Nokia Oyj
✦ Quant Fair Value how this is computed
- Implied fair-value range of 0.44-6.81, from this stock's own trailing 5-year average P/E applied to trailing EPS.
- Current price is +89.8% above the average-multiple fair value of 3.63.
Valuation each multiple against its own 5-year range
Vs. peers Communication Equipment
| Company | Market cap | P/E (TTM)i | P/Bi | Div yieldi |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nokia Oyj (NOK) | 38.93B | 44.68 | 1.67 | 2.31% |
| Cisco (CSCO) | 357.34B | 24.17 | 6.92 | 1.84% |
| Motorola Solutions (MSI) | 86.01B | 41.85 | 28.03 | 0.93% |
| Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) | 54.31B | 21.09 | 2.05 | 1.36% |
| Lumentum (LITE) | 41.77B | -5.15 | 9.13 | 0.00% |
| Ubiquiti (UI) | 35.72B | 33.35 | 21.21 | 0.58% |
Other StockVane-tracked companies in the same industry.
Morningstar
Trading 22.1% below Morningstar's fair value estimate.
Analyst note
Nokia's third-quarter revenue rose 10% to EUR 5.15 billion as AI and cloud sales surged 123%, with EUR 1.5 billion in new orders. Adjusted operating profit jumped 35% to EUR 605 million. Management maintained its full-year profit outlook but now expects results above the EUR 2.4 billion midpoint.
Why it matters: Nokia's efforts to court further hyperscaler customers are evident in revenue growth and margin expansion. Improved execution and margin expansion despite rising restructuring costs bode well, but we're cautious about the magnitude of earnings power beyond 2027. Networking infrastructure, and specifically optical and IP networking, remains the growth engine for Nokia, with the firm winning key hyperscaler business. Systems remain supply constrained and production starting at the firm's San Jose indium phosphide fab should help convert underserved demand. The core telecom business remains stable, with a surprise 11% growth in radio network sales. We think strong performance in Japan and India reflects broader network improvement plans that also benefited Ericsson, rather than share gains, which we'd view as more durable.
The bottom line: After adjusting our model for stronger fourth-quarter operating profit, we raise our fair value estimate to EUR 7.50 per share from EUR 7.30 for no-moat Nokia. We now view shares as fairly valued and would prefer a wider margin of safety for new investors, given our High Morningstar Uncertainty Rating. We think Nokia's valuation has become more reasonable after the broader artificial intelligence complex selloff. We believe AI-related fears have adjusted expectations that were too high, but we don't see a structural demand problem for Nokia's optical products.
Coming up: T-Mobile completed the first call on a commercial network using NVIDIA's AI-RAN hardware and Nokia's anyRAN software. While wireless network providers may adopt this technology en masse, we think NVIDIA captures most of the financial benefit, not Nokia.
Fair value
Our fair value estimate of $8.40 per share reflects an exchange rate of USD 1.12/EUR, implying price/earnings and enterprise value/EBITDA multiples of 34 and 11, respectively, based on our 2027 estimates.
We forecast revenue to average 4%-5% between 2027 and 2031, with slower growth beyond 2031 as demand from the data center buildout becomes lumpier. In mobile networks, Nokia remains a leader in global radio access network, or RAN, equipment, but we believe conservative capital spending by major carriers worldwide will limit growth. While still in early development, products compliant with 6G standards are likely to be commercially available beginning in 2030, giving the mobile infrastructure segment some additional demand beyond 2030. Technological challenges, such as ORAN, are likely to cap Nokia's potential growth opportunities from 6G relative to 5G.
We expect the networking infrastructure segment to grow nicely and roughly match the mobile infrastructure segment in revenue by 2029. Still, mobile networks should be more profitable, given the presence of the software business.
We believe firm profitability will improve as an optical networking mix shift and cost savings drive incremental margin expansion. Commoditization of networking equipment is likely to reduce Nokia's pricing power, but a shift toward software and service offerings is likely to more than offset any margin compression in equipment sales.
We believe there is some room to reduce R&D as a percentage of sales, given significant increases in optical networking revenue, but we still expect R&D expenses to grow in absolute terms. Overall, we expect the operating margin to expand from an artificially low 3.7% in 2025 to 15.6% in 2035.
We assign Nokia a 8.1% cost of capital, assuming an 8.7% cost of equity, a 4.2% cost of debt, and a favorable inflationary adjustment of 0.2%.
Economic moat
We assign Nokia a Morningstar Economic Moat Rating of none. While Nokia has some characteristics of an economic moat, structural challenges in the telecommunications equipment industry prevent these advantages from translating into long-term, persistent economic profits.
