Magna International
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 29.48-69.87, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is +17.8% above the average-multiple fair value of 49.68.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Auto Parts
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Magna International (MGA) | 15.12B | 19.07 | 1.31 | 3.37% |
| O'Reilly Automotive (ORLY) | 74.31B | 28.42 | -35.51 | 0.00% |
| AutoZone (AZO) | 52.39B | 21.34 | -20.94 | 0.00% |
| Genuine Parts (GPC) | 16.34B | 455.81 | 3.51 | 3.56% |
| Allison Transmission (ALSN) | 9.55B | 16.78 | 4.59 | 0.98% |
| BorgWarner (BWA) | 9.43B | 19.64 | 1.66 | 1.45% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 45.2% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
On Nov. 11 Magna held an investor day and unveiled 2030 targets, including adjusted EBIT margin expanding over 200 basis points from 6.4% at the midpoint of 2026 guidance, and compound annual organic revenue growth 2-4 percentage points above global light vehicle production.
Why it matters: We are glad to see management think that recent years of margin expansion are not the best the company can achieve. We also like the company saying it will repurchase all 25.8 million shares of the recently announced normal course issuer bid over the next 12 months. Guidance is not for a smooth 50 basis points of margin expansion annually, but Magna targets that annual increase on average. Ongoing operational excellence initiatives will drive this expansion centered around data analytics, preventing shutdowns, materials flow, and factory automation. The presentation showed most of these focus points are only in early stages of global roll out and won't be fully implemented until primarily 2030, so we see potential for gross margin expansion and some overhead cost leveraging through that time.
The bottom line: We are increasing our USD fair value estimate for no-moat Magna to $85 per share from $80 and our CAD fair value estimate to CAD 121 per share from CAD 112. The change is from increasing our average operating margin including equity income to 6.4% from 6.2% over our five-year explicit forecast. We don't find management's 2030 targets unrealistic, and we think Magna's track record on recent margin expansion merits some benefit of the doubt. The growth above market is based on only approximately 1% annual growth in global light vehicle production. 2030 is our midcycle year for now, so we keep our 2030 adjusted EBIT margin at 6.6% rather than the mid-8% range implied in the new targets. A midcycle margin of 8.5% would raise our USD fair value estimate to $108, all else constant.
Leadership sounded optimistic about a new target of nonautomotive revenue of at least $2 billion by 2030 and thinks it can exceed that level given a TAM exceeding $100 billion. 2026 revenue in adjacent markets is projected by the company at about $700 million. We like that Magna only wants new verticals that are scalable and accretive, and it makes sense to target areas in which the firm's manufacturing expertise can add value. Examples include fuel tanks for commercial vehicles, body panels for off-road recreational vehicles, various systems and assembly for robotaxis, and the same for military vehicles.
The company also announced that starting in first-quarter 2027 the seating and complete vehicle assembly segments will be combined. 2027 will still see some revenue disclosures about each business separately, but management felt now was the right time to combine due to their somewhat similar sizes and some synergies from customers directing seating orders for their assembled vehicle outsourcing.
Fair value
We are raising our USD 80 fair value estimate for the NYSE-traded shares to USD 85 after incorporating 2030 targets issued at the Nov. 11 investor day. Our weighted average cost of capital is 9.1%. Our model is built in US dollars. We model average operating margin excluding equity income across our five-year explicit forecast period at 5.9%, up from 5.8%. 2030 targets are for adjusted EBIT margin at least 200 basis points higher than 2026 levels (which are likely in the mid-6%) and adjusted diluted EPS growing at a compound annual rate of at least 15% through 2030.
Magna targets 2026 adjusted EBIT margin, which includes equity income but excludes tariffs (management presently sees nearly all tariff costs reimbursed by customers, albeit with a lag), at 6.3%-6.6%. We model 2026 revenue of over USD 42 billion and adjusted EBIT margin of about 6.3%. Volume, cost-containment efforts, and contribution from new-vehicle program launches are the largest contributors to whether Magna reaches its 2026 targets. Cost-efficiency measures, which Magna calls operational excellence, are playing a key role in profit growth along with lower net engineering spending in light of sluggish industry light-vehicle production. Lack of volume is a problem for all suppliers but should improve after the next few years once tariff uncertainty improves, given depressed vehicle production from the pandemic and the chip shortage.
We assume Magna’s revenue grows at about a 2.5% compound annual rate for 2026-30, up from 1.5%. Operating margin before equity income was above 7% in 2015-17 but has suffered from the chip shortage and investments for electric vehicles and driver assistance tech. Our adjusted EBIT margin including equity method income assumptions for 2026-30 averages 6.4%, up from 6.2%, expanding from 5.6% in 2025 to a peak of 6.6% in 2030 (our midcycle year) on greater operating leverage as operational excellence initiatives around things like preventing equipment downtime and more cost-effective materials handling gets implemented globally through 2030. We don't model 2030 margin at the firm's target level in the mid-8% range due to 2030 for now being our midcycle year. Modeling midcycle adjusted EBIT margin at 8.5%, all else constant, would increase our fair value estimate to about USD 108. Revenue growth and richer-margin-potential products, including advanced driver-assistance systems and electrified powertrain products and EV battery trays, should enhance profit mix over time as these new products realize more volume to reach scale. We assume a long-run effective tax rate of 21.5% based on Magna's historical results and Canadian statutory tax rates.
