Skip to content

CoStar

US · CSGP #1375 by market cap Listed 1970
29.61 +0.91 +3.17%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 19:56

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 1.56 Cheap vs history 5th percentile
5-year average 4.01 · #29 of 47 in Real Estate Services
P/E ratio 72.00 Cheap vs history 2nd percentile
5-year average 280.53 · forward 35.69 · #21 of 21 in Real Estate Services
P/S ratio 3.39 Cheap vs history 3rd percentile
5-year average 11.71 · forward 3.04 · #40 of 51 in Real Estate Services

Vs. peers Real Estate Services

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
CoStar (CSGP) 11.91B 68.86 1.49 0.00%
CBRE Group (CBRE) 36.52B 27.13 4.21 0.00%
KE Holdings (BEKE) 20.36B 21.59 2.03 1.58%
Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) 15.77B 14.98 2.06 0.00%
Compass (COMP) 7.39B 64.27 2.36 0.00%
Firstservice (FSV) 6.36B 46.52 6.79 0.78%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★★★★☆ Fair value50.00 Economic moatNarrow UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 68.9% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

CoStar Group reported decent third-quarter results, as adjusted earnings per share and adjusted EBITDA of $0.18 and $229 million, respectively, exceeded our estimates, yet disheartening net new booking results were the focal point, sending shares down by a mid-single-digit percentage after hours.

Why it matters: Despite 62 consecutive quarters of double-digit growth, the firm underperformed our quarterly revenue estimates, driven mainly by Apartments.com, and, more importantly, firmwide net new bookings fell to $37 million, the lowest quarterly result since 2020, highlighting the firm’s recent salesforce mismanagement. Part of the slowdown in Apartments.com growth is attributable to weakness in the multifamily residential industry, as vacancy rates spiked to 8%, married with 1% nominal rent growth (negative after adjusting for inflation), which led to 43% of properties offering concessions in September, the highest CoStar has observed, pushing property owners to cut costs. While attempting to rapidly scale Homes.com in 2024-25, the firm redirected part of the salesforce from other business lines to it, resulting in too lean a team to both service accounts and prospect new contracts, causing monthly renewal rates to dip 20 basis points to 98.4% and paid properties to sequentially decline 2%.

The bottom line: After digesting results, we’re lowering our fair value estimate for narrow-moat CoStar Group to $50 from $53 after reducing our near-term revenue forecasts, chiefly for Apartments.com. We believe shares are quite attractive at the current valuation. Slightly offsetting the lower revenue estimates, our revised forecasts now reflect better expense control after management announced it identified about $200 million in cost-efficiency opportunities across procurement, technology, and infrastructure over the next 12-18 months, along with a $150 million expense-reduction initiative for 2026.

Opining on our thoughts regarding Apartments.com and the broader salesforce strategy, we were quite pleased to hear that management is planning to increase the Apartments.com salesforce, and not only because that is implicitly captured in the cost-savings goals outlined. The salesforce is smaller than it was last year, and it has only grown 21% since the first quarter of 2023, despite revenue growing 53% over that time period. To put this lack of prioritization in perspective, the firm had 570 sales reps for Homes.com at the end of first-quarter 2026, compared with only 520 for Apartments.com, even though Homes.com accounts for less than 3% of firmwide revenue, while Apartments.com accounts for roughly 35%.

We continue to believe that Apartments.com enjoys durable competitive advantages, in the form of network effects, underpinned by the highest web traffic and conversion rates in the industry, and a reprioritization of this business helps to solidify our long-term thesis and forecasts, even if near-term results come in a bit weaker than we initially pegged. Supporting the value proposition that the platform presents is continued customer engagement, as unique visitors to the site increased 10% year over year, tour requests increased 57%, and applications more than doubled, while its closest competitor in the residential industry, we remain confident that Apartments.com, equipped with the necessary sales force, will once again reaccelerate its growth trajectory as advertising budgets for property managers normalize. Zillow has simply struggled to keep up. As cyclical and macroeconomic pressures abate on the multifam