Nokia's strongest claim to a competitive advantage comes from intangible assets. Nokia spends more than EUR 4 billion annually on research and development, generating intellectual property in the form of patents. Nokia currently holds over 268,000 patents across 20,000 patent families, with over 8,000 deemed essential to 5G wireless standards. Despite investing over 20% of sales in R&D, Nokia is unlikely to derive a competitive advantage from its intellectual property. Wireless standards change constantly, and dominance in one standard or generation offers little guarantee of future success.
Historically, the segment with the best case for a moat was Nokia Technologies, which has now been combined with Mobile Infrastructure. Nokia Technologies, which licenses patents to smartphone vendors, automotive companies, and consumer electronics firms, has generated between EUR 1.1 billion and EUR 1.5 billion in revenue in recent years, with very high operating margins (71% in 2025). However, this patent licensing business is only a small fraction of Nokia's total revenue. Also, we believe that the majority of the patents Nokia licenses result from R&D in the networking and mobile infrastructure segments, where maintaining intangible assets requires substantial, continuous reinvestment to avoid obsolescence.
In addition to intellectual property, Nokia and Ericsson benefit from favorable regulations. Western-aligned countries have banned the purchase and deployment of equipment from Chinese networking competitors, specifically Huawei and ZTE. This leaves the North American and European markets primarily serviced by Nokia, Ericsson, and Samsung in radio-access networks, or RAN, and additionally by Cisco and Juniper Networks in physical networks and routing.
While Nokia and Ericsson both benefit from this favorable regulation, Western markets remain highly competitive, with network vendors regularly undercutting each other on price. Wireless carriers are cost-conscious, and we don’t believe wireless equipment vendors produce meaningfully differentiated equipment, which encourages carriers to pursue the best coverage at the lowest cost. Additionally, in most countries, wireless carriers are oligopsonies, with their bargaining power exceeding that of the networking equipment providers. With a highly concentrated telecom customer base relentlessly pushing for greater interoperability among equipment and software manufacturers, profitability in wireless networking markets has been weak.
Nokia’s optical networking offering, bolstered by the acquisition of Infinera, holds the highest probability of generating a moat for the firm. Increasing data center demand has led to a customer mix that extends beyond telecom providers to include hyperscalers and neocloud providers. This results in better margins than the mobile infrastructure business. Chinese competitors are also banned from supplying optical equipment in Western markets, resulting in a duopoly between Ciena and Nokia in many of those markets.
We see two hang-ups that prevent the optical networking business from generating a companywide moat. Nokia and Infinera have consistently trailed Ciena when releasing new generations of capacity standards, often by a year or more. This results in Nokia having difficulty displacing Ciena among the most profitable customers who have deeply embedded Ciena products in their network flows. Additionally, Cisco has made slow but concerted efforts to break into the optical networking space and will likely take some share in a few capacity generations. Secondly, the research and development expenses required for the firm, including mobile infrastructure, are so significant that they suppress the firmwide returns on invested capital.
The other potential moat source for Nokia is switching costs. In industrial technology and telecom equipment, switching costs are naturally high due to the risk of downtime, the high cost of failure, and the complex retraining and integration required to swap core network infrastructure and software. Historically, if a customer like AT&T wanted to switch from Nokia to Ericsson equipment and software, it would have to remove all Nokia equipment and replace it (or a major portion of it) with Ericsson equipment and software, incurring retraining costs for the software implementation and potentially resulting in network outages.
While switching costs exist, they are clearly not insurmountable. Major communication service providers are willing to endure the friction of switching vendors if the financial or technological value proposition is strong enough. For example, Nokia lost out on new contracts when Verizon elected to equip a portion of its 5G network with Samsung in 2020. AT&T ousted Nokia in favor of Ericsson in 2023. Furthermore, the industry is actively shifting toward the open radio access network, or ORAN, architecture and cloud-native software. ORAN is specifically designed to disaggregate hardware and software, effectively lowering switching costs and allowing operators to mix and match vendors.
Bull case
Nokia’s acquisition of Infinera makes it a strong player in data center interconnect networking, which is experiencing extraordinary growth.
Wireless technology built for wireless carriers is now being sold to private enterprises, widening Nokia’s customer mix and increasing returns on R&D investment.
Mobile network R&D should produce a steady stream of new patents, which will be monetized through licensing to third parties.
Bear case
Nokia’s customer base is concentrated among large, capex-wary telecom providers, who hold dominant negotiating leverage.
Technologies such as open-RAN are commoditizing mobile hardware and minimizing any pricing power that vendors may have.
Growth in optical networking is predicated on the success of AI and the data center buildout, which is uncertain.
By Martin Szumski
Quote time 2026-11-20 19:59:59 · For reference only, not investment advice and not tailored to your situation.
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