Economic moat
While Magna innovates in its product lineup, benefits from high customer switching costs, has size to merit scale, and possesses long-term, highly integrated customer relationships, we think that it does not benefit enough from its intellectual property or cost structure to drive consistent economic profits over time. Owing to restructuring actions taken in 2009, Magna's economic profits were relatively fair until the coronavirus pandemic. However, a lack of economic profit since the pandemic and some forecast years carrying little to no economic profit each year merit a Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of none for now.
Among auto suppliers, the most common sources of economic moats tend to be intangible assets and switching costs. From a qualitative perspective, Magna enjoys switching cost advantages like many large suppliers do and its customer relationships are an intangible asset, but many of its products are too commodified to generate moatworthy ROIC.
Vehicles typically consist of thousands of parts, each of which requires deep expertise and incremental investment as newer vehicle models come to market. As a result, automakers outsource many of the components that make up their vehicles to auto suppliers that have more specialized knowledge surrounding particular parts and drive long-term relationships with these suppliers through co-development agreements, tooling, and research and development subsidies. This dynamic helps reduce automakers' expenses, as they don't have to pay for the entire cost of developing and manufacturing every part that goes into their vehicle. It also drives long-term sticky relationships for auto suppliers, creating a deeply integrated business while keeping competitors at bay.
In our view, Magna has significant scale and co-development agreements, which are evidence of an economic moat. However, there's an additional factor that drives the development of barriers to entry, and that relates to pricing power to generate economic profit, which we think Magna lacks. Across its largest business units, the company faces fierce competition from numerous auto suppliers. For 2025, the company's two largest segments, body exteriors and structures and power and vision, accounted for about 74% of sales. Within these two segments, Magna faces immense competition, as noted in the company's annual information form, where it lists dozens of competitors. Products in these groups include things like stamping, chassis systems, doors and handles, trim, and grilles, things that we consider commodified due to the numerous competitors. As a result, segment margins remain in the single digits across the various business units, despite Magna's significant size. In 2026, Magna reached a deal to divest USD 1.1 billion in low-profit revenue from lighting and rooftop systems via three transactions, so management is taking steps to have a less commodified lineup.
Auto-dimming internal and exterior mirrors are a good example of Magna's profit/product contrast with more-specialized narrow-moat suppliers. Magna makes mirrors in its power and vision segment; its main mirror competitor is Gentex, which controls around 80% of the auto-dimming mirror market. These tech-heavy mirrors can generate moatworthy ROIC, as evidenced by Gentex's roughly high teens to 20% levels on EBIT margins around 20%-25%. However, Magna Mirrors does not disclose profit metrics and is so small within Magna that even if that division has similar EBIT margin to Gentex (which we doubt, due to Gentex's share vastly larger and its better technology), it's not enough to bring Magna's overall profit and ROIC metrics to moatworthy levels. This same dynamic happens in seating, where Magna's seating group EBIT margin of 3.6% and share (often number four or five) do not approach seating leader Lear's profit margin of 6.4%. Furthermore, Magna's 2025 seating revenue of USD 5.9 billion does not rival Adient's USD 14.5 billion or Lear's USD 17.3 billion, making achieving scale in seating more difficult for Magna versus these two leading firms.
Additionally, we forecast Magna's ROICs to mostly remain very slightly below or just above its cost of capital as the industry faces new megatrends in the form of autonomous vehicles, electric vehicles, and more electronic safety and assisted-driving content. We believe Magna will be forced to increase its pace of investments, driving further pressure on margins. It is also worth noting that relative to many of the other auto suppliers, Magna has historically spent less on R&D as a percentage of revenue (low single digits versus midsingle digits for some other suppliers). Meanwhile, it's generating mid-single-digit EBIT margins, meaning it could at times be at a disadvantage with respect to the next auto investment cycle. The acquisition of Veoneer's active safety business for USD 1.5 billion (about 1 times 2023 sales) brought USD 670 million of goodwill and is an example of the high investment required to stay competitive in the megatrend arena. Investment needs for megatrends are huge compared with prepandemic and a reason we don't model ROIC returning to prepandemic levels in the midteens.
Bull case
High switching costs often enable sticky market shares for auto suppliers.
Magna sees growth over time, even with tepid industry vehicle production growth, thanks to more content on vehicles.
As automakers consolidate purchases with fewer suppliers, large vendors such as Magna are in the best position to gain share because they can offer a wide range of parts, modules, and complete systems.
Bear case
Magna relies heavily on a handful of automakers; its top six customers accounted for 76% of total 2025 revenue. Asian automakers can be hard to gain share with.
The cyclical, capital-intensive nature of the industry means that a modest volume decline could translate into a significant drop in profitability and the stock price.
The auto-parts supply industry is highly competitive, and customers expect annual contractual price reductions absent product innovation. Raw material costs are volatile and tariff risk adds even more uncertainty to margins.
By David Whiston, CFA, CPA, CFE
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:30:05 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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