A key part of our long-term thesis has been the reduction of net investment in Homes.com after management continually pushed back goals and timelines from 2022 to 2025. In response to an analyst question on the earnings call, management disclosed that the firm is on pace to exceed its goal in reducing adjusted EBITDA losses by over $300 million from last year, which was a particular bright spot in the results. We continue to believe the market is ignoring the strength of its core business lines, lacking faith in the management team to actually wind down its investment in the single-family residential segment, with continued execution toward reaching its mid-term goal of breakeven profitability for Homes.com likely to attract new investor attention and shift the narrative overhang on the stock.

Fair value

We are lowering our fair value estimate for CoStar Group to $50 from $53, which translates to a price/earnings ratio of 34.8 times, 27.6 times, and 21.1 times our adjusted earnings per share forecasts for 2026, 2027, and 2028, respectively.

For the CoStar business, which combines the CoStar Suite and the businesses that comprised the legacy information services segment, we forecast 8.5% annualized growth over the cycle, supported by mid-single-digit price increases and modest subscriber growth.

For the LoopNet business, the core CRE marketplace, we forecast compounded revenue growth of 11.0%, driven by continued subscriber growth as the firm increases its international CRE presence, modest price escalation, and improved mix shift as existing users pay for higher-tier subscription packages.

For the residential real estate segment, comprised most notably of Apartments.com and Homes.com, we forecast revenue growth of 11.3% over the cycle, driven by rapid scaling of the Homes.com platform as it increases penetration from its current subscriber base of 35,000 subscribers among its total addressable market of 500,000 agents. For Apartments.com, we forecast 9.3% annualized growth over the next decade, driven by modest price escalation and upselling to existing clients, while maintaining a 99% retention rate, plus mid-single-digit customer growth as the firm increases penetration among complexes with under 200 units.

Given the strong incremental margins associated with running digital marketplaces, and to a lesser extent, the commercial real estate data business, we believe that sustained revenue growth in these segments, in combination with modest profitability in the single-family residential real estate, should fuel considerable margin expansion, with midcycle operating and adjusted EBITDA margins of 31.5% and 36.9%, respectively.

Economic moat

We believe CoStar Group has carved out a narrow Morningstar Economic Moat, anchored in an intangible asset data advantage across commercial real estate, or CRE, and network effects spanning its CRE and multifamily marketplaces. Average adjusted returns on invested capital have been 10.3% over the trailing decade, exceeding our 8.3% cost-of-capital estimate, which corroborates our view, though acquisition-related goodwill drag and exuberant spending scaling the Homes.com single-family business have materially dampened returns. We forecast similar average returns over the next decade of 10.2%, indicating a marked improvement from currently depressed levels as spending moderates and recent integrations mature. We remain skeptical, however, that capturing a critical share of Zillow’s single-family dominance would ultimately be worth more to the franchise than simply reinvesting further in the core CRE and multifamily businesses, which we view as the primary earnings drivers for the foreseeable future. The residential segment splits along similar lines: the multifamily rental marketplace has built its own network-effects moat, while the single-family business faces an entrenched incumbent and has yet to demonstrate one.

