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United Airlines

US · UAL #594 by market cap Listed 1970
101.03 -4.50 -4.26%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.85 Cheap vs history 21st percentile
5-year average 2.31 · #6 of 13 in Airlines
P/E ratio 9.25 In line with history 66th percentile
5-year average 4.80 · forward 11.34 · #4 of 10 in Airlines
P/S ratio 0.50 In line with history 60th percentile
5-year average 0.44 · forward 0.45 · #11 of 18 in Airlines

Vs. peers Airlines

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
United Airlines (UAL) 32.82B 9.25 1.85 0.00%
Delta Air Lines (DAL) 52.64B 15.97 2.34 0.97%
Ryanair (RYAAY) 28.04B 14.37 2.20 1.61%
Southwest Airlines (LUV) 21.58B 21.50 2.94 1.63%
LATAM Airlines Group (LTM) 12.66B 7.86 5.73 3.45%
American Airlines (AAL) 7.88B -16.30 -1.86 0.00%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★☆☆ Fair value98.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyVery High Capital allocationStandard

Trading 3.0% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

On Friday, Nov. 13, in response to malfunctioning network communications equipment, the US Federal Aviation Administration halted domestic air departures for several hours, stranding thousands of fliers and snarling airport tarmacs for days.

Why it matters: The failure reportedly stemmed from a couple of malfunctioning network routers recently installed by the contractor L3Harris, which administers the FAA's communication network. It remains unclear whether hardware, software, or configuration were to blame. In any case, a security breach does not seem the likely cause, despite initial concerns at the time of the FAA's announcement of the ground stop that a cyberattack or other security breach may have been underway. Airlines face disruptions to their flight schedules quite frequently, though only rarely on a truly nationwide scale. They have evolved to cope with getting their equipment, staff, and passengers rerouted and back on schedule, though this can take several burdensome days.

Between the lines: Even if an error on L3Harris's part caused the new routers to swamp the FAA's network, we do not expect meaningful financial consequences to the company. On the contrary, the apparent fragility of the FAA's system and the strain it places on air traffic controllers seem likely to steel political resolve to fund and complete the FAA network's overhaul as soon as possible.

The bottom line: We haven't altered our forecasts or fair value estimates for the no-moat US airlines, which remain at least 10% overvalued for reasons unrelated to the outage. We maintain our $342 fair value estimate for narrow-moat L3Harris, which trades at a 23% discount. With its Medium Morningstar Uncertainty Rating, we would consider L3Harris shares compellingly cheap below $240 per share. Along with other defense contractors, its shares have gotten cheaper in recent months driven in part by doubts about future military budgets.

Fair value

Our fair value estimate for United Airlines Holdings is $98 per share, 12.8 times our 2026 GAAP earnings estimate, and an enterprise value multiple of 7 times our 2026 EBITDAR estimate. We decreased our fair value estimate for no-moat United shares from $102, primarily due to increasing operating costs such as landing fees and aircraft rent in our near-term forecast.

Beyond 2026, we forecast low-single-digit, potentially lumpy, revenue growth over our forecast period, during which we expect United to capture a small amount of market share from low-cost providers and potentially from American, and we see recent record yields normalizing with a long-term subsiding of fuel costs. United returned to 2019 capacity levels in early 2023, and we expect available seat miles to be approximately 24% higher in 2030, our midcycle year, than in 2019. Our earlier growth estimate projected ASMs to be 33% higher by 2030.

Over the medium term, even if a consumer recession slows demand for a few quarters, we still expect steady demand for domestic leisure travel and strengthening business travel as workers return to offices. We anticipate United's load factors will plateau at around 83%, and average passenger revenue yields will eventually dip below $0.20 per mile due to competition, despite United's premium customer segments' loyalty.

Our average operating margin forecast for United is 7.5% (peaking at 7.6% in 2027), 310 basis points below the 2015-19 average, which declined steadily over that period. We no longer see evidence that pandemic-related restructuring has generated labor efficiencies at United, and while the airline and its peers will benefit from elevated yields indefinitely, these are just offsetting the increases in unit costs they experienced as they rehired necessary crew and renegotiated labor agreements. We forecast about 3 cents more in structural costs per available seat mile in United's midterm future than it experienced in 2015-19, with passenger revenue yields more or less tracking unit costs.

Based on delayed airplane deliveries from Boeing and Airbus, we're expecting capital expenditure to be about $7.5 billion in 2026 and increase toward $8 billion or more subsequently, before eventually tapering off as the airline takes delivery of some 250 aircraft it has on order, though the timing of these deliveries remains uncertain. We expect capital expenditures to remain elevated over our five-year explicit forecast as United continues to add capacity and renew its fleet.

We think a high cost of equity and above-average cost of debt are reasonable assumptions for this airline, given its highly cyclical business model and somewhat leveraged balance sheet, which leads us to an 8.2% weighted average cost of capital.

Economic moat

We assign United Airlines a Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of none.

