Hexcel
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Aerospace & Defense
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hexcel (HXL) | 5.52B | 32.85 | 4.17 | 0.97% |
| SpaceX (SPCX) | 1.74T | -505.10 | 9.82 | 0.00% |
| GE Aerospace (GE) | 319.95B | 36.13 | 18.26 | 0.57% |
| RTX Corp (RTX) | 256.62B | 30.92 | 3.71 | 1.48% |
| Lockheed Martin (LMT) | 130.63B | 20.08 | 12.98 | 2.44% |
| Boeing (BA) | 123.54B | 16.09 | 18.89 | 0.00% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 24.8% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Hexcel reported third-quarter revenue of $496 million, up 9% compared with the year-ago quarter, with adjusted operating profit of $54.4 million, up 21% from the year-ago quarter. As commercial aerospace production rates continue ramping up, Hexcel will benefit from operating leverage as they do.
Why it matters: Lulls in demand for composites in Boeing and Airbus widebody jets, due to other bottlenecks in increasing production of those planes, accounted for most of the financial drag on Hexcel in 2025, but both aircraft makers are now ramping up production in earnest, and Hexcel is seeing increased shipment orders.
The bottom line: We've raised our fair value estimate for narrow-moat Hexcel to $91 per share from $90, reflecting the time value of money and an unaltered forecast. Hexcel's shares traded down nearly 12% on Oct. 22 following its report of revenue shy of Wall St. expectations (by about $6 million) and reaffirmed full-year expectations guidance from management. Shares now trade around 13% below our fair value estimate.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate is $91 per share, representing 39 times our 2026 estimated earnings and implies an enterprise value that is 18 times our forecast for 2026 EBITDA. The primary valuation drivers are aircraft production rates, margins on production, and the (relatively low) amount of capital reinvestment required.
We expect revenue growth to average 8.9% over the next five years, led by global increases in large aircraft production. In defense, we expect Hexcel's exposure to the F-35 and other military aircraft production to grow at a low-single-digit rate. Longer-term, we anticipate steadier revenue increases with normalizing aircraft production and an eventual recovery in the wide-body market, including Hexcel's lucrative exposure to the Airbus A350 program. We project that the company's military exposure will grow roughly in line with overall budgets, somewhat slowed by steadier production for small and shrinking exposure to adjacent markets like high-performance automobiles.
We project meaningful operating margin expansion for Hexcel from pandemic-depressed levels. Margin went from nonexistent in 2020 to 12% in 2023 before dipping below 10% in in 2024 and 2025, though we forecast a steady contribution from incremental margin as the firm can ramp up output volume in its primary and intermittently underutilized commercial aerospace facilities. We see adjusted operating margin lapping 2019's 18% by 2027, and our midcycle operating margin is 22%.
The company was able to pare capital expenditures to maintenance levels during the pandemic and will grow into existing capacity in the next year or two; Hexcel delivered just under 1,800 commercial shipsets in 2019, and we anticipate a similar delivery pace sometime in the later part of 2026. We expect some incremental investment as both Boeing and Airbus are ramping up their total delivery rates for narrow-bodies from historical levels, but we estimate capital spending will normalize around 6% of sales only after 2029. We use a 7.9% cost of capital to discount cash flows.
Economic moat
We think Hexcel, a manufacturer of aerospace-grade composite fibers, resins, and structural materials, deserves a narrow Morningstar Economic Moat Rating based primarily on switching costs and reinforced by a regulatory intangible asset.
Hexcel's customers face switching costs because it is often the sole supplier of mission-critical components of aircraft or other platforms with long and complex production runs, and its customers are very risk-averse and thus unwilling to switch suppliers lightly. The fact that aircraft designs are certified for airworthiness also forms a regulatory intangible asset that limits competition to provide components once a supplier’s goods are approved in the aircraft design. Until the pandemic stilled aircraft factories worldwide, Hexcel earned returns on invested capital exceeding 15% like clockwork. In 2026, as aircraft production at Boeing and Airbus has finally resumed more-normal cadence and volume, Hexcel is able to utilize its processing and manufacturing capacity efficiently, and we forecast it will resume and continue earning ROICs between 15% and 20% for at least the next decade, well exceeding our estimate of the company’s 7.9% cost of capital.