The CRE research platform and LoopNet marketplace combine to contribute 88% of CRE segment revenue. With 99% of the top 100 CRE brokerages subscribing, the flagship CoStar Suite draws on 2.4 trillion data points across more than 8.5 million properties, a depth and breadth no competitor replicates. The resulting pricing power is demonstrated by annualized price increases of 5.6% since 2015, roughly 230 basis points above inflation, and no single customer exceeds 2% of consolidated revenue, limiting concession risk on future pricing. Only 25% of the dataset is in the public domain, and restrictive, litigated terms of service make the remainder difficult to replicate, even for well-funded entrants using AI systems to scrape data. The firm employs over 1,500 researchers who call and email brokers, physically inspect properties, and review court filings and tax records to continually widen its data lead, and renewal rates of 92% reflect the resulting stickiness. The platform also benefits from network effects, as more contributors improve data quality and attract more users, reinforced by the CoStar Power Broker Awards incentivizing brokers to submit full deal flow. LoopNet, the largest CRE marketplace with 83 times the unique visitors of the average competitor and six times its closest rival, captures over 90% of CRE transaction volume through a visibility-gated subscription model, growing revenue 9.4% annualized since 2020. LoopNet further insulates the research platform from its largest competitive threat, lets CoStar price that research platform more aggressively than it otherwise could, and creates a large upsell base for CoStar Suite, reinforcing why we see the segment's synergies as greater than the sum of its parts.

The multifamily marketplace, apartments.com, leads the online rental category with $1.06 billion in 2024 revenue and 43 million unique monthly visitors, roughly 2.3 times the revenue and 1.4 times the visitors of closest competitor Zillow Rentals. The platform is built almost entirely on institutional property owners, evidenced by just 1% revenue penetration among the smaller-unit properties that comprise two-thirds of the addressable market. Since 2015, the business has grown revenue, unique visitors, and customers annually by 20.8%, 26.8%, and 15.3%, respectively, while lifting average revenue per customer 60% over the trailing decade through up-selling and price increases against a largely fixed cost base. We believe this flywheel is difficult for competitors to unwind, even if they mimic the subscription-tier monetization model that CoStar pioneered in the space, as institutional owners are largely entrenched, evidenced by monthly renewal rates of 99%.

The single-family residential business, Homes.com, is the primary drag on the consolidated return profile and the reason we stop short of a wide-moat rating. The appeal is real, as a 65.3% US homeownership rate implies nearly double the addressable owners as renters, but unlike CRE and multifamily where property owners choose their marketplace, residential listing data flows through a cooperative multiple listing service that every broker must feed, denying Homes.com, Zillow, or Redfin any exclusive-inventory advantage. Zillow still commands roughly double the unique visitors of the next-largest player after two decades of network-building and remains only marginally profitable, underscoring how difficult it is to monetize a wide lead in this vertical. We are encouraged that CoStar decided to cut net investment in Homes.com by $300 million, or 35.2%, in 2026, but management does not forecast the business turning EBITDA-positive until 2030. Despite the size of the hypothetical market, we maintain the ceiling for single-family marketplace profitability is structurally lower than in other developed markets, capped by both MLS-driven limits on listing pricing power and the finite pool of real estate agent commissions, even if Homes.com eventually gains share.

Taken together, we view CoStar Group as a narrow-moat franchise: durable intangible-asset and network-effect advantages in CRE and multifamily are enough to clear our cost-of-capital bar, but continued capital destruction in single-family residential creates enough uncertainty that we stop short of a wide moat. We see a credible path for the firm to materially exceed its cost of capital over the next two decades, particularly if Homes.com spending discipline holds, but a narrow moat remains the more appropriate rating given the current state of that business.

Bull case

Expanding the Apartments.com network to smaller property owners, a largely untapped market for the firm that represents roughly two-thirds of the total addressable market, could provide tremendous upside.

Incorporation of AI and automated data-fees in the CRE research business could enable the firm to operate with significantly lower headcount than we forecast, lifting operating margins.

By owning a superior repository of verified data, the firm could improve monetization by training and rolling out AI products and solutions specific to CRE that exhibit lower data hallucination.

Bear case

Large-scale data sharing arrangements between CRE brokers, lenders, and/or upstart data providers could disrupt the core CRE business.

The firm could continue a relentless push into single-family residential real estate without meaningful progress, weighing down margins and risking a proxy fight.

The firm’s dominance within the CRE landscape could invite regulatory attention that threatens its pricing power.

By Austin Taggart, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 19:56:03 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

CoStar discussion 0 comments

Add a comment