Airlines rent seats by the hour on aircraft that fly for decades, their operations and financial results subject to fluctuations beyond their control including volatile fuel costs, growth in labor costs, weather, seasonal variation in travel demand, and ticket prices in most markets. The airline business remains price-competitive, capital-intensive, and labor-intensive, all of which make it difficult for an airline to generate any profit beyond its cost of capital. IATA, an industry group, published estimates in 2020 and 2026 that return on invested capital had only approached the industry's cost of capital once in 30 years, never exceeding it. Our own modeling reflects the same reality for United: over the last decade, it showed volatile annual ROICs ranging from 26% to negative 30%, averaging 7.3%, consistent with our 8.2% cost of capital estimate. We forecast United’s ROICs approaching its cost of capital in our midcycle forecast.

What's more, the industry was pummeled by severe macroeconomic shocks over the last two decades: Sept. 11, 2001, two global pandemics (SARS and covid-19), and the global financial crisis. Airlines experienced drastic and systemic disruptions to their operations, staffing, and financial viability, resulting in much higher leverage and many bankruptcies. Similar shocks are likely to recur at any time, which no airline can defend itself from, leaving investors persistently at risk of permanent capital loss.

Although the amount of fuel needed to power every flight is known to the gallon by weight at takeoff, the price the airline will pay for it can vary widely over a week, seasonally, and regionally. Most important about fuel prices is that each airline experiences them in more or less the same way: they are a commodity. Most of the time, airlines can pass this cost on to customers by charging more per mile when fuel prices are high. Over the long term, airline CPI, a component of consumer CPI, has been remarkably stable (notwithstanding bumps since 2022 that reflected transitory spikes in fuel prices), implying that aggregate airline fares operate similarly to a commodity, as well.

Major US carriers have partnered with a credit card issuing bank to promote loyalty programs that feature their frequent flyer points. For some, these programs, in which the bank pays the airline more for the points up front than they are technically worth to redeem, represent the lion's share of ongoing operating profit. We do not see these programs as changing the competitive dynamics or structural profitability of the airline. Rather, the airlines have time-shifted when they experience any profit from serving a loyal segment of customers, in many cases redeeming points for perks such as premium seating and lounge access that add incremental cost to provide and maintain.

Through persistent price competition, basic advertised airfares now only include transportation for a passenger (and a small personal item) in an unassigned seat. Labor and other cost inflation have narrowed the historical gap in structural unit costs between discount and full-service carriers. Instead, by charging higher fares to include baggage allowance, seat assignments, and a widening array of other perks, and by exchanging them for collected loyalty points, airlines have tried to establish switching costs among certain segments of their customers. For us to reconsider our moat rating, United’s premium customer segments would have to represent a large enough, loyal enough, and profitable enough portion of revenue to deliver economic profits over an entire cycle. However, we believe that industry fundamentals and price competition will still outweigh segmentation through the next downturn.

The most-costly competition airlines engage in is for aircraft. Every other decade or so, Boeing and Airbus offer new models powered by new engines that can fly farther, carry more passengers, and consume less fuel. We observe a steady increase in available seat miles (ASMs) flown per gallon of fuel consumed across all airlines, as they consistently upgrade their fleets. Delta, United, and American were able to fly an average airplane seat about 60 miles on a gallon of fuel in 2012 and approached 70 in 2023. They fly hub-and-spoke routes with regional and wide-body jets that burn more fuel per seat mile than narrow-body jets. Southwest went from 70 ASMs per gallon a decade ago to over 80 in 2023, its mileage advantage versus the Big Three because it flies only variants of the narrow-body 737 on point-to-point routes. The mileage trend reflects improvements in engine efficiency, wing design, and fuselage materials, and it represents a competitive ratchet that no airline can afford to ignore: multiplied over many hundreds of millions of ASMs per year, even a small difference in fleet efficiency would represent a structural disadvantage for an airline competing on similar routes. Thus, airlines constantly refresh their fleet to stay competitive (new seats, bigger luggage trays, and the like are a side benefit of new planes that also may augment an airline's brand perception for a short time).

Airlines provide invaluable service to their customers and communities, often stimulating the economies of those destinations they connect to the global travel network. However, investors in airlines are literally flying on a wing and a prayer, as we see no prospect for durable economic profit in this industry. Instead, we observe that the duopoly airframe suppliers Airbus and Boeing and the oligopoly engine manufacturers GE, Safran, Pratt & Whitney, MTU, and Rolls-Royce reap the economic reward from providing successively more efficient, powerful aircraft that airlines line up to buy or rent so their service and cost profile can keep up with competing carriers.

Bull case

The United Next strategy is boosting capacity per plane and drive stronger profitability with more efficient planes.

Demand for air travel recovered more rapidly from the covid-19 pandemic than the industry's ability to expand capacity to meet it.

Due to United's many long-haul international routes, it gets more mileage than peers from an average flight.

Bear case

Like other global airlines, United is persistently exposed to costly disruptions from weather, geopolitical strife, commodity prices, and other hard-to-predict phenomena.

Competition from low-cost airlines and full-service peers put a limit on United's ability to pocket higher fares in most of its cabins.

Business travel recoveries tend to lag economic recoveries, and United has high and evolving business travel exposure.

By Nicolas Owens

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:42 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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