ResMed
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 221.34-491.80, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is -33.9% below the average-multiple fair value of 356.56.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Medical Instruments & Supplies
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ResMed (RMD) | 33.14B | 21.46 | 5.57 | 1.04% |
| Intuitive Surgical (ISRG) | 138.33B | 48.25 | 8.65 | 0.00% |
| Becton Dickinson & Co (BDX) | 57.96B | 52.02 | 2.35 | 1.97% |
| Alcon (ALC) | 35.92B | 54.24 | 1.64 | 0.48% |
| Medline (MDLN) | 32.55B | 57.52 | 2.76 | 0.00% |
| West Pharmaceutical Services (WST) | 27.19B | 43.80 | 9.16 | 0.23% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 18.8% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
ResMed’s fiscal first-quarter 2027 revenue rose 6% to USD 1.41 billion, while EPS increased 14% to USD 2.91. Gross margin expanded 50 basis points to 62.5% on manufacturing productivity gains and delayed US facility costs. Management reiterated its fiscal 2027 guidance.
Why it matters: Demand is solid, but temporary benefits flattered the quarter. Revenue was slightly ahead of consensus, and EPS beat by 8%, helped by delayed Indiana facility costs and a French device replacement cycle. We leave our forecasts unchanged. Americas revenue, about 59% of the group, grew 8% with minimal pricing contribution. Mask sales grew 10%, and device sales rose 6%, indicating solid demand. Rest-of-world device sales grew 13%, but a French fleet renewal drove much of the growth and will fade in the second half. The margin timing benefit reverses next quarter, with management guiding a roughly 30-basis-point sequential hit as costs from its new Indiana manufacturing facility start flowing through. Excluding that delay, gross margin rose only about 20 basis points, in line with full-year guidance.
The bottom line: We maintain our USD 280 fair value estimate for narrow-moat ResMed, or AUD 40 per CDI. Shares remain undervalued. We are likely more optimistic than the market about ResMed's ability to capitalize on growing sleep apnea awareness. Fewer than 20% of US sleep apnea sufferers are diagnosed or treated. More diagnoses should support long-term growth.
Bulls say: Better masks and wider screening could help ResMed add patients and keep them on therapy for longer. Management says fabric masks improved therapy adherence by 6% compared with their silicone mask counterparts. Better adherence supports physician preference, repeat mask sales, and ResMed’s narrow moat. Data covering 3.3 million patients show GLP-1 users were more likely to start CPAP and continue with the treatment. The finding suggests GLP-1 drugs and CPAP treatment can complement each other.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate is USD 280 per share. Our discounted cash flow model uses a weighted average cost of capital of 7.4%, and our valuation implies a fiscal 2027 P/E of 23 times.
We forecast revenue from ResMed's core devices and masks business to grow about 7% a year over the next five years. Masks and accessories should grow faster than devices because they compound on ResMed's installed base. Patients stay on therapy longer with its connected devices, and the average US patient replaces a mask only about twice a year, against the four a year Medicare pays for. ResMed's resupply programs are narrowing that gap. We expect device growth to soften in the near term before recovering as more undiagnosed patients are brought into treatment.
We expect only modest margin expansion, as higher-margin masks and accessories become a larger share of sales and sales and marketing costs scale with growth. Our earnings forecasts therefore rest on revenue growth. Share buybacks add to that, lifting earnings per share growth to about 11% a year over our five-year forecast.
Economic moat
We assign ResMed a narrow Morningstar Economic Moat Rating, sourced from intangible assets. Its reputation among sleep physicians for best-in-class device adherence drives overwhelming referral flow for ResMed's devices, granting greater bargaining power over medical equipment suppliers than competitors, and supporting a price premium.
In the US, ResMed's core market, the physician's only real concern when prescribing continuous positive airway pressure therapy is efficacy: roughly 90% of US patients pay for it through insurance at a fixed reimbursement rate regardless of brand, so price plays no role in the physician's decision. What matters is the likelihood of remission from sleep apnea. And remission is a function of adherence: using the device consistently cuts breathing interruptions by around 90%. But adherence is far from guaranteed, since new patients often find CPAP uncomfortable and many fail to persist with therapy. Published estimates put CPAP adherence at about 50% to 80%.
Under the right conditions, ResMed can achieve adherence well above that range: when a physician monitors through AirView and the patient uses the myAir app, adherence runs as high as 87%, and no competitor has matched this to our knowledge.
