Thor Industries

Thor's fiscal 2026 fourth-quarter diluted EPS fell 66.9% year over year while gross margin fell 230 basis points to 12.4% and adjusted EBITDA fell 37.1%. Total units fell 12% but backlog rose 8% thanks to towables and Europe. Management is waiting until later in 2026 to give fiscal 2027 guidance.

Why it matters: The company said that North American consumer headwinds intensified in fiscal fourth quarter due to high oil prices, inflation, and interest rates. US interest rates recently increasing suggest to us that no improvement in demand is coming in fiscal 2027. Pretax income for the North American towable segment fell 77% while the North American motorized segment posted a $5.2 million loss. Both segments saw double-digit unit declines on mix and input cost headwinds. Thor is absorbing most tariff costs to keep consumer prices affordable. Europe was a bright spot with pretax income up 5.9% despite higher warranty costs. RV consumers there are less reliant on borrowing and demand higher-priced motorcaravans and campervans over caravans.

The bottom line: We will be rolling our model forward for the 10-K filing shortly. We may modestly lower our fair value estimate at that time due to fiscal 2027 demand likely flat at best, in our view. Thor remains in good financial health with low leverage and $1.3 billion of liquidity at July 31. We understand management delaying giving fiscal 2027 guidance to first get better demand visibility this fall at the Hershey RV show and the Elkhart Open House event. The company did say that restructuring and reorganization will, when complete, yield over $100 million in cost savings. We like that management repurchased $34.3 million of stock in the quarter, and actions to centralize purchasing to bring more bargaining power over suppliers is a good move even though it comes with restructuring costs now.

After rolling our model for the 10-K, we are lowering our Thor fair value estimate to $126 per share from $138. The change is from modeling weaker profitability in the first two years of our forecast period and from lowering our midcycle EBIT margin to 6.5% from 7.0%. The first change is due to our expectation of flat to weak RV demand in the US given continued macroeconomic headwinds such as oil prices and interest rates. The midcycle change is to better account for the range of EBIT margins possible throughout a business cycle.

Our fair value estimate reflects our view that dealers will eventually resume inventory restocking and that Thor is capable of delivering high-single-digit to low-double-digit top-line growth over most years of our five-year explicit forecast period while experiencing an increase in operating margins of over 400 basis points by our midcycle year of fiscal 2031 versus fiscal 2026's 2.1%. Although our midcycle forecast projects sales and operating margins below fiscal 2022 levels, this should not be interpreted as negative sentiment, as the company experienced abnormally high demand back then due to the pandemic. Our forecast reflects more normalized demand as opposed to any negative view we have toward the company’s growth prospects, margin profile, or management quality. In fact, we believe Thor is well positioned to capitalize on momentum garnered over the past few years, as it has attracted a younger, more active audience and diversified its business both geographically and through the development of new offerings such as parts. The firm is also centralizing RV operations such as purchasing, which had previously been done at the brand level. Management guides for about $100 million of earnings contribution once these moves are fully in place.

Our revenue forecast reflects headwinds affecting the entire RV manufacturing industry. Supply chain constraints that have affected all industry participants, especially for chassis, and dealers remain hesitant to replenish inventory. So we model negative top-line growth for fiscal 2027. However, as the supply chain and dealer sentiment eventually improve in what we expect will be either in fiscal 2027, we believe Thor can generate top-line growth at around an 8% compound annual rate between fiscal 2027 and 2030. We believe a portion of this growth can be attributed to a normalized demand environment for RVs in North America and Europe, which we expect to return to mid- to high-single-digit growth over the medium term. Additionally, we expect Thor to benefit from the acquisition of parts maker Airxcel, as we expect replacement parts to be a large growth engine for the company over time. We believe that RV demand was pulled forward in fiscal 2021 and 2022 due to increased work-from-home flexibility and increased demand for travel and outdoor activities following lockdowns.

We expect Thor will be able to generate a midcycle operating margin of about 6.5%. Fiscal 2023 saw a steep year-over-year decline in operating margins to 5.3% from 9.4%, as the company was affected by lower gross margins and a 31.8% decline in sales, forcing it to absorb more fixed costs. However, as the company returns to growth, we believe it will benefit from fixed-cost leverage as well as slight improvements in bargaining power with suppliers, allowing it to generate midcycle gross margins of about 15%, similar to fiscal 2021's 15.4%. Given the increased reliance on the European segment, which consistently generates pretax margins in the mid to low single digits (2.2% in fiscal 2026), and a more normalized demand environment, we do not foresee total company operating margins returning to levels such as fiscal 2022’s 9.4%. In June 2025, management said its expectation for overhead costs as a percentage of revenue long-term is about 8%, which we model the company reaching in fiscal 2031. Our weighted average cost of capital is about 10%.

