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Kinross Gold

US · KGC #707 by market cap Listed 1970
17.32 -0.93 -5.10%
Periodic snapshot; not a real-time feed. · 2026-11-20 20:02

Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range

P/B ratio 2.05 In line with history 65th percentile
5-year average 1.98 · #30 of 54 in Gold
P/E ratio 6.56 Cheap vs history 21st percentile
5-year average 32.54 · forward 6.71 · #11 of 35 in Gold
P/S ratio 2.42 In line with history 55th percentile
5-year average 2.64 · forward 2.31 · #17 of 42 in Gold

Vs. peers Gold

Company Market cap P/E (TTM) P/B Div yield
Kinross Gold (KGC) 20.40B 6.56 2.05 0.89%
Newmont (NEM) 98.39B 10.98 2.76 1.09%
Agnico Eagle (AEM) 76.49B 12.33 2.58 1.16%
Barrick Mining (B) 51.91B 8.07 1.88 3.00%
Wheaton Precious Metals (WPM) 49.92B 23.88 4.98 0.68%
Franco-Nevada (FNV) 43.06B 27.22 4.89 0.76%

Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.

Morningstar

★☆☆☆☆ Fair value10.00 Economic moatNone UncertaintyHigh Capital allocationStandard

Trading 42.3% above Morningstar's fair value estimate.

Analyst note

Kinross' third quarter benefited from a higher gold price than a year ago, which more than offset reduced sales volumes and higher unit costs. Adjusted NPAT of USD 591 million—USD 0.50 per share—is up 12%. It declared a USD 4 cents per share quarterly base dividend in line with its policy, up 14%.

Why it matters: Shares closed trading down 6% on Oct. 29, the result tracking below our full-year expectations. We reduced forecast 2026 and 2027 EPS by 4% after management lowered gold equivalent ounce, or GEO, sales guidance over this period. 2026 cost guidance was also raised, and we think unit costs will also be higher in 2027 than we previously estimated. But these changes are more than offset by increases to our assumed margins and earnings beyond 2027, driven by reductions in forecast unit costs, a lower tax rate than previously assumed, and the time value of money.

The bottom line: We raise our fair value estimate by 8% to USD 10 per share for no-moat Kinross, with shares trading around double our intrinsic assessment. This is likely driven by the market projecting spot gold of about USD 4,000 per ounce into perpetuity. This price is also double our assumed midcycle price of around USD 2,050 based on our estimate of the long-run marginal cost of production.

Bulls say: We are in a new paradigm and the gold price will be higher for longer rather than returning to being driven by the fundamentals of supply and demand. Our bull-case fair value estimate is USD 15. In this scenario, we assume gold averages about USD 5,400 from 2026 through 2029 before reverting to around USD 2,500 midcycle in 2030, 20% above our base-case assumptions.

Key stats: It has spent around USD 810 million repurchasing about 29 million shares for an average cost of USD 28.42 so far in 2026. This is materially above its current share price of USD 21.60, let alone our fair value, and illustrates why we think higher dividends are preferable to procyclical buybacks.

The strong gold bull market and rising earnings in recent years mean its balance sheet is strong, with net cash of USD 1.9 billion at the end of September 2026.

Reduced GEO guidance is driven by production issues encountered at its La Coipa mine in Chile and Round Mountain in Nevada during the third quarter. Along with planned maintenance and lower grades at Fort Knox, and some sales slipping into the fourth quarter, attributable third-quarter GEO sales of 410,000 ounces fell 19% on the same quarter of 2025.

We now expect attributable sales of about 1.85 million GEO in 2026 and 2027, down from around 2 million and in line with updated guidance, but still expect about 2 million on average from 2028 through 2030. Production at La Coipa and Round Mountain is likely to be higher from 2027, while we expect first production from its Curlew development in 2028 and initial gold from Great Bear in 2029.