We think the proper way to understand the company's competitive position is by end-market exposure, where at least 87% of its revenue comes from commercial aerospace, defense, and space applications, which we see as the moatiest exposures for commodity processors, each with a comparable split between composite materials and engineered products. We do not believe the small industrial business has a moat, and the segment had negligible engineered products revenue.
Hexcel acts as a downstream commodity processor with specialized products and a high degree of customer intimacy as it supplies inputs to major and critical components of high-value and long-lived platforms like the fuselage and wings that constitute nearly half the weight of the latest generation wide-body aircraft, the Airbus A350 and Boeing B787. The concentration of Hexcel's customers in the aerospace and defense markets confers its economic moats but also limits them to narrow. We see Hexcel as inheriting some of the moat of its top two customers—its products form crucial elements of their aircrafts' design and manufacture, and even though composites represent a growing physical portion of successive generations of aircraft, their relatively small monetary value as a proportion of the value of the assembled plane is static or decreasing, indicating to us that Hexcel does not control its economic destiny in the long run. Airbus pays Hexcel less than $5 million per shipset of A350 components, at most 3% of the selling price of the plane. That said, we see little threat of new entrants within the next 10 years or so, as neither Boeing nor Airbus is working on a clean-sheet new design that would launch in that time and might spur a new bidder, not to mention that Hexcel is a strong incumbent in those development conversations. Hexcel will also have built out its capacity to meet projected demand for current models, so we see little incremental room for moat-accretive investment in aerospace and defense composites (for Hexcel or other providers), even as the technology of carbon fiber and related composites will continue to evolve.
We see the primary switching costs for Hexcel’s aerospace customers as driven by the long product lifecycles of aircraft (the Boeing B787 entered service 29 years after the B767 it replaces), the time and cost airframers would have to endure to switch or insource supply, and the mission-critical nature of these structural aircraft components. Although several manufacturers produce carbon fiber composites, few provide them to the aerospace and defense market, and when they do, they are most often procured on a sole-source basis and are not easily interchangeable due to the certification process required for commercial aerospace products and their specialization for a given aircraft design.
Boeing and Airbus account for almost two-thirds of Hexcel's revenue. Carbon fiber is inherent to many aerostructures, such as wings and fuselages, so product failure due to carbon fiber failure would be catastrophic to the manufacturer’s reputation; thus, we think the mission-criticality of carbon fiber to the end product is a strong disincentive to switch suppliers. With each generation of new aircraft, composites as a percentage of weight have increased because they allow airlines to save on fuel expense. We do not anticipate this secular trend to slow, as fuel-saving improvements drive the adoption of newer aircraft.
Within Hexcel's defense exposure, we see similar dynamics to commercial aerospace and a narrow moat. Typically, the competitive dynamics for the military business resemble the commercial model, with sole-source contracts prevailing. While defense platforms are not regulated the way commercial aircraft are, the design specifications are set by the customer and enforced through engineering specifications in the original delivery and maintenance of the platform. Hexcel is the only aerospace-grade carbon fiber manufacturer that is based in the United States, which we believe may put it at an advantage relative to global peers in its supply to the US military of carbon fiber components.
The primary risk to Hexcel’s moat would surface about once a decade as its aerospace and defense customers build the supply chain for new platform designs. While we don’t think they have a strong incentive to do so, a decision by one or more major customers to insource production of carbon fiber components or qualify a different supplier on a platform where Hexcel was the incumbent would erode the company’s returns and cause us to downgrade its narrow moat.
Bull case
Commercial aerospace manufacturing has a highly visible revenue runway from increasing flights per capita as middle-class demand in emerging markets grows.
Hexcel has long-term sole-source contracts for most of its revenue, which we believe creates substantial switching costs for customers.
Composites, Hexcel’s primary product, have increased as a proportion of aircraft weight with each successive generation of aircraft.
Bear case
More than half of 2019 commercial revenue came from wide-body production, which fell 60% by 2021, and we do not expect it to return to 2019 levels until 2029.
Hexcel pared back capital spending during the pandemic but will eventually have to reinvest in expanding capacity to ramp up narrow-body parts production.
The company is subject to the whims and tribulations of its biggest customers, Boeing and Airbus, which have each experienced disruptive swings in the production rates of their airplanes.
By Nicolas Owens
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:06 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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