We assign a no-moat Morningstar Economic Moat Rating to Thor as the company has been unable to develop sufficient barriers to entry that would prevent new players from entering the market. Recreational vehicle producers face cyclical demand; we think they operate in an even more cyclical sector than what traditional automakers face. Although RV producers appear to face less competition than their counterparts in the general auto manufacturing industry, as evidenced by the oligopolistic nature of the industry with three manufacturers consistently accounting for almost 90% of North American market share, we attribute this dynamic to the much smaller market size of the industry as opposed to any maintainable competitive advantages. For example, North American RV shipments peaked in 2021 when the industry wholesaled over 600,000 units, but 2023 shipments were the lowest since 2012 at about 313,000, as the industry unwound its massive pandemic-fueled backlog. The industry figure for calendar 2025 was 342,121, and industry wholesales for calendar 2026 through July are down 13.9% year over year. Comparatively, US light-vehicle sales are generally 16 million units per year.

Despite its leading North American market share, achieving nearly 40% share for towables and almost 50% for motor homes, we do not believe Thor has established adequate scale to warrant a cost advantage. Thor typically purchases many of the components used in its vehicles in finished form, including chassis, aluminum, lumber, plywood, plastic, fiberglass, and steel. As a result, Thor can experience significant production delays due to constraints in the supply chain. Although Thor has achieved significant size relative to other RV manufacturers, it must also compete for semiconductor chips and engines against other vehicle manufacturers, many of which are significantly larger with much greater bargaining power, preventing Thor from achieving any meaningful cost advantage, in our view. In recent years, Thor has worked with key suppliers to better leverage its buying power to improve purchasing terms and, in some cases, co-design (such as chassis). The company historically operated via a decentralized approach, though, allowing its brands to maintain certain levels of autonomy, which we feel likely prevents the company from maximizing any scale benefits available. In February 2026, Thor announced that most North American brands are moving under two groups to utilize AI for pricing and procurement and for more common parts sourcing (design will be done at the brand level). This change could lead to higher profits and perhaps economic profit over time.

Although Thor boasts premier RV brands such as Airstream and Tiffin, it also sells numerous other brands that do not garner the same level of consumer recognition or pricing power. Thor does not disclose sales or operating income at the brand level, making it difficult to quantify the contribution from premium brands that may have an intangible asset moat source. Even so, Thor operates over 30 brands across North America and Europe, and we therefore think it is likely that it experiences some brand dilution. We think this argument is supported by the fact that competitor Winnebago, which exclusively operates in the premium market with far fewer brands in its portfolio, has generated average adjusted EBITDA margins of over 10% over the past five years, whereas Thor has generated margins of 7.4%.

Before the pandemic, Thor’s returns on invested capital had been declining, reaching 9.8% including goodwill during fiscal 2019. Although Thor was able to improve adjusted ROIC to 22.9% in fiscal 2022, we attribute this dynamic to a pull-forward in demand as consumers were eager to get outdoors during the lockdowns as well as take advantage of increased remote work flexibility. Fiscal 2023 ROIC fell to 8.2% and fiscal 2024-26 have been low- to mid-single-digit years. We forecast ROICs rising over time to a normalized midcycle level about in the low teens, as we expect goodwill from future acquisitions and a normalized demand environment will hamper future returns relative to elevated pandemic levels.

Thor has positioned itself as the largest RV manufacturer in North America and Europe, which should disproportionately benefit the company as the industry returns to growth.

The company has ample balance sheet flexibility to execute additional acquisitions as well as engage in buybacks and dividends.

Thor has diversified over the past few years as it has entered new geographies and now sells aftermarket parts, which should help reduce some of the overall cyclicality in the business.

Thor operates over 30 RV brands across North America and Europe. We believe this has driven some brand dilution, affecting margins.

The RV industry experiences significant cyclicality as consumers can choose to purchase cheaper forms of leisure during economic downturns.

A reliance on acquisitions exposes the company to risks that may hit ROICs.