Fair value

We raise our fair value estimate to USD 10.00 per share, from USD 9.30. We reduce forecast 2026 and 2027 EPS by 4% after management lowered gold equivalent ounce, or GEO, sales guidance over this period. 2026 cost guidance was also raised, and we think unit costs will also be higher in 2027 than we previously estimated. But these changes are more than offset by increases to our assumed margins and earnings beyond 2027, driven by reductions in forecast unit costs, a lower tax rate than previously assumed, and the time value of money.

We assume gold averages around USD 4,500 per ounce from 2026 to 2029 based on the futures curve. Our assumed midcycle price is about USD 2,050 per ounce from 2030. This is based on our estimate of the long-run marginal cost of production.

We also assume silver averages about USD 62 per ounce from 2027 based on spot, reverting to around USD 37 per ounce midcycle from 2030, 1/55th of our assumed midcycle gold price.

Cash flow is discounted at an 8.8% weighted average cost of capital, based on a long-term capital structure comprising 25% debt and 75% equity. We assume a 10.6% long-term cost of equity, reflecting gold's lack of systematic risk and correlation to GDP. The company’s higher exposure to sovereign risk also means we think shareholders require additional return commensurate with these risks. We apply a 5.4% pretax cost of debt, reflecting what we expect Kinross’ long-term cost of debt will be in a normalized interest rate environment.

Economic moat

As a commodity producer, Kinross is a price taker and needs low-cost mines with long lives and a low installed capital base to support the longer-term excess returns needed to justify an economic moat.

We assign a no-moat rating to Kinross as its modestly below-industry-average production costs weigh on its ability to generate returns in excess of its cost of capital. Its all-in sustaining costs (including byproduct credits) in 2025 of roughly USD 1,540 per ounce place it in the second quartile of the gold AISC curve, around the 45th percentile. Due to the flatness of the industry cost curve, only miners in the lowest quartile tend to enjoy a material operating cost advantage. And that would need to be paired with an efficiently invested capital base and long reserve life to warrant a moat. Kinross’ total production costs are not low enough to justify a moat, and so we don’t think the company exhibits a low-cost advantage.

We also think the firm's history of disappointing acquisitions and an overinflated invested capital base also makes it difficult to assign the company an economic moat, though we acknowledge its investment decision discipline has improved in recent years. Kinross’ adjusted return on invested capital is below its weighted average cost of capital. We have included around USD 5 billion in asset and intangibles write-downs on the basis that the impairments relate to assets developed or acquired in the ordinary course of business, and so should be included when calculating ROIC, as they are a normal part of doing business as a gold miner.

The company averaged ROIC in the 10 years ended Dec. 31, 2025, of about 5%, while ROIC averaged 8% in the five years ended Dec. 31, 2025, albeit inflated by ROIC of 21% in 2025 due to the incredible gold bull market. However, we think elevated gold prices are temporary. We estimate that Kinross will generate a ROIC in the low single digits midcycle in 2030, below its WACC of about 9%. Forecast below-WACC returns support our qualitative no-moat assessment.

In terms of commodity prices used for our forecasts, our assumed midcycle gold price is about USD 2,050 per ounce from 2030 based on our estimate of the marginal cost of production. We also assume silver prices of about USD 37 per ounce midcycle from 2030, being 1/55th of our assumed midcycle gold price.

Bull case

Tasiast and Paracatu, Kinross' two largest operations by production, sit in the lower half of the industry cost curve.

The Great Bear project in Canada is a potential long-life, low-cost mine that we think is likely to be developed, increasing its exposure to low sovereign risk locales.

Gold companies tend not to follow general economic cycles. They can also provide a hedge to inflation risk.

Bear case

Kinross sits broadly in the middle of the gold cost curve, making it more leveraged to movements in gold prices compared with its lower-cost competitors.

More than half of Kinross’ operations are in higher-sovereign-risk locales, including Brazil and Mauritania.

Gold is subject to the whims of investors, who can move as a herd and affect the gold price.

By Jon Mills, CFA

Quote time 2026-11-20 20:02:38 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.

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