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Eastman Chemical

US · EMN #1730 by market cap Listed 1970
58.77 -2.94 -4.76%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:30

✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed

Near fair value
39.54 fair value ≈ 58.95 78.37
  • Implied fair-value range of 39.54-78.37, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
  • Current price is -0.3% below the average-multiple fair value of 58.95.

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.18 Cheap vs history 2nd percentile
5-year average 1.82 · #15 of 59 in Specialty Chemicals
P/E ratio 12.00 Cheap vs history 31st percentile
5-year average 14.38 · forward 10.74 · #4 of 36 in Specialty Chemicals
P/S ratio 0.82 Cheap vs history 9th percentile
5-year average 1.06 · forward 0.78 · #23 of 61 in Specialty Chemicals

Vs. peers Specialty Chemicals

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Eastman Chemical (EMN) 6.72B 10.84 1.07 5.72%
Linde (LIN) 230.84B 33.39 5.86 1.25%
Ecolab (ECL) 82.65B 40.10 7.93 0.99%
Sherwin-Williams (SHW) 82.08B 31.25 20.64 0.94%
Air Products & Chemicals (APD) 66.16B 124.31 4.63 2.43%
PPG Industries (PPG) 25.87B 16.71 3.05 2.45%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value84.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 42.9% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Eastman Chemical reported third-quarter results; sales rose 8% year over year and adjusted EBIT rose 45%, which lifted margin 4 points to 13%. Eastman also announced that the Department of Energy has reinstated its $375 million grant for a 30% expansion of the Kingsport molecular recycling facility.

Why it matters: Margin recovery was driven by price increases in all segments except fibers. Volumes in most end markets trended flat to negative on continuously weak demand in durables. This reaffirms our view that a recovery to midcycle earnings will be slow. We expect the expansion from the DOE grant to contribute growth to Eastman’s advanced materials platform. However, we think the renewed agreement is less favorable than the original, as Eastman will have to commit 50% of the investment capital at each stage of the upgrade. Given this new grant structure, we find the added value from the expansion to be less meaningful. We expect Eastman’s capital expenditure to rise by around 20% in 2027. Even in the current market environment, we think Eastman can comfortably cover this expenditure without new debt.

The bottom line: We maintain our $84 fair value estimate for no-moat Eastman Chemical. We are seeing progress in profitability improvement from trough 2025 levels but think end markets will remain weak as inflation pressures demand for consumer durables like autos. At current prices, we view Eastman shares as undervalued, with the stock trading in 4-star territory and more than 23% below our fair value estimate. For income-focused investors, Eastman also offers a 5% dividend yield at the time of writing, and we currently view the dividend as safe.

Fair value

We maintain our $84 fair value estimate for Eastman Chemical. We are seeing progress in profitability improvement from trough 2025 levels but think end markets will remain weak as inflation pressures demand for consumer durables like autos.

We forecast a profit recovery in 2026. Eastman's 2025 results were affected by a tariff-related slowdown. In 2026, Eastman should benefit from its two specialty businesses—its advanced materials, and its additives and functional products—seeing more stable results. We forecast strong profit growth in the chemicals intermediates as the Iran war created an energy and commodity chemicals supply shock that drove prices higher due to a shortage of the latter and increased near-term feedstock costs for chemical producers outside of the US. As Eastman produces 80% of its products in the US, the company should be a beneficiary, partially offset by chemicals inflation likely weighing on volumes over time. Combined with Eastman's cost reduction initiatives, we anticipate profits rising in 2026, then falling in 2027 as the commodity chemicals business sees lower profits and the specialty businesses see slower growth from lower volume growth.

Over the long term, even if tariffs remain in place, we think global trade flows will shift, and Eastman's sales will recover. We see Eastman’s investment in innovative products in its AM and AFP segments as accretive; we also believe that its circular initiatives at the Kingsport methanolysis facility will add incremental earnings power through 2026 and 2027. Longer-term, we think these investments will allow Eastman to have profit growth above that of GDP. We forecast that operating margins recover to 19% and 15% in the AFP and AM segments, respectively, by the end of our five-year explicit forecast, above the 18% and 12% levels achieved in 2025.

In Eastman's chemical intermediates business, we forecast midcycle margins at around 5%, though we expect this segment will continue to see cyclicality and acknowledge a wide range of outcomes. Operating profits were negative in 2025, but we expect margins to come in above midcycle levels in 2026 due to the Middle East conflict-related supply shock that is boosting commodity chemicals prices. Eastman’s intermediate products are made from both coal and natural gas, while many of its competitors use higher-cost oil-based naphtha, which sets the global marginal cost and typically informs prices.

In a scenario where Eastman sees a prolonged volume decline due to an economic slowdown, we would forecast revenue to decline while operating margins average in the low double digits, well below the company's historical average. Under these assumptions, our fair value estimate would fall to $49 per share.