ResMed reinforces this reputation directly within the sleep physician and research community. Open Payments, the US register of manufacturer payments to physicians, shows ResMed spending several times more than Philips on physician interactions related to sleep devices. Its research output includes the single most cited paper in modern sleep apnea epidemiology, the 2019 study that reset the field's understanding of global prevalence. It also funds academic research and clinical studies led by prominent researchers in the field, keeping its name attached to the evidence base sleep physicians read and cite.
Physicians choose the best-evidenced option, and have an active disincentive to prescribe an untested manufacturer: a failed setup, a frustrated patient, the risk of medical liability. This bears out in the referral data: even before the Philips recall, ResMed’s surveys show 65% of US sleep specialists' scripts are explicitly branded to ResMed, or the medical supplier knows a physician prefers the brand and will supply it even when it isn't explicitly specified.
ResMed's dominant referral flow gives it leverage over the medical equipment suppliers that source and distribute devices and masks. Suppliers would prefer a cheaper brand, as they keep the difference between the insurer’s fixed payment and the wholesale price. But no supplier can credibly threaten to drop ResMed, as it would lose too much business. Suppliers also care about adherence, as they bear the cost if a patient fails to stay on CPAP during the 90-day reimbursement window. This combination allows ResMed to extract a premium. Before the recall, ResMed priced above Philips at every like-for-like comparison we can make at US retailers, with a median premium of about 25%. While wholesale pricing is less transparent, we would expect a similar premium there too.
We think it will be very hard to break ResMed's entrenched position with prescribing physicians, supporting its pricing power and excess returns for at least the next 10 years. We rate the moat narrow rather than wide because the source is largely reputational, resting on continued investment in outcomes data and physician engagement; a lapse in either could open ground for a well-resourced challenger over a long horizon.
ResMed is a capital-light business. Capital expenditure runs at around 3% of revenue, below depreciation in most years. Acquisitions, concentrated in noncore software, have been under 3% of revenue in most years. Even carrying its goodwill, which is about a third of ResMed’s capital base, the core business earns strong returns, several times its cost of capital, and should stay clear of that hurdle across our forecast. ResMed's operating leverage has not come at the cost of cutting research and development spending, which has stayed remarkably consistent at 7% of revenue for more than a decade. Instead, it has scaled selling and administrative expenses, which have fallen by about seven percentage points of revenue over the same period. This is a feature of ResMed's referral model: the physician directs demand, so the revenue base scales without proportionate spending.
Competition from Philips may constrain further price rises, but we don't think it threatens the moat, and expect the existing premium to hold even as price growth slows. We expect Philips to return to the US market in 2027 and price aggressively to win back share lost during the recall, but not to meaningfully dent ResMed's share given its reputational advantage and the damage Philips suffered from the recall. We would consider a downgrade if branded-script share fell materially below the pre-recall 65%, or the premium over Philips' devices collapsed after reentry.
We think GLP-1 drugs for obesity are a gradual headwind for CPAP adoption, not an existential threat. While weight is the primary risk factor for most sleep apnea, studies show GLP-1s only reduce breathing interruptions by about 50%, whereas CPAP cuts them by roughly 90%. So, a physician whose primary concern is treating sleep apnea is still highly likely to recommend CPAP as the primary therapy. Compared with a world with no GLP-1s, we estimate the drugs will reduce ResMed's addressable market by about 10% by 2035. However, fewer than 20% of sleep apnea sufferers are diagnosed and treated today, so there is still a long runway for growth, even if GLP-1s erode some of this.
Bull case
Home sleep tests and ResMed's training of primary care doctors make diagnosis quicker and cheaper, bringing more of the untreated population into therapy.
Selling and administrative costs fell from 27% of revenue to under 20% in the decade to fiscal 2026. If that operating leverage continues, margins could expand well beyond the modest gains we expect.
Treatment is far less penetrated outside the US. ResMed puts it at 10% to 15% in Europe and under 5% in Asia, against 15% to 20% in the US, leaving a long runway as diagnosis improves abroad.
Bear case
Philips is likely to return to the US in 2027 and price aggressively to win back share, which could pressure ResMed's prices.
GLP-1s may remove more patients from the treatable pool if people stay on the drugs for longer or the efficacy of the drugs improves.
Tighter reimbursement in the US, whether through competitive bidding or stricter resupply rules, would squeeze suppliers and make ResMed's premium harder to hold.
By Lochlan Halloway, CFA, Oriana Pham, CFA
Quote time 2026-11-20 20:01:25 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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