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JD.com

US · JD #596 by market cap Listed 2014
24.90 -0.74 -2.89%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 0.99 Cheap vs history 0th percentile
5-year average 1.84 · #17 of 36 in Internet Retail
P/E ratio 14.77 In line with history 60th percentile
5-year average 27.20 · forward 10.07 · #9 of 22 in Internet Retail
P/S ratio 0.17 Cheap vs history 0th percentile
5-year average 0.38 · forward 0.15 · #11 of 39 in Internet Retail

Vs. peers Internet Retail

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
JD.com (JD) 33.50B 14.77 0.99 4.10%
Amazon (AMZN) 2.67T 19.95 4.35 0.00%
Alibaba (BABA) 201.71B 11.45 1.14 1.31%
PDD Holdings (PDD) 119.11B 8.92 1.67 0.00%
MercadoLibre (MELI) 68.69B 36.35 8.38 0.00%
DoorDash (DASH) 66.53B 63.32 6.21 0.00%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value36.00 Economic moatNarrow UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 44.6% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

JD.com swung to CNY 5.2 billion EBIT in the third quarter from a CNY 1.1 billion loss a year ago as food delivery losses narrowed and Jingxi passed its peak investment period. Meanwhile, strong European momentum for Joybuy is fueling the company's optimism for the platform's long-term growth.

Why it matters: Both the results and the near-term loss outlook for new business came in better than our expectation. That said, we anticipate Joybuy's integrated fulfillment model in Europe will require heavy, persistent investment over the long term. Building a European e-commerce platform requires years of investment in warehousing, logistics, and marketing before order density is high enough to generate adequate returns. Currently covering roughly 80 towns and still expanding into new markets, Joybuy's losses widen alongside volume growth.

Joybuy is up against global e-commerce juggernauts and regional players in Europe. At present, Joybuy's category depth and pricing aren't competitive compared with Amazon, which we think would require meaningful long-term investments to improve.

The bottom line: We maintain our HKD 138 per share (USD 36 per ADS) fair value estimates for narrow-moat JD.com, with heavier Joybuy investments offsetting the positive valuation impact of narrowing near-term new business losses. Shares remain undervalued, in our view. While concerns about overseas expansion remain, we think its domestic e-commerce business' value is underestimated by the market. We think customers seeking authentic goods, same-day/next-day delivery, and a large assortment will struggle to find an alternative that matches JD’s offering. Given JD's large market share in the core electronics and home appliances segment, we think on-demand delivery rivals and e-commerce platforms won't be able to replicate JD's sourcing scale and cost advantage.

Fair value

Our fair value estimate is USD 36.00 per ADS (HKD 138.00 per share).

We expect a 3% revenue compound annual growth rate in the coming 10 years, driven by a 0% CAGR in net product sales and a 6% CAGR in services and others. We expect JD to continue to enhance sales through its omnichannel strategy by providing merchandise to online platforms and retailers, improving its third-party platform's operations, gaining new users, broadening its variety of products, and providing food delivery and travel services.

We expect non-GAAP operating margin to reach 2.7% in 2035 from 0.7% in 2025, mainly due to narrowing losses from the food delivery and other new businesses, and, to a lesser extent, rising contribution from the high-margin third-party platform. We expect the logistics segment to see a margin increase due to economies of scale. Our 10-year non-GAAP operating profit CAGR is 17%.

Economic moat

We think JD.com has a narrow economic moat, based on an intangible asset of high reliability and assurance (on-hand inventory, product authenticity, and fast proprietary logistics services) and a cost advantage resulting from economies of scale in its first-party business. We downgraded JD's moat to narrow from wide because intensifying competition from on-demand delivery and content-driven e-commerce no longer gives us confidence that JD can maintain excess returns on invested capital over the next 20 years. However, we remain confident it will do so over at least the next 10 years.

JD's intangible asset is derived from its fast, efficient, and high-quality proprietary logistics, complemented by the assurance of authentic products on its first-party platform. By procuring inventory directly from manufacturers and authorised brand distributors and placing it in warehouses closest to likely end consumers, JD can fulfill most of its first-party orders on the same or next day across almost all districts and counties in China. This model is fundamentally different from marketplace peers such as Alibaba, PDD, and Douyin that mainly rely on third-party sellers and third-party logistics providers.

This integrated first-party retail and logistics advantage, however, has narrowed. The rise of on-demand retail—in which Meituan and Alibaba deliver in an average of 38 minutes—has redefined the value proposition for JD's core premium shoppers, particularly in low-value, high-frequency categories where speed matters most. Content-led platforms have also taken share: between 2022 and 2025, Douyin and Pinduoduo lifted their GMV shares by 8 and 3 percentage points, respectively, while JD's declined by 4. We expect JD to cede a further 300 basis points of GMV share by 2035, taking it to 14% from 17% in 2025.

We nonetheless believe JD is not a no-moat company. JD's first-party platform carries more than 5 million stock-keeping units versus the 4,000-10,000 of a typical on-demand delivery warehouse, allowing it to satisfy long-tail demand that on-demand delivery rivals cannot. As China's largest retailer of home appliances with an approximately 60% share, JD can source these products at the lowest cost and reinvest the savings into comprehensive after-sales services—installation, uninstallation and disposal of old appliances, warranty support, and returns—that competitors would need considerable time and capital to replicate. This is why JD's GMV share in electronics and home appliances, the segment that accounted for 46% of 2025 revenue, has been stable since the fourth quarter of 2022, even as its overall GMV share eroded—big-ticket, durable goods are seldom bought on impulse and are not solely driven by price. We think 30-minute delivery is not the priority for these items.

We also do not expect rivals' momentum to persist indefinitely. Pinduoduo's GMV growth slowed to high-single-digit percentages by March and April 2026, and its online marketing services revenue growth slowed to 2.5% in the first quarter, signs of a maturing platform. Douyin's live-streaming format—best suited to discretionary, highly visual, low-price, impulse-driven goods—is approaching its GMV ceiling of CNY 3 trillion-CNY 4 trillion versus its CNY 2.6 trillion in 2025, per our estimate. Live streaming e-commerce cannot effectively serve planned, high-ticket, or bulky purchases. These dynamics limit further share loss and underpin our view that JD warrants a narrow moat rather than none.

Finally, JD's national fulfillment scale mirrors the competitive advantages of its global, moaty peers. Operators such as Mercado Libre, Sea Limited, Coupang, and Amazon all hold narrow or wide moats thanks to their extensive warehouse and fulfilment networks; JD's comparable infrastructure should at a minimum support a narrow moat in China. Although JD's entry into loss-making food delivery cut ROIC to 6% in 2025, we forecast ROIC to recover to over 20% by 2035, significantly below the 42% to 55% during 2021-24, but still well above our cost of capital assumption.

Bull case

JD.com’s free return, exchange, and shipping policies substantially increase the new user base, purchase frequency, and average order value, leading to better-than-expected profit for the firm.

JD.com can increase the number of its merchants and their competitively priced products, similar to the scale of Taobao, 1688, and Pinduoduo, without sacrificing margins.

JD.com adopts generative AI on its platform to help customers buy products that meet their specific demand better than its peers, leading to market share gain.

Bear case

Many customers associate the JD.com brand with a poorer quality of products and services and insufficiently competitive prices as JD.com pushes its third-party platform, leading to lower-than-expected sales.

JD.com’s profitability suffers due to higher employee compensation, low take rate, and heavy investments in the business, such as the introduction of a lower free shipping threshold.

JD.com expands into value-destroying domains in which it lacks competitive advantages, resulting in lackluster earnings growth.

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:34 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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