Deutsche Bank

SpaceX has filed for one of the largest IPOs in history, with Anthropic and OpenAI expected to follow in the most significant fundraising cycle in years. No European bank holds a lead equity arranger role; that honor belongs to five US banks. 

Why it matters: Market valuations are eyewatering, but the free float is small, and equity underwriting fee margins are thin on trophy deals. On SpaceX, the underwriting economics flow overwhelmingly to a handful of US banks. We expect the Anthropic and OpenAI listings to follow a similar pattern. Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and UBS sit in the second tier of the equity syndicate as joint bookrunners, below the five US lead managers. ING, Santander, and Société Générale appear in the third tier, which carries the lowest fee potential. BNP Paribas is the most noteworthy absentee.

The bottom line: Missing out on lead arranger roles for US tech listings should come as no surprise — this is not an area of strength for European banks. We think debt financing is a more durable and significant revenue opportunity. AI companies burn through capital fast and will keep on borrowing. European banks tend to be more competitive in debt capital markets, especially in servicing their deep bond-friendly home markets. Barclays, Deutsche Bank, and UBS appear in both the equity syndicate and the SpaceX credit facilities, giving them a head start in securing future mandates. As the debt program scales, the syndicate will widen — creating openings for other European banks.

Bears say: A calendar crowded with mega-cap roadshows will compress the midmarket pipeline, the deal tier where European banks do win lead mandates. Some issuers may rationally defer to 2027, which could reduce European banks' underwriting fees in 2026.

Our fair value estimate is $29.60 per share and corresponds to 0.8 times tangible book value.

We model a 3% revenue compound annual growth rate until 2030 stemming from the private bank and asset management operations. We model Deutsche's efficiency ratio to improve to 63% from 64% in 2025, barring large litigation charges. Returns on tangible equity come in at 9.5% in what we consider to be Deutsche's likely midcycle profitability. We assume a cost of equity of 11.2%.

We assign Deutsche Bank a no-moat rating. The bank operates a good corporate and investment banking business with strong positions in foreign exchange, fixed income, and corporate banking, but fails to consistently outearn its cost of capital. Its strongest businesses are capital- or talent-intensive, while its end markets can be volatile, reducing earnings quality and ultimately the durability of any economic moat.

Deutsche’s corporate bank can deploy a big balance sheet, good clearing infrastructure, and well-rounded cross-border capabilities to acquire and retain multinational corporates as clients in lending, hedging, and cash management. These capabilities are not easily replicated, forming a barrier for new entrants, but they primarily protect client relevance rather than pricing power, as large global banks can compete effectively. Customers face mild forms of switching costs, with Deutsche Bank integrating into their liquidity management and treasury operation systems, but this space is nevertheless exposed to high price competition, compressing margins in weaker market environments. The corporate banking business is also capital-heavy, weighing on risk-adjusted returns.

In its investment bank, Deutsche operates strong rates and foreign-exchange trading desks. These segments tie in well with their corporate banking services, providing cash management, treasury, and hedging services to large corporates. However, the businesses are capital- and client flow-intensive and exposed to volatile end markets. Compared with global investment banks, which we do believe have moats, Deutsche is lacking a top-tier position in origination and advisory, segments that are fee-rich, capital-light, and structurally more profitable.

We don’t think Deutsche Bank has a retail or SME banking moat. The German banking system is best described as a three-pillar structure: private commercial banks, public savings banks (Sparkassen and Landesbanken), and cooperative banks. Competition in Germany is best viewed as between these pillars rather than within them. Public and mutual banks in Germany follow a regional principle, ruling out competition among member banks, while back-office infrastructure is shared to reduce costs. As such, private commercial banks compete against a few large networks of regionally focused banks as well as other private commercial banks rather than many small, local, and independent banks.

Importantly, public and cooperative banks do not display strong profit-maximization motives, but control a material share of banking assets and deposits in Germany. Their mandates prioritize access, stability, and regional development over shareholder returns. As a result, competitive dynamics are distorted in Germany, capping excess returns for Deutsche Bank through the cycle.

Our moat rating for DWS, Deutsche Bank’s listed asset management arm, is narrow. We believe DWS benefits from intangible assets, reflected in its captive distribution agreement with Deutsche Bank, the strong brand of its passive products, and switching costs.

After years of declining revenue but sticky costs, Deutsche is on track to improve its cost efficiency.

Having completed its restructuring effort, the bank can set its sights on better uses of capital, such as shareholder distributions and strategic initiatives.

Higher profitability and stronger capitalization have improved investor confidence, which is crucial during industrywide stress scenarios.

Strength in investment banking could rekindle ambitions to target a global top-tier spot in this business, a position that has brought Deutsche into disarray in the past.

Deutsche faces competitive markets with often strong incumbents in its focus areas corporate banking, private banking and asset management.

Fines as the result of current or future investigations into Deutsche's operations by regulators could be a draw on capital.