Economic moat

We do not think Eastman has a moat. We think two of its segments possess moat sources—AFP driven by intangible assets through patents, and elements of efficient scale in its fibers segment, which primarily manufactures acetate tow used to make cigarette filters. Notably, the fibers segment earns an outsize portion of company profits, accounting for around 10% of sales but a fifth of company profits. Ultimately, the firm’s excess returns over WACC are too narrow to give us sufficient confidence in a moat, and one moat source stems from a segment facing declining demand and high regulatory uncertainty.

Cigarette-filter demand is mature and declining. Only a handful of global producers make acetate tow, the compound used in filters. The top three players control over two-thirds of global production. A new entrant would add capacity to a market that carries spare capacity and would likely earn less than its cost of capital due to the high cost of building an integrated facility like Eastman’s. We estimate the cost is around $9,200-$14,500 per ton of new capacity, or roughly $356 million for a new 30,000-ton plant (around 10% of global capacity). We estimate the new entrant would need to earn EBITDA margins above 38%-40%—which no incumbent currently does—while adding capacity into the market, to earn a positive return on capital. We find this unlikely. Furthermore, the market is in secular decline, with global cigarette volumes dropping by roughly a third of a percent annually, according to data from Euromonitor. We contend it would not make much sense for competition to open a new facility, as capacity and demand continuously shrink each year.

Making acetate tow requires acetate flake and wood pulp. Eastman describes its facility as the world's largest and most integrated tow site, and makes acetate flake in-house. Even after 2025 sales fell 20% on customer destocking, fibers still earned a 30% return on invested capital, more than quadruple the company's 7% (a historically low year). The 10 largest customers took about 65% of 2025 segment sales, and most customers must meet annual minimums on volume contracts. To stave off secularly declining demand, Eastman has since moved to long-term variable-price contracts and is repurposing some tow capacity to make textile fibers, used in fashion.

AFP produces a wide range of coating additives, care additives, solvents, and the like, representing a small portion of overall customer costs. This business structures contracts for its specialty chemicals under a cost-plus method, which locks in unit profits even in an inflationary environment. We think this plays a critical role in its ability to maintain price and customer relationships over multiyear periods—customers are also hesitant to reformulate and requalify their products for small savings. It is rare to see large, adverse swings in price, but it is relatively common to see large price increases. The moat here is driven by intangible assets through patents and brands such as Texanol, a coating additive that acts as a coalescent, that customers use across their products. Eastman does not rely on any single patent for returns. Notably, we calculate segment returns on invested capital have been consistently around 11% over the past decade, exceeding our WACC assumption by 300 basis points.

AM sells interlayers for windows and windshields in medium-range to high-end autos, Tritan copolyester—used in reusable water bottles, food storage, and so on, and window and paint-protection films. Eastman designs its products to customer specifications, which drives a degree of switching costs. However, margins are not as resilient here as in the AFP segment, because the raw material costs are not as quickly passed through to customers, so when raw material prices rise, margins can contract. We are concerned by AM’s exposure to automotive production, which represents about a third of segment sales. Exposure to European automotive end markets has led to a drag on earnings for the past few years, and so, we view this as a cost-of-capital earning business.

Eastman’s CI segment rises and falls with commodity pricing tied to oil and natural gas, such as propane and ethane. This segment provides intermediate materials such as ethylene and propylene used in other segments. We think the captive use of upstream chemicals provides a slight advantage to Eastman’s business overall, as other segments save on transportation costs of upstream chemicals and ultimately pass through raw materials costs in contracts. However, we do not think this segment warrants a moat rating because it is driven by volumes and the underlying demand of other segments, which it cannot offset with higher pricing.

We acknowledge risk in Chinese tow capacity being added without regard for returns, but we find it unlikely. We think that a more credible threat to fibers remains with regulatory uncertainty and quicker adoption of tobacco alternatives that do not require filters. The consolidated 7% ROIC in 2025, though a historically low year, fell below our roughly 8% cost of capital assumption, and it shows how little room the firm has when fibers volumes weaken, as they did in 2025 on customer destocking. We think that Eastman fails to earn a moat based on this uncertainty.

Bull case

Eastman is well-positioned to meet evolving chemical demands in auto with window interlayers and specialty plastics through its best-in-class patented products.

The ethylene-to-polyethylene project could raise Eastman’s baseline profitability by negating the need to sell excess ethylene supply on the merchant market.

Oil prices will remain higher for longer, boosting the profitability of Eastman’s commodity intermediates business.

Bear case

Acetate tow supply will be added by competitors that are agnostic to returns, forcing Eastman to rationalize further capacity.

Tariffs will disproportionately hurt Eastman. Nearly 7% of Eastman's revenue in 2024 came from chemicals made in the US and exported to China.

A cautious acquisition and growth strategy could cause Eastman to lag peers in a chemical upcycle.

By Christian Fleming, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:05 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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