% in 2035 from 17% in 2025. We expect Caesars’ digital revenue growth and margin to average 7% and 24%, respectively, during the next 10 years.

We expect Caesars to endure synergies from its merger with Eldorado, with a 2030 EBITDAR margin of 34% versus 31% in 2021.

Economic moat

Despite management’s record of value-enhancing acquisitions (namely Isle in 2017, Tropicana/Grand Victoria in 2018, and the Eldorado merger in 2020), we don’t believe Caesars has an economic moat due to its outsize exposure to Las Vegas (48% of 2025 EBITDA) and US regional markets (49%) where regulatory barriers are low. This stance is supported by Caesars’ 6% return on invested capital, or ROIC, including goodwill, in 2025, which sat below its 9% weighted average cost of capital, or WACC. Also, we don’t ascribe much weight in the very marginal economic profit we forecast for the company by the end of the decade (2028 estimate ROIC of 7.1%) as that result is driven by Caesars’ participation in an improving US digital market, which we project to remain a small minority of total EBITDA (13% in 2028).

We don't think Caesars will form an economic moat with the proposed acquisition by Fertitta Entertainment, as the incremental assets are in the competitive US region. With the deal, Caesars’ casino portfolio increases to more than 60 casinos, compared with more than 50 properties and just four in 2014. Caesars' share of the $79 billion US commercial gaming market has risen to about 8% in 2025 from less than 1% in 2014. We attribute these gains to its ability to identify and integrate acquisitions, like Isle and Tropicana/Grand Victoria in 2018 and Eldorado in 2020, that generated enhanced value for shareholders, with the three acquisitions averaging more than a 30% return on invested capital.

Although we believe Eldorado’s acquisitions have added shareholder value and some support for a brand intangible asset advantage, the ability to repeat this is challenged by management needing to lower debt leverage the next few years to be in a financial position for inorganic growth as well as there being fewer sizable take-out candidates. Also, the company’s acquisition strategy is overshadowed by competitive barriers in the US gaming industry that are too low to warrant a moat for the company. Due to lower barriers, the US gaming market has more supply than its Asian counterparts. This is illustrated in the US’ 1,014 commercial and tribal casinos in 2025, compared with just two and about 50 casinos in Singapore and Macao, respectively. This regional casino supply results in one US casino for every 330,000 people versus 3 million and 28 million Singaporean and Chinese citizens per Singapore and Macao gaming property, respectively. Also, we do not expect additional gaming licenses in the foreseeable future in either Singapore or Macao, while there has been incremental legalization of gaming in the US casino industry over the past 30 years. As a result of supply expansion, US casinos typically achieve single-digit ROICs versus the low double digits for Singapore and Macao integrated resort operations, supporting our no-moat rating for Caesars.

In addition to a heavily supplied US physical gaming market, online sports betting and i-gaming continue to expand across more states and markets, presenting additional avenues for individuals to wager and potentially cannibalizing activity at traditional casinos. In fact, during the last several years, more than 30 states and predictive platforms have launched online sports betting, with others offering i-gaming. Although covid has made it tough to determine if online betting is eating away at the demand for physical wagering, we note that US physical gaming revenue grew 2.3% in 2025, near the 1.8% in 2019 before the pandemic.

That said, we are constructive on the revenue opportunity of the US digital industry and think the segment is an incremental driver for Caesars’ consolidated ROICs long term, although not enough to tip the scale toward an economic advantage. To this point, we estimate US digital sports and igaming industry sales of $48 billion by 2030 from $27.5 billion in 2025, as more states legalize the activity. And even though we view the market as competitive, with dozens of operators, we forecast Caesars’ digital share to hold at a mid-single-digit percentage and expect margins to expand to the mid-20s later this decade from 17% in 2025. While this margin prognosis sits below the mid-30s and mid-40s for the company’s regional and Las Vegas assets, we believe it will be achieved with far less invested capital, thereby enhancing consolidated ROICs. Our positive stance is despite the competitive risk of predictive event platforms, which we think will mostly expand the opportunity for traditional online sports betting companies.

Bull case

Caesars' best-of-breed management has generated cost and revenue synergies from its merger with Eldorado.

Stand-alone Caesars has the largest property (around 50 domestic casinos versus roughly 30 for MGM) and loyalty presence (more than 60 million members versus MGM's more than 45 million) in the US, which presents cross-selling opportunities.

We see Caesars' domestic properties as well positioned to benefit from the $48 billion US sports betting, i-gaming, and predictive revenue opportunity by 2030.

Bear case

Debt levels are elevated, which could raise financing costs for future renovations and investment.

All cash flow for the company comes from the domestic regions, which have lower barriers, demand, margins, and ROICs than Macao.

Caesars faces many competitors in the US sports betting and i-gaming markets, including Penn, DraftKings, FanDuel, MGM, Fanatics, and predictive event companies Kalshi and Polymarket.

By Dan Wasiolek

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

Caesars Entertainment discussion 0 comments